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Abstract	  
Zambia	  is	  a	  country	  whose	  food	  security	  largely	  depends	  on	  maize.	  In	  the	  light	  of	  expected	  
structural	  maize	  deficits	  and	  the	  likely	  occurrence	  of	  shock	  events,	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  
to	  test	  the	  resilience	  of	  the	  Zambian	  maize	  value	  chain	  towards	  production	  shocks	  in	  terms	  
of	   food	   supply	   security,	   and	   to	   find	   policy	   recommendations	   on	   how	   to	   increase	   this	  
resilience.	   To	   that	   end,	   I	   devised	   and	   applied	   a	   new	   framework	   for	  measuring	   resilience	  
properties	   using	   System	   Dynamics,	   which	   relies	   on	   comparing	   the	   development	   of	   food	  
security	   indicators	   between	   the	   base	   run	   and	   the	   respective	   shock	   scenario	   run	   of	   a	  
simulation	  model.	  Results	  show	  that	   the	  value	  chain	   is	  quite	  resilient	   towards	   floods	  and	  
exchange	   rate	   shocks,	   moderately	   vulnerable	   towards	   changes	   in	   fertilizer	   subsidy	  
programmes,	  and	  very	  vulnerable	  towards	  droughts,	  especially	  prolonged	  ones.	  In	  general,	  
the	  resilience	  of	   the	  value	  chain	   towards	  one-­‐time	  shocks	   is	  good	  due	   to	   the	  existence	  of	  
maize	  buffer	  stocks	  that	  people	  can	  consume	  when	  production	  is	  low.	  However,	  the	  value	  
chain	  is	  not	  very	  resilient	   if	   faced	  with	  two	  or	  more	  different	  shocks,	  as	  buffer	  stocks	  are	  
quickly	  depleted	  and	  maize	  demand	  cannot	  be	  serviced	  any	  more.	  The	  resilience	  properties	  
are	   also	   strongly	   affected	  by	  demand	  adjustments	  of	   consumers	   in	   response	   to	   changing	  
maize	   availability,	   and	   moderately	   affected	   by	   the	   distribution	   of	   maize	   in	   between	   the	  
informal	  and	   formal	  value	  chain	  and	   the	  storage	  policies	  of	  FRA.	  The	  observed	  resilience	  
properties	   can	   endogenously	   be	   improved	   using	   smart	   long-­‐term	  maize	   storage	   policies	  
that	  exploit	  surplus	  production	  years.	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1.1	  Problem	  Description	  
Zambia	   is	   a	   society	   built	   on	   maize.	   Since	   the	   colonial	   period,	   a	   large	   part	   of	   the	  
government’s	   legitimacy	   has	   depended	   on	   its	   ability	   to	   fulfil	   the	   implicit	   social	   contract	  
with	  its	  constituency	  that	  requires	  it	  to	  ensure	  a	  sufficient	  maize	  supply	  for	  the	  population	  
(Jayne	  &	  Jones,	  1997).	  And	  the	  importance	  of	  maize	  has	  not	  waned	  over	  the	  last	  decades:	  
even	   today,	   maize	   still	   accounts	   for	   over	   50%	   of	   the	   calories	   consumed	   by	   an	   average	  
Zambian	  citizen	  (FAO,	  2015b),	  whereby	  especially	  the	  poorest	  strata	  of	  society	  depend	  on	  
maize	  over-­‐proportionally	  (Nicole	  Mason	  &	  Jayne,	  2009).	  This	  might	  not	  be	  a	  problem	  per	  
say	  would	  Zambians	  live	  in	  a	  state	  of	  food	  security	  –	  but	  unfortunately,	  the	  opposite	  is	  true.	  
FAO's	   (2014b)	   food	   security	   indicators	   show	   that	   Zambia	   has	   only	   been	   able	   to	   supply	  
around	  90%	  of	   the	  calories	   its	  citizens	  need	   to	   live	  a	  healthy	  and	  active	   life	  over	   the	   last	  
years;	  and	  Gerber	  (2015)	  expects	  a	  structural	  maize	  deficit	  to	  emerge	  in	  Zambia	  in	  the	  near	  
future.	  On	   top	   of	   this	   generally	   tense	   situation,	  weak	  political	   and	   economic	   institutions,	  
bad	   infrastructure,	   heavy	   reliance	   on	   one	  main	   staple	   food	   crop	   and	   high	   exposition	   to	  
sudden	   and	   strong	   changes	   in	   its	   climatic,	   political	   and	   economic	   environment	   leave	  
Zambia	  in	  in	  a	  position	  of	  high	  vulnerability	  on	  many	  levels	  (Bertelsmann	  Transformation	  
Index,	  2012;	  Stockholm	  Resilience	  Centre,	  2012;	  UNDP,	  2014).	  
Given	  the	  central	  role	  of	  maize	  in	  Zambia,	  the	  population’s	  access	  to	  maize	  can	  legitimately	  
be	   seen	   as	   a	   proxy	   for	   overall	   food	   security	   in	   Zambia.	  My	   thesis	  will	   thus	   explore	  what	  
happens	  to	  the	  maize	  supply	  in	  Zambia	  when	  it	  is	  faced	  with	  production	  shocks.	  I	  want	  to	  
find	   out	   how	   resilient	   the	  mechanisms	   that	   bring	   the	  maize	   “from	   farm	   to	   fork”,	   i.e.	   the	  
maize	   value	   chain,	   are	   towards	   production	   shocks	   –	   and	   what	   can	   be	   done	   within	   the	  
political	   and	   economic	   boundaries	   of	   Zambia	   to	   enhance	   those	   resilience	   properties.	   To	  
that	  end,	  I	  will	  devise	  a	  framework	  that	  enables	  the	  quantitative	  measurement	  of	  resilience	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with	  a	  System	  Dynamics	  (SD)	  simulation	  model.	  The	  completion	  of	  this	  case	  study	  will	  also	  
serve	  as	  a	  test	  of	  the	  usefulness	  and	  feasibility	  of	  my	  resilience	  framework.	  
1.2	  Research	  Questions	  and	  Objectives	  
To	   substantiate	   the	   goals	   for	   this	   thesis,	   I	  will	   break	   them	  down	   into	   research	  questions	  
and	  research	  objectives.	  My	  central	  research	  question	  is:	  
What	  are	  the	  resilience	  properties	  of	  the	  maize	  value	  chain	  in	  Zambia	  	  
towards	  production	  shocks	  in	  terms	  of	  ensuring	  sufficient	  maize	  supply,	  
and	  how	  can	  the	  resilience	  be	  improved	  endogenously?	  
“Sufficient”	   in	   this	   context	   means	   enough	   supply	   to	   meet	   the	   population’s	   demand	   for	  
maize,	  and	  thereby	  ensuring	  food	  security.	  	  
Resilience	   will	   be	   measured	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   integral	   between	   the	   base	   run	   and	   the	  
respective	   shock	   scenario	   runs	   for	   an	   indicator	   that	   I	   call	   the	   “Adjusted	   Dietary	   Energy	  
Supply	  with	  Maize”	  (ADESM).	  This	  parameter	  will	  serve	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  food	  security	  and	  is	  
based	  on	  a	   food	  security	   indicator	  by	  FAO	  (2014)	  called	   “Average	  Dietary	  Energy	  Supply	  
Adequacy”	   (ADESA),	   which	   measures	   the	   supply	   of	   maize	   in	   relation	   to	   demand.	   I	   will	  
discuss	  these	  indicators	  and	  their	  relation	  to	  food	  security	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  chapter	  2.	  	  
To	  be	  more	  concise	  about	  what	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  achieve	  in	  this	  thesis,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  split	  my	  
research	  question	  into	  a	  set	  of	  sub-­‐questions.	  These	  are:	  
1. What	  is	  the	  physical	  and	  economic	  structure	  of	  the	  maize	  value	  chain	  in	  Zambia?	  
2. According	  to	  which	  rules	  and	  decisions	  does	  the	  maize	  move	  through	  the	  value	  
chain?	  
3. What	  are	  the	  most	  relevant	  and	  likely	  production	  shocks	  that	  may	  hit	  the	  maize	  
value	  chain	  in	  Zambia	  and	  how	  can	  their	  effects	  be	  represented	  in	  the	  model?	  
4. How	  do	  these	  shocks	  affect	  the	  ADESM	  through	  the	  value	  chain,	  i.e.	  how	  resilient	  is	  
the	  value	  chain	  to	  production	  shocks	  in	  terms	  of	  maize	  supply	  security?	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5. What	  policies	  can	  endogenously,	  i.e.	  within	  the	  political,	  geographical	  and	  economic	  
boundaries	  of	  Zambia,	  improve	  the	  resilience	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  towards	  production	  
shocks?	  
	  
According	  to	  Saunders	  &	  Lewis	  (2012:	  chapter	  1),	  it	  helps	  to	  increase	  the	  clarity	  and	  focus	  
of	  a	  research	  project	  to	  translate	  the	  research	  questions	  into	  tangible	  research	  objectives.	  
For	  my	  thesis,	  these	  are:	  
1. To	  devise	  an	  operational	  framework	  for	  measuring	  resilience	  in	  a	  quantified	  SD	  
model	  
2. To	  define	  a	  clear	  and	  measurable	  indicator	  that	  serves	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  food	  security	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  maize	  supply	  in	  Zambia	  
3. To	  create	  a	  valid	  quantitative	  System	  Dynamics	  model	  of	  the	  maize	  value	  chain	  in	  
Zambia	  
4. To	  select	  the	  most	  relevant	  production	  shocks	  that	  may	  affect	  the	  maize	  value	  chain	  
in	  Zambia	  in	  terms	  of	  creating	  food	  supply	  insecurity,	  and	  find	  a	  way	  to	  represent	  
these	  shocks’	  effects	  in	  the	  model	  
5. To	  assess	  how	  resilient	  the	  maize	  value	  chain	  in	  Zambia	  is	  towards	  these	  shocks	  in	  
terms	  of	  my	  resilience	  framework	  
6. To	  devise	  policy	  recommendations	  that	  can	  endogenously,	  i.e.	  within	  the	  political,	  
geographical	  and	  economic	  boundaries	  of	  Zambia,	  improve	  the	  resilience	  of	  the	  
value	  chain	  towards	  production	  shocks	  
1.3	  Research	  Methodology	  
Having	  established	   the	  goals	  of	  my	  study	   in	   the	   form	  of	   research	  questions	  and	  research	  
objectives,	  I	  will	  explicate	  the	  way	  in	  which	  I	  intend	  to	  fulfil	  them	  in	  the	  following	  section.	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1.3.1	  Research	  Design	  
My	   research	   strategy	   is	   best	   characterized	   as	   a	   case	   study	   using	   quantitative	   System	  
Dynamics	  modelling.	   Saunders	  &	  Lewis	   (2012:	  p.116)	  define	  a	  case	   study	   as	  a	   “research	  
strategy,	  which	  involves	  the	  investigation	  of	  a	  particular	  contemporary	  topic	  within	  its	  real-­‐
life	  context,	  using	  multiple	  sources	  of	  evidence”.	  This	  describes	  exactly	  what	   I	  am	   trying	   to	  
accomplish:	  using	  a	  variety	  of	  sources	  to	  examine	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  particular	  case	  and	  
explain	  its	  behaviour.	  As	  such,	  I	  want	  to	  answer	  the	  questions	  “how”	  is	  the	  case	  structured	  
and	  “why”	  does	  it	  behave	  the	  way	  it	  does.	  The	  study	  will	  be	  longitudinal,	  as	  I	  am	  interested	  
in	  exploring	  how	  the	  resilience	  properties	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  develop	  over	  time	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  a	  shock	  or	  a	  series	  of	  consecutive	  shocks.	  
The	   case	   study	   is	   carried	   out	   using	   a	   quantitative	   System	   Dynamics	   modelling	   and	  
simulation	  approach.	  The	  great	  advantage	  of	  formal	  modelling	  with	  SD	  in	  terms	  of	  helping	  
to	  answer	  the	  research	  question	  is	  that	  it	  forces	  the	  modeller	  to	  thoroughly	  think	  through	  
every	   causal	   connection,	   creating	   a	   deep	   understanding	   and	   giving	   feedback	   in	   terms	   of	  
model	   behaviour	   when	   there	   are	   weak	   points	   in	   one’s	   dynamic	   hypothesis.	   Using	   a	  
simulation	  model	  furthermore	  enables	  me	  to	  quantitatively	  measure	  the	  impact	  of	  different	  
scenarios	  on	  my	  resilience	   indicators	  –	  a	  necessary	  prerequisite	   to	  answering	  my	  central	  
research	   question.	   Moreover,	   modelling	   with	   System	   Dynamics	   has	   proven	   to	   be	   a	   very	  
useful	  tool	  for	  analysing	  value	  chains	  in	  many	  instances	  (Angerhofer	  &	  Angelides,	  2000).	  
My	  thesis	  will	  thereby	  largely	  follow	  the	  well-­‐established	  framework	  for	  System	  Dynamics	  
modelling	  projects	  by	  Sterman	  (2000:	  chapter	  3),	  that	  proposes	  the	  following	  schema:	  
1	   Problem	  articulation	  
2	   Model	  conceptualization	  
3	   Formulation	  of	  simulation	  model	  
4	   Model	  testing	  and	  validation	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5	   Analysis	  and	  evaluation	  
6	   Policy	  design	  
Table	  1:	  System	  Dynamics	  modelling	  process	  template	  
Luna-­‐Reyes	   &	   Andersen	   (2003:	   p.	   275)	   show	   that	   similar	   frameworks	   have	   been	  
recommended	  and	  used	  by	  a	  several	  prominent	  System	  Dynamics	  practitioners.	  
My	   thesis	  will	   encompass	   exploratory,	  descriptive	   and	   explanatory	   elements	   (Saunders	  &	  
Lewis,	   2012:	   ch.	   5).	   The	  exploratory	  part	  will	   be	   to	   clarify	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  problem,	   i.e.	  
gathering	  information	  about	  the	  structure	  and	  behaviour	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  and	  finding	  out	  
which	   are	   likely	   and	   relevant	   shocks	   that	   may	   affect	   the	   value	   chain.	   This	   leads	   to	   the	  
descriptive	   part,	  which	   consists	   of	   describing	   the	   value	   chain,	   or	   to	   be	  more	   precise,	  my	  
dynamic	  hypothesis	  about	  how	  it	  is	  structured	  and	  behaves,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  quantified	  SD	  
model.	   Finally,	   in	   the	   explanatory	   part,	   I	   will	   use	   the	   simulation	   results	   to	   formulate	  
hypotheses	   about	   the	   structural	   causes	   of	   the	   resilience	   properties	   observed	   and	   derive	  
policy	  recommendations	  from	  that.	  
1.3.2	  Data	  Collection	  and	  Analysis	  
Since	  I	  did	  not	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  go	  to	  Zambia	  myself	  for	  first-­‐hand	  data	  collection,	  
my	  thesis	  is	  based	  on	  secondary	  data,	  academic	  literature	  and	  expert	  interviews.	  To	  sample	  
the	   secondary	   data	   and	   literature,	   I	   relied	   on	   purposive	   sampling	   (Saunders	   &	   Lewis,	  
2012,	  p.	  138-­‐139).	  Specifically,	  I	  tried	  to	  use	  critical	  and	  heterogeneous	  sampling	  in	  order	  
to	   base	  my	   research	   on	   secondary	   data	   and	   literature	   that	   is	   relevant	   and	   diverse:	   this	  
means	  that	  I	  built	  my	  model	  using	  a	  multitude	  of	  sources,	  especially	  in	  cases	  where	  single	  
sources	  seemed	  to	  be	  not	  that	  reliable.	  A	  good	  example	  for	  this	   is	  the	  time	  series	  data	  on	  
maize	  production,	  trade	  and	  sales	  in	  Zambia:	  I	  collected	  this	  data	  in	  a	  lengthy	  process	  from	  
a	   variety	   of	   different	   databases	   and	   research	   papers,	   cross-­‐checking	   if	   the	   numbers	   fit	  
together	   in	   a	   sensible	  way,	  discarding	  data	   that	  did	  not	   fit	   the	  other	   sources,	   looking	   for	  
new	  data	  etc.	  (cf.	  appendix	  C1).	  The	  application	  of	  such	  data	  triangulation	  was	  also	  a	  way	  to	  
increase	  the	  reliability	  of	  my	  research.	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For	  the	  quantitative	  data	  that	  I	  needed	  to	  build	  the	  model,	  I	  mainly	  relied	  on	  databases	  of	  
public	  institutions	  like	  the	  FAO,	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  Central	  Statistical	  Office	  of	  Zambia.	  
Furthermore,	   I	   used	   time	   series	   data	   from	   tables	   and	   appendices	   of	   various	   research	  
papers,	   most	   notably	   publications	   by	   the	   Indaba	   Agricultural	   Policy	   Research	   Institute	  
(IAPRI)	   and	   its	   predecessor,	   the	   Food	   Security	   Research	   Project	   (FSRP)	   at	   the	  Michigan	  
State	  University.	  In	  cases	  where	  necessary	  numerical	  data	  was	  not	  available	  in	  any	  of	  these	  
sources,	   I	   relied	   on	   expert	   estimates	   from	   P.	   Nyanga	   (see	   below)	   for	   the	   remaining	  
parameter	  values.	  	  
The	  qualitative	  data	  necessary	  to	  establish	  the	  context	  of	  my	  research	  and	  to	  conceptualize	  
the	  model	  was	   taken	   from	   academic	   literature,	   reports	   of	   political	   organizations	   such	   as	  
USAID	  or	  UN	  organizations.	  Here	  again,	  research	  papers	  by	  IAPRI	  and	  the	  FSRP	  were	  most	  
helpful	  due	  to	  their	  high	  degree	  of	  detail.	  However,	  even	  these	  papers	  did	  not	  cover	  some	  of	  
the	  micro-­‐data	  that	  I	  needed	  to	  build	  the	  information	  feedback	  structure	  of	  my	  model.	  	  
Luckily,	  we	  were	  so	  fortunate	  to	  have	  Dr	  Progress	  Nyanga	  from	  the	  University	  of	  Zambia	  
with	  us	   in	  Bergen	  for	  several	  weeks.	  Not	  only	  was	  he	   involved	  in	  many	  research	  projects	  
about	  agriculture	  and	  rural	  development	  in	  Zambia,	  but	  also	  is	  he	  an	  active	  maize	  farmer,	  
which	  qualifies	  him	  as	  one	  of	  the	  leading	  experts	  for	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  maize	  marketing	  
sector	  in	  Zambia.	  I	  used	  two	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  to	  collect	  data	  for	  the	  missing	  links	  
in	  my	  research,	  where	  the	  first	  interview	  was	  more	  exploratory	  in	  nature,	  while	  the	  second	  
one	   resembled	   more	   a	   disconfirmatory	   interview	   to	   increase	   confidence	   in	   the	   model’s	  
structure	  (Andersen	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  The	  interviews	  are	  reported	  in	  appendix	  D.	  
The	  way	  I	  went	  about	  the	  data	  analysis,	  i.e.	  the	  translation	  of	  numerical	  and	  qualitative	  data	  
into	  my	  model,	   is	   described	   in	   extensive	   detail	   in	   chapter	   4	   and	   the	   comments	   for	   each	  
variable	   in	   appendix	   A.	   In	   order	   to	   keep	   the	   introduction	   as	   concise	   as	   possible,	   I	   will	  
therefore	  not	  repeat	  this	  content	  in	  detail	  here.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
	  
7
Reliability	  was	  ensured	  through	  the	  sampling	  and	  triangulation	  processes	  explained	  above	  
and	  illustrated	  in	  further	  detail	  in	  chapter	  4	  and	  appendix	  C;	  while	  validity	  was	  warranted	  
using	  a	  set	  of	  validation	  tests	  following	  Barlas	  (1996)	  that	  are	  described	  in	  chapter	  6.	  
1.4	  Relevance	  of	  the	  Topic	  
The	  relevance	  of	  the	  research	  stems	  from	  several	  considerations.	  On	  the	  one	  had,	  there	  is	  
the	   tense	  situation	   in	  Zambia	  concerning	   food	  security,	   the	  strong	  reliance	  on	  maize	  as	  a	  
staple	   food	   crop	   and	   the	   high	   exposure	   to	   shocks	   that	   make	   the	   investigation	   of	   the	  
resilience	  of	  the	  maize	  value	  chain	  a	  worthwhile	  undertaking.	  The	  food	  security	  situation	  in	  
Zambia	  was	  touched	  upon	  in	  section	  1.1	  and	  I	  will	  explain	  it	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  chapter	  2.1,	  
whereas	  the	  exposure	  to	  shocks	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  chapter	  3.3.	  
While	   the	   value	   chain	   is	   central	   to	   understanding	   food	   security,	   as	   it	   represents	   the	  
mechanism	  that	  actually	  get	  the	  food	  “from	  farm	  to	  fork”,	  most	  of	  the	  academic	  literature	  
on	   food	   security	   focuses	   on	   the	   production	   or	   consumption	   level	   (Stave	   &	   Kopainsky,	  
forthcoming),	  leaving	  the	  intermediate	  stages	  as	  a	  little	  understood	  “black	  box”.	  My	  thesis	  
thus	  aims	  to	  fill	  this	  gap	  in	  the	  research	  and	  thereby	  create	  a	  more	  holistic	  understanding	  
of	  the	  food	  security	  situation	  in	  Zambia.	  
Furthermore,	   there	   is	   the	  methodological	  argument	  that	  already	  quite	  a	   lot	  of	  conceptual	  
literature,	  but	   few	  applications	  exist	   in	   resilience	  research,	  and	  many	  authors	   thus	  argue	  
that	   conducting	   more	   comprehensive	   case	   studies	   to	   explore	   the	   usefulness	   and	  
applicability	   of	   the	   concept	   is	   the	   necessary	   next	   step	   in	   resilience	   research	   (Janssen	   &	  
Anderies,	  2013).	  
1.5	  Outline	  of	  the	  Thesis	  
Chapter	  2	  will	  discuss	  the	  problem	  background	  and	  context	  in	  greater	  detail,	  exploring	  the	  
food	   security	   situation	   and	   specifics	   of	   the	   maize	   sector	   in	   Zambia,	   thereby	   further	  
establishing	   the	   relevance	   of	   the	   topic.	   Together	   with	   chapter	   3,	   it	   will	   constitute	   the	  
literature	  review,	  placing	  my	  thesis	  in	  the	  context	  of	  other	  topical	  or	  methodological	  work	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related	   to	   my	   research.	   Chapter	   3	   will	   establish	   the	  methodological	   framework	   and	   the	  
metrics	  I	  will	  use	  to	  measure	  resilience.	  
Chapter	  4	  contains	  the	  description	  of	  my	  dynamic	  hypothesis	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  simulation	  
model.	   Therein,	   I	   will	   develop	   the	   structure	   step	   by	   step	   and	   link	   it	   to	   the	   literature.	  
Chapter	  5	  then	  discusses	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  model	  and	  the	  assumptions	  made	  concerning	  
the	  inputs	  for	  the	  scenario	  analysis,	  so	  that	  the	  reader	  gains	  the	  necessary	  understanding	  of	  
the	  dynamics	  to	  comprehend	  the	  results	  of	  the	  ensuing	  resilience	  analysis.	  Chapter	  6	  then	  
examines	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  model	  by	  applying	  a	  series	  of	  well-­‐established	  validation	  tests	  
for	  quantitative	  SD	  models.	  The	  last	  step	  before	  the	  resilience	  properties	  can	  be	  tested	  is	  to	  
choose	  and	  operationalize	  the	  shocks	  that	  I	  will	  expose	  the	  model	  to,	  which	  will	  be	  done	  in	  
chapter	  7.1	  
Having	  laid	  all	  the	  groundwork	  in	  these	  first	  seven	  chapters,	  chapter	  8	  then	  presents	  and	  
discusses	   the	   results	   of	   the	   resilience	   analysis.	   The	   model	   is	   subjected	   to	   22	   different	  
production	   shock	   scenarios	   and	   its	   response	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   resilience	   framework	   is	  
analysed,	  allowing	  us	  to	  answer	  research	  question	  4.	  It	  will	  be	  shown	  that	  the	  value	  chain	  is	  
quite	   resilient	   towards	   floods	   and	   exchange	   rate	   shocks,	  moderately	   vulnerable	   towards	  
changes	   in	   fertilizer	   subsidy	   programmes,	   and	   very	   vulnerable	   towards	   droughts,	  
especially	  prolonged	  ones.	   In	   general,	   the	   resilience	  of	   the	   value	   chain	   towards	  one-­‐time	  
shocks	   is	   good	   due	   to	   the	   existence	   of	   buffer	   stocks	   that	   can	   compensate	   for	   losses	   in	  
production;	   whereas	   the	   resilience	   towards	   two	   or	  more	   shocks	   is	   low	   and	   the	   ADESM	  
quickly	  breaks	  down.	  Furthermore,	  I	  will	  show	  that	  consumption	  adjustments	  in	  response	  
to	   changes	   in	   maize	   availability	   and	   the	   distribution	   of	   maize	   between	   the	   formal	   and	  
informal	  value	  chain	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  resilience	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  towards	  a	  
given	  shock.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Even	  though	  chapter	  7	   is	  conceptually	  more	  a	  part	  of	   the	  “problem	  articulation”	  stage,	   I	  put	   it	  behind	  the	  
model	   discussion	   chapters	   because	   the	   choice	   and	   operationalization	   of	   shocks	   depends	   on	   the	   model	  
structure	  and	  the	  reader	  will	  thus	  be	  able	  to	  grasp	  the	  logic	  better	  having	  been	  exposed	  to	  the	  model	  already.	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Based	   on	   these	   results,	   I	   will	   discuss	   possible	   policies	   to	   endogenously	   improve	   the	  
resilience	   properties	   in	   chapter	   9.	   I	  will	   show	   that	   a	   smart	   storage	   policy	   over	   the	   time	  
horizon	   of	   several	   years,	   exploiting	   the	   occasionally	   occurring	   surplus	   harvest	   can	  
significantly	  enhance	  the	  resilience	  towards	  production	  shocks.	  Chapter	  10	  then	  concludes	  
the	  thesis	  by	  answering	  the	  research	  question,	  discussing	  limitations	  and	  indicating	  areas	  
of	  further	  research.	  
	  
2.	  Problem	  Background	  
As	  promised	  in	  the	  introduction,	  I	  will	  examine	  the	  relevance	  of	  my	  topic	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  
this	  chapter.	  There	  are	  four	  main	  questions	  on	  which	  this	  relevance	  depends:	  
• How	  much	  of	  a	  problem	  is	  food	  insecurity	  in	  Zambia?	  
• How	  important	  is	  the	  role	  of	  maize	  for	  ensuring	  food	  security	  in	  Zambia?	  
• What	  is	  the	  role	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  in	  ensuring	  maize	  supply	  for	  the	  population?	  
• How	  susceptible	  is	  the	  maize	  sector	  in	  Zambia	  to	  shocks?	  
While	  the	  susceptibility	  to	  shocks	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  3,	  I	  will	  explore	  the	  state	  of	  
food	  security	  in	  Zambia	  and	  the	  role	  of	  maize	  in	  general,	  and	  the	  value	  chain	  in	  particular,	  
in	  the	  following	  chapter.	  
2.1	  Food	  Security	  in	  Zambia	  
To	   be	   able	   to	   evaluate	   the	   food	   security	   situation	   in	   Zambia,	   we	   must	   first	   develop	   an	  
understanding	  of	  what	  food	  security	  actually	  means	  and	  how	  it	  can	  be	  measured.	  	  The	  1996	  
World	   Food	   Summit	   defined	   food	   security	   as	   the	   state	   “when	  all	  people	  at	  all	   times	  have	  
access	  to	  sufficient,	  safe,	  nutritious	  food	  to	  maintain	  a	  healthy	  and	  active	  life”	  (FAO,	  2008:	  p.	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1).	  According	  to	  FAO,	  IFAD,	  &	  WFP	  (2014),	  this	  state	  can	  be	  measured	  along	  the	  following	  
four	  dimensions:	  
Availability	   The	  quantity	  of	  (certain	  types	  of)	  food	  or	  nutrients	  that	  can	  be	  supplied	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  number	  of	  people	  in	  a	  given	  area	  
Access	   The	  extent	  to	  which	  people	  actually	  have	  physical	  and	  economic	  access	  to	  
the	  food	  available	  
Utilization	   Gauging	   the	  ability	  of	   individuals	   to	  utilize	   the	   supplied	   food	   in	   a	  proper	  
way,	  including	  an	  appropriate	  preparation	  of	  food	  and	  mix	  of	  nutrients	  
Stability	   Assessing	  how	  stable	  the	  other	  three	  dimensions	  are	  over	  time	  
Table	  2:	  Dimensions	  of	  food	  security	  
FAO	  (et	  al.,	  2014)	  currently	  uses	  a	  set	  of	  as	  much	  as	  31	  diverse	  indicators	  to	  measure	  these	  
four	  dimensions	  and	  thus	  determine	  the	  state	  of	  food	  security.	  However,	  I	  neither	  have	  the	  
room	  to	  discuss	  all	  of	  these	  indicators	  here,	  nor	  is	  it	  necessary.	  To	  get	  an	  understanding	  of	  
the	  food	  security	  situation	  in	  Zambia,	  it	  suffices	  to	  look	  at	  a	  few	  central	  indicators	  from	  FAO	  
(2014),	  which	  I	  summarized	  in	  table	  3:	  
Indicator	  name	   Short	  name	   Description	  
Dietary	  Energy	  Supply	   DES	   Amount	   of	   food	   than	   can	   be	   supplied	   in	   a	   given	  
area	  per	  person	  in	  the	  corresponding	  population	  
Average	  Dietary	  Energy	  
Supply	  Adequacy	  	  
ADESA	   Ratio	  comparing	  the	  DES	  with	  the	  ADER,	  showing	  
if	   there	   is	  enough	  food	  for	  everyone	  assuming	  an	  
even	  distribution	  of	  food	  among	  the	  population	  
Prevalence	  of	  
Undernourishment	  	  
PoU	   Probability	   that	   a	   randomly	   selected	   individual	  
from	  the	  reference	  population	  consumes	  less	  than	  
her	  calorie	  requirement	  for	  an	  active,	  healthy	  life	  
Average	  Dietary	  Energy	  
Requirement	  
ADER	   The	   amount	   of	   calories	   an	   individual	   needs	   on	  
average	   to	   ensure	   it	   does	   not	   hunger,	   given	  
medium	   physical	   activity	   and	   considering	   the	  
specifics	  of	  the	  population	  and	  its	  environment	  
Table	  3:	  Central	  indicators	  of	  food	  security	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Equipped	  with	  this	  knowledge,	  we	  can	  now	  assess	  the	  situation	  of	  food	  security	  in	  Zambia	  
by	   looking	  at	   the	   indicators.	  The	  Prevalence	  of	  Undernourishment,	  was	  as	  high	  as	  48.3%	  
for	   the	   last	  measurement	   period	   of	   2012-­‐13	   (FAO,	   2014).	   This	  means	   that	   every	   second	  
Zambian	  you	  would	  meet	  by	  chance	  is	  undernourished	  –	  a	  clear	  sign	  that	  food	  security	  is	  
still	  a	  big	  issue	  in	  Zambia.	  
But	  in	  how	  far	  is	  this	  lack	  of	  food	  security	  attributable	  to	  availability	  problems?	  Looking	  at	  
the	   ADESA,	   we	   see	   that	   it	   has	   been	   fluctuating	   around	   90%	   in	   the	   last	   years,	   meaning	  
Zambia	  could	  only	  supply	  90%	  of	  the	  calories	  that	  its	  citizens	  need	  for	  a	  healthy	  lifestyle.	  
Moreover,	  Gerber	   (2015)	   expects	   that	   Zambia	  will	   enter	   a	   structural	  maize	  deficit	   in	   the	  
near	   future	   due	   to	   stagnating	   harvests	   and	   growing	   population,	   making	   the	   supply	  
situation	  even	  worse	  than	  it	  has	  been	  in	  the	  relatively	  good	  last	  harvest	  years.	  
Hence,	  we	   can	   conclude	   that	   food	   insecurity	   is	   an	   on-­‐going	   problem	   in	   Zambia,	   that	   not	  
only	   stems	   from	  an	   inefficient	   distribution	  of	   food	   in	   the	   society	   (access	   dimension),	   but	  
also	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  most	  basic	   requirement	  of	   sufficient	  availability	   of	   food	   is	  not	  
fulfilled.	   Following	   the	   rule	   that	   the	  most	   basic	   problems	  need	   to	   be	   addressed	   first,	  my	  
work	  will	  therefore	  focus	  on	  the	  problems	  of	  availability	  of	  food	  in	  Zambia.	  	  
In	  terms	  of	  the	  stability	  dimension,	  there	  is	  no	  overarching	  single	  indicator	  measuring	  the	  
degree	  of	  (in)stability.	  This	  is	  unfortunate,	  but	  again	  confirms	  that	  stability	  or	  resilience	  of	  
food	  security	  are	  topics	  that	  have	  not	  been	  sufficiently	  addressed	  so	  far	  and	  that	  my	  work	  
could	  be	  a	  welcome	  addition	  to	  existing	  food	  security	  frameworks.	  	  
2.2	  The	  Role	  of	  Maize	  for	  Food	  Security	  in	  Zambia	  
2.2.1	  The	  Maize	  Sector	  in	  Zambia	  
Having	  established	  that	  ensuring	  food	  security	  is	  an	  enduring	  problem	  in	  Zambia,	  the	  next	  
step	  is	  to	  find	  out	  what	  the	  role	  of	  maize	  is	  for	  food	  security	  in	  Zambia.	  I	  will	  therefore	  first	  
discuss	   the	   history	   and	   current	   specifications	   of	   the	   maize	   sector	   in	   Zambia	   in	   general	  
before	  then	  assessing	  its	  role	  for	  food	  security.	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If	  there	  was	  one	  salient	  feature	  that	  all	  governments	  in	  Zambia	  over	  the	  last	  decades	  have	  
shared,	   it	   has	   been	   the	   special	   emphasis	   they	   have	   placed	   on	   supporting	   the	   domestic	  
production	  and	  consumer	  access	  to	  maize	  (Zulu,	  Jayne,	  &	  Beaver,	  2007).	  Ensuring	  that	  the	  
population	  had	  sufficient	  access	  to	  maize,	  which	  is	  the	  central	  staple	  food	  crop	  in	  Zambia,	  is	  
even	  considered	  the	  basis	   for	  an	   implicit	  social	  contract	  between	  the	  government	  and	   its	  
constituency	  (Jayne	  &	  Jones,	  1997).	  
Hence,	   the	   first	  post-­‐independence	  governments	   in	   the	  1960’s	   through	  80’s	  exerted	   tight	  
control	   over	   the	   maize	   market,	   using	   maize	   policy	   as	   the	   major	   tool	   for	   welfare	  
interventions	  intended	  to	  benefit	  especially	  the	  rural	  poor.	  However,	  as	  mounting	  financial	  
problems	  and	  critical	  donors	   forced	   the	  government	   to	  abandon	   their	  heavy	  subsidy	  and	  
trade	  control	  programmes,	  the	  maize	  policy	  changed	  towards	  liberalization	  in	  the	  1990’s.	  
Yet,	   as	   international	   donors	   relaxed	   the	   economic	   policy	   conditions	   tied	   to	   their	  
contributions	  some	  years	   later,	   the	  government	  sought	   to	  re-­‐establish	   it’s	  position	  as	   the	  
major	   player	   in	   the	   domestic	   maize	   market	   and	   set	   up	   a	   new	   agency	   that	   will	   become	  
essential	   for	   the	   remainder	   of	   our	   analysis:	   the	   Food	   Reserve	   Agency	   (FRA).	   While	   the	  
FRA’s	  original	  role	  was	  merely	  to	  buy	  strategic	  buffer	  stocks	  of	  maize	  to	  guard	  against	  price	  
fluctuations	   in	   the	   just	   emerging	   private	  maize	   sector,	   one	   can	   see	   in	   figure	   1	   that	   from	  
2004	  on,	  FRA	  progressively	  expanded	  this	  mandate	  up	  to	  a	   level	  where	  it	  actually	  traded	  
the	  majority	  of	  maize	  in	  Zambia.	  (Govereh,	  Jayne,	  &	  Chapoto,	  2008)	  




Figure	  1:	  Domestic	  maize	  sales	  vs.	  FRA	  purchases	  (Kuteya,	  Sitko,	  &	  Inn,	  2014:	  p.	  8)	  
The	  result	  of	  this	  interventionist	  history	  is	  that	  these	  days,	  the	  maize	  market	  in	  Zambia	  can	  
hardly	  be	  considered	  a	  “free	  market”	  working	  purely	  according	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  demand	  and	  
supply.	   Rather,	   governmental	   actors	   exert	   strong	   influence	   by	   using	   a	  multitude	   of	   tools	  
beside	   the	   FRA’s	   domestic	   purchasing	   activities	   to	   influence	   the	   maize	   market.	   These	  
include:	  explicit	  export	  bans,	  limited	  issuing	  of	  export	  licenses,	  adjustment	  of	  import	  tariff	  
rates,	   government	   imports	   of	   maize	   through	   FRA,	   sales	   of	   subsidized	   maize	   to	   large	  
industrial	   millers,	   levies	   or	   bans	   on	   maize	   trade	   between	   different	   districts	   in	   Zambia,	  
targeted	  fertilizer	  subsidies,	  etc.	  (N.	  M.	  Mason	  &	  Myers,	  2011).	  	  
This	   long	   history	   of	   strong	   government	   support	   for	   maize,	   coupled	   with	   deeply	   rooted	  
cultural	   perceptions	   and	   traditions,	   made	   and	   sustained	   maize	   as	   the	   single	  
overwhelmingly	   important	   staple	   food	   crop	   in	   Zambia.	   Even	   in	   spite	   of	   recent	   shifts	  
towards	  a	  greater	  crop	  variety,	  maize	  still	  accounts	  for	  over	  50%	  of	  calories	  consumed	  in	  
Zambia	  as	  of	  2011	  (FAO,	  2015b)	  and	  is	  cultivated	  by	  80%	  of	  farmers	  in	  Zambia	  (Zulu	  et	  al.,	  
2007).	  	  Furthermore,	  Mason	  &	  Jayne,	  (2009)	  have	  found	  that	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  correlation	  in	  
Zambia	  between	  low	  income	  and	  an	  above-­‐average	  reliance	  on	  maize	  as	  the	  main	  source	  of	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calorific	   supply.	   This	  means	   that	   especially	   the	   poorest,	   who	   are	   typically	   also	   the	  most	  
vulnerable	  to	  shocks	  of	  all	  kinds,	  depend	  on	  maize	  over-­‐proportionally	  for	  satisfying	  their	  
basic	   calorific	   needs.	   As	   food	   insecurity	   is	   mainly	   a	   problem	   for	   the	   poorest	   strata	   of	  
society,	  this	  means	  that	  maize	  is	  especially	  important	  to	  maintain	  food	  security	  for	  all	  of	  the	  
population	  in	  Zambia.	  
After	   I	   initially	  wanted	   to	   create	   a	  model	   of	   the	   food	   value	   chain	   in	   Zambia	   in	   general,	   I	  
quickly	  realized	  that	  every	  commodity’s	  value	  chain	  has	  very	  distinct	  features	  that	  would	  
make	  it	  impossible	  to	  represent	  them	  in	  one	  single	  chain.	  With	  too	  few	  time	  and	  resources	  
at	  my	  disposal	  to	  build	  several	  value	  chain	  models,	  it	  was	  imperative	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  most	  
important	   contributors	   to	   food	   security.	   For	   the	   reasons	   discussed	   above,	   this	   is	   clearly	  
maize.	  
2.2.2	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  Maize	  Value	  Chain	  
Having	  examined	   the	  nutritional	   role	  of	  maize	   in	  Zambia,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   there	   can	  be	  no	  
adequate	   food	   supply	   for	   Zambians	   at	   large	   without	   a	   sufficient	   supply	   of	   maize.	   But	   it	  
remains	  to	  motivate	  why	  I	  chose	  to	  examine	  the	  maize	  value	  chain,	  i.e.	  clarifying	  which	  role	  
it	   plays	   in	   ensuring	   a	   sufficient	   calorie	   supply	   to	   the	   population.	   Since	   the	   value	   chain	  
represents	   the	   very	   mechanisms	   that	   actually	   get	   the	   maize	   from	   the	   farms	   scattered	  
around	   the	   country’s	   remote	   places	   to	   the	   non-­‐subsistence	   consumers	   in	   the	   (semi-­‐)	  
urbanized	  regions,	  it’s	  role	  is	  obviously	  decisive:	  no	  distribution	  of	  food	  from	  producers	  to	  
consumers	  can	  take	  place	  without	  a	  functioning	  value	  chain.	  	  
Field	   research	   suggests	   that	   food	   value	   chains	   are	   crucial	   when	   trying	   to	   address	  
inadequate	   availability	   of	   food,	   as	   in	   Sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa,	   post-­‐harvest	   losses	   typically	  
number	   around	   10-­‐23%	   of	   the	   original	   production	   (Hodges	   &	   Bernard,	   2014).	   Bou	  
Schreiber	   (2015)	   shows	   that	   this	   problem	   is	   especially	   pervasive	   in	   Zambia:	   the	   main	  
maize	   purchaser	   FRA	   has	   mostly	   inadequate	   storage	   facilities,	   leading	   to	   heavy	   annual	  
grain	   losses	   that	   become	   even	  worse	  when	   the	   system	   is	   shocked	   out	   of	   its	   equilibrium	  
state,	  e.g.	  by	  unexpected	  bumper	  harvests.	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Apart	   from	   the	   practical	   relevance	   of	   the	   value	   chain	   in	   maintaining	   an	   adequate	   food	  
supply,	  there	  is	  also	  the	  circumstance	  that	  most	  of	  the	  academic	  literature	  on	  food	  security	  
focuses	  on	   the	  production	  or	   consumption	   level	   (Stave	  &	  Kopainsky,	   forthcoming),	  while	  
the	   intermediate	   value	   chain	   connecting	   both	   remains	   an	   apparently	   relevant	   but	   few	  
understood	  “black	  box”.	  I	  thus	  want	  to	  fill	  this	  knowledge	  gap	  by	  building	  a	  causal	  model	  of	  
the	  maize	  value	  chain	  in	  Zambia.	  As	  such,	  will	  my	  thesis	  complement	  Gerber's	  (2015)	  work	  
about	   the	   production	   level	   and	   Bou	   Schreiber's	   (2015)	   study	   of	   food	   loss	   in	   the	   FRA,	  
together	  helping	  to	  create	  a	  more	  holistic	  understanding	  of	  the	  maize	  sector	  in	  Zambia.	  
	  
3.	  Methodological	  Framework	  
Two	   prerequisites	   for	   answering	   the	   research	   question	   are	   to	   devise	   an	   operationable	  
framework	   for	  measuring	   resilience	   in	   a	   quantified	   SD	  model,	   and	   to	   define	   a	   clear	   and	  
measurable	  indicator	  that	  serves	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  food	  security	  in	  the	  context	  of	  maize	  supply	  
in	  Zambia.	  These	  endeavours	  actually	  correspond	  to	  research	  objectives	  1	  and	  2	  and	  will	  be	  
discussed	   in	   the	   following	   chapter.	  Moreover,	   I	  will	   further	   explore	   the	   relevance	   of	  my	  
topic	  by	  investigating	  how	  susceptible	  the	  maize	  value	  chain	  is	  to	  shocks.	  
3.1	  Definitions	  of	  Resilience	  
Resilience	  is	  a	  very	  broad	  topic	  that	  has	  received	  increasing	  attention	  in	  various	  disciplines	  
over	   the	   last	   years.	   Yet,	   the	  use	   in	  manifold	   contexts	   and	   relative	  novelty	   of	   the	   concept	  
contributes	   to	  a	   lack	  of	   conceptual	   clarity	  and	   the	  existence	  of	  many	  different	  competing	  
definitions	  of	  resilience	  (Carpenter	  &	  Brock,	  2008;	  Henry	  &	  Emmanuel	  Ramirez-­‐Marquez,	  
2012).	   However,	   the	   concept	   is	   of	   course	   not	   used	   completely	   arbitrarily	   and	   therefore	  
does	  have	  a	   certain	   core	   that	   is	  widely	   agreed	  upon.	  Olsson,	   Jerneck,	  Thoren,	  Persson,	  &	  
O’Byrne	  (2015:	  p.	  1)	  define	  this	  core	  as	  the	  agreement	  that	  “resilience	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	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ability	   [of	  a	  system]	  to	  cope	  with	  stress	  or,	  more	  precisely,	  to	  return	  to	  some	  form	  of	  normal	  
condition	  after	  a	  period	  of	  stress.”	  
In	  their	  endeavour	  to	  further	  clarify	  the	  nature	  of	  resilience	  discourses,	  Olsson	  et	  al.	  (2015)	  
reviewed	  the	  systems	  thinking	  literature	  and	  concluded	  that	  there	  are	  essentially	  two	  types	  
of	  definitions	  of	  resilience	  in	  use:	  
1. Resilience	  as	  “bouncing	  back”:	  
This	   definition	   stresses	   the	   quality	   of	   a	   system	   to	  withstand	   a	   disturbance	   and	   to	  
recover	   from	   it,	   while	   preserving	   its	   structure.	   Insofar,	   resilience	   is	   seen	   as	   the	  
ability	   of	   a	   system	   to	   resist	   forced	   structural	   change,	   while	   maintaining	   and/or	  
recovering	  its	  central	  functions.	  (See	  also:	  Dalziell	  &	  Mcmanus,	  2004)	  
2. Resilience	  as	  “bouncing	  back	  and	  transforming”:	  
This	  definition,	  contrary	  to	  the	   first	  one,	  understands	  the	  resilience	  of	  a	  system	  as	  
depending	  on	  the	  ability	  to	  change	   its	  structure.	  The	   idea	   is	   that	  when	  a	  system	  is	  
faced	   with	   a	   disturbance,	   it	   not	   only	   bounces	   back	   by	   recovering	   important	  
functions,	  but	  also	  transforms	  its	  structure	  in	  a	  way	  that	  makes	  it	  better	  adapted	  to	  
cope	  with	  the	  new	  environment.	  
These	  two	  lines	  of	  thought	  are	  therefore	  somewhat	  contradictory	  in	  how	  they	  view	  the	  role	  
of	  preserving	  a	  system’s	  structure.	  Adopting	  the	  second	  view	  also	  creates	  further	  questions	  
about	   the	   identity	   of	   a	   system:	   how	   big	   can	   the	   structural	   change	   be,	   so	   that	   the	  
transformed	   system	   is	   still	   considered	   a	   “smart	   adaptation”	   of	   the	   original	   system,	   and	  
when	  does	  the	  change	  become	  so	  big	  that	  the	  system	  essentially	  loses	  its	  identity	  and	  can	  
thus	  be	  considered	  to	  have	  broken	  down	  and	  succumbed	  to	  the	  disturbance?	  
Summing	   up,	   we	   can	   conclude	   that	   there	   are	   competing,	   even	   partially	   contradictory,	  
definitions	  of	  resilience	  and	  none	  can	  per	  se	  be	  said	  to	  be	  superior	  to	  the	  others.	  However,	  
to	  achieve	  conceptual	  clarity	  in	  my	  research,	  it	  is	  imperative	  to	  choose	  a	  clear	  definition.	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Since	  I	  want	  to	  find	  out	  how	  the	  supply	  of	  maize	  changes	  in	  relation	  to	  production	  shocks,	  I	  
will	  have	  to	   look	  at	  short-­‐to	  medium	  term	  changes	  that	   take	  place	   in	  a	  set	  of	  parameters	  
within	   a	   few	  months	   to	   years.	   It	   is	   very	   unlikely	   that	   the	   basic	   structure	   of	  maize	   value	  
chain	  will	   change	  significantly	  within	   this	   relatively	  short	   time,	   so	   that	   the	  component	  of	  
structural	   change	   that	   is	   central	   to	   the	  second	  definition	   is	  not	   relevant.	  As	  methodology	  
choices	  should	  be	  made	  according	  to	  their	  usefulness	  in	  reaching	  the	  research	  objectives,	  I	  
will	  therefore	  adopt	  the	  “bounce	  back”	  definition	  of	  resilience.	  	  
3.2	  Framework	  for	  Measuring	  Resilience	  in	  System	  Dynamics	  Simulation	  Models	  
Having	  established	  the	  general	  direction	  of	  how	  I	  intend	  to	  conceptualize	  resilience	  for	  my	  
research,	  it	  remains	  to	  make	  this	  still	  rather	  vague	  concept	  measurable.	  Henry	  &	  Emmanuel	  
Ramirez-­‐Marquez	   (2012)	   propose	   a	   framework	   that	   operationalizes	   resilience	   as	   a	  
function	   of	   time,	  which	   is	  well	   suited	   for	   application	   in	   simulation	  models.	   They	   remark	  
that	  resilience	  always	  has	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  resilience	  of	  a	  certain	  function	  in	  the	  system	  
against	   a	   certain	   shock	   event.	   This	  makes	   sense,	   as	   function	   A	   of	   a	   system	  might	   not	   be	  
affected	  by	  a	  shock,	  while	  function	  B	  might	  break	  down	  completely	  –	  but	  when	  faced	  with	  a	  
different	  shock,	  the	  system	  might	  be	  able	  to	  maintain	  function	  B,	  but	  not	  function	  A.	  
Henry	  &	  Emmanuel	  Ramirez-­‐Marquez'	  (2012)	  framework	  therefore	  requires	  to	  specify	  the	  
central	  functions	  of	  a	  system	  that	  one	  wants	  to	  evaluate,	  which	  they	  call	  “figures	  of	  merit”	  
(FOM).	   The	   development	   of	   these	   FOM	   is	   then	   simulated	   in	   a	   no-­‐shock	   base	   run	   and	   a	  
shock	  scenario.	  The	  extent	  of	  change	  in	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  FOM	  between	  the	  base	  run	  and	  
the	  shock	  scenario	  then	  indicates	  how	  resilient	  the	  system	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  that	  specific	  FOM	  
to	  that	  specific	  shock.	  A	  graphic	  representation	  of	  this	  idea	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  figure	  2.	  




Figure	  2:	  Development	  of	  FOM	  under	  different	  shock	  scenarios	  
Henry	  &	  Emmanuel	  Ramirez-­‐Marquez	  (2012)	  further	  differentiate	  between	  two	  features	  of	  
resilience	  in	  their	  framework:	  
• The	   initial	   vulnerability2	  is	   determined	   by	   how	   strong	   the	   initial	   impact	   of	   a	  
system	  disturbance	  is	  on	  the	  FOM.	  In	  figure	  2,	  this	  would	  be	  the	  drop	  in	  the	  scenario	  
graphs	   occurring	   between	   times	   seven	   and	   eight.	   The	   FOM	   in	   scenarios	   1	   and	   2	  
drops	  by	  6,5	  units,	  while	  the	  FOM	  in	  scenario	  3	  only	  drops	  by	  4,5	  units.	  The	  initial	  
vulnerability	  of	  the	  FOM	  against	  the	  shock	  in	  scenario	  3	  would	  thus	  be	  smaller.	  
• The	  adaptive	  capacity	  is	  determined	  by	  how	  fast	  the	  FOM	  recovers	  from	  the	  shock	  
by	   returning	   towards	   its	   original	   base	   run	   trajectory.	   The	   FOM	   shows	   the	   lowest	  
adaptive	   capacity	   towards	   the	   shock	   in	   scenario	   1,	   as	   it	   takes	   the	   longest	   time	   to	  
return	  to	  the	  base	  run	  trajectory.	  While	  the	  FOM	  in	  shock	  scenarios	  2	  an	  3	  actually	  
rise	  by	  a	  total	  of	  6,5	  units	  throughout	  the	  first	  six	  time	  steps	  after	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  
shock,	  the	  FOM	  in	  scenario	  1	  only	  grows	  by	  3,8	  units	  in	  the	  same	  time.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 	  Note	   that	   in	   their	   paper,	   Henry	   &	   Emmanuel	   Ramirez-­‐Marquez	   (2012)	   call	   this	   concept	   simply	  
“vulnerability”,	  but	  I	  chose	  to	  make	  its	  name	  more	  specific	  so	  that	  it	  will	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  general	  idea	  











1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	   9	   10	   11	   12	   13	   14	   15	   16	   17	   18	   19	   20	  













The	  overall	  resilience	  of	  the	  system	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  FOM	  under	  consideration	  is	  therefore	  
measured	  as	  the	  integral	  between	  the	  base	  run	  and	  the	  respective	  shock	  scenario	  run	  curve	  




Figure	  3:	  Comparison	  of	  Integrals	  
The	   differences	   observed	   between	   the	   three	   scenarios	   are	   neatly	   reflected	   in	   the	  
development	  of	  the	  integral	  between	  the	  base	  run	  and	  the	  respective	  shock	  scenario	  runs.	  
While	   the	   integrals	   for	   scenario	   1	   and	   2	   rise	   in	   the	   same	   fashion	   after	   the	   onset	   of	   the	  
shock,	   scenario	  3	   exhibits	   a	   smaller	   initial	   rise	  due	   to	   its	   lower	   initial	   vulnerability.	   	  The	  
differences	   in	   adaptive	   capacity	   can	   also	  be	  well	   observed	   in	   figure	  3:	   the	   faster	   the	   gap	  
between	  scenario	  FOM	  and	  the	  base	  run	  FOM	  is	  closed,	  the	  flatter	  is	  the	  rise	  in	  the	  integral.	  
When	  the	  scenario	  FOM	  has	  fully	  recovered	  to	  the	  base	  run	  FOM’s	  trajectory,	  the	  integral	  
value	   stagnates.	   The	   framework	   thus	   described	   in	   this	   section	   will	   be	   the	   basis	   for	  
measuring	  resilience	  in	  my	  analysis.	  	  
As	  a	  final	  remark	  on	  the	  terminology	  used,	  I	  want	  the	  reader	  to	  note	  that	  I	  will	  use	  the	  term	  
“vulnerability”	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  Adger	  (2006:	  p.	  269),	  who	  defines	  it	  as	  “the	  degree	  to	  which	  a	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system	  is	  susceptible	  to	  and	  is	  unable	  to	  cope	  with	  adverse	  effects”.	   In	   the	   light	  of	  our	  basic	  
definition	   of	   resilience	   as	   the	   capacity	   of	   a	   system	   to	   successfully	   cope	   with	   shocks,	  
vulnerability	  will	   be	   referred	   to	   as	   the	  opposite	  of	   resilience,	   so	   to	   speak	   the	   absence	  or	  
resilience.	  
3.3	  The	  Rationale	  for	  a	  Resilience	  Perspective	  on	  the	  Value	  Chain	  
Knowing	  what	  resilience	  is	  and	  how	  it	  can	  be	  operationalized	  for	  my	  purposes,	  it	  remains	  
to	   be	   argued	   why	   resilience	   analysis	   is	   a	   relevant	   and	   useful	   theoretical	   framework	   for	  
addressing	   food	   insecurity	   in	   the	   value	   chain.	   Adopting	   a	   resilience	   perspective	   on	   the	  
maize	   value	   chain	   makes	   sense	   when	   Zambia	   in	   general,	   and	   the	   maize	   value	   chain	   in	  
particular,	  are	  susceptible	  to	  shocks.	  
Several	   sources	   suggest	   that	   the	  generally	  weak	  political	   and	  economic	   institutions,	  poor	  
infrastructure,	  heavy	   reliance	  on	  one	  main	   staple	   food	   crop	  and	  an	  exposition	   to	   sudden	  
and	  strong	  changes	  in	  its	  climatic,	  political	  and	  economic	  environment,	  that	  it	  shares	  with	  
most	   of	   its	   Sub-­‐Saharan	   African	   neighbours,	   leave	   Zambia	   in	   in	   a	   position	   of	   high	  
vulnerability	   on	   many	   levels.	   (Bertelsmann	   Transformation	   Index,	   2012;	   Stockholm	  
Resilience	  Centre,	  2012;	  UNDP,	  2014)	  	  
Since	   the	  maize	  value	  chain	   is	  a	  complex	  system	  influenced	  by	  political,	  economic,	  social,	  
agricultural	  and	  climatic	   factors,	   the	  general	  vulnerability	  of	   the	  Zambian	  socio-­‐economic	  
system	  will	  also	  affect	  the	  value	  chain.	  More	  specifically,	  Stave	  &	  Kopainsky	  (forthcoming)	  
argue	  that	  the	  food	  value	  chain,	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  function	  of	  delivering	  a	  sufficient	  food	  
supply	  to	  the	  population,	  is	  susceptible	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  shocks	  even	  in	  developed	  countries.	  
These	   include:	   transportation	   shocks	   (breakdown	   of	   the	   ability	   to	   transport	   food	   due	   to	  
flooding	  or	  fuel	  shortage),	  energy	  shocks	  (breakdown	  of	  the	  ability	  to	  process	  maize	  due	  to	  
a	   lack	   of	   energy),	   population	   shocks	   (loss	   of	   the	  workforce	   necessary	   to	   keep	   the	   value	  
chain	   functioning	   due	   to	   hunger	   or	   disease),	   and	   resource	   shocks	   (impairment	   of	  maize	  
production	   due	   to	   pests,	   droughts,	   floods).	   Furthermore,	   one	   could	   imagine	   economic	  
shocks	  (impediment	  of	  the	  supply	  with	  input	  factors	  for	  maize	  production,	  processing	  and	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transport	  due	   to	  price	  shocks),	  or	   in	   the	  case	  of	  Zambia’s	  unstable	  political	  environment,	  
political	  shocks	  (sudden	  stops	  of	   funding	   for	   fertilizer	  subsidies	  or	  FRA’s	  maize	  purchase	  
and	  storage	  programmes).	  
We	   can	   thus	   conclude	   that	   the	  maize	   value	   chain’s	   capacity	   to	   ensure	   a	   sufficient	  maize	  
supply	  for	  the	  population	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  risks.	  Analysing	  the	  resilience	  towards	  
these	  risks,	  and	  how	  it	   is	  related	  to	  the	  structural	  properties	  of	  the	  value	  chain,	  therefore	  
appears	   to	   be	   a	   useful	   and	   relevant	   endeavour	   –	   as	   developing	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	  
current	  situation	  is	  always	  the	  necessary	  first	  step	  towards	  improving	  it.	  
Apart	  from	  the	  topical	  relevance	  of	  a	  resilience	  perspective	  on	  the	  maize	  value	  chain,	  such	  a	  
study	   would	   also	   constitute	   a	   desirable	   contribution	   to	   the	   theoretical	   discourse	   about	  
resilience,	  as	  many	  authors	  argue	  that	  conducting	  more	  comprehensive	  case	  studies	  is	  the	  
necessary	   next	   step	   towards	   greater	   applicability	   and	   practical	   usefulness	   of	   resilience	  
research	  (Janssen	  &	  Anderies,	  2013).	  
3.4	  Measuring	  the	  Resilience	  of	  Food	  Security	  in	  the	  Value	  Chain	  in	  an	  SD	  Model	  
The	  last	  preparatory	  step	  before	  we	  can	  delve	  into	  the	  details	  of	  the	  model	  and	  the	  ensuing	  
resilience	   analysis	   is	   to	   define	   the	   FOM	   that	  will	   serve	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   that	   analysis.	   To	  
begin	   with,	   I	   want	   to	   remind	   the	   reader	   of	   two	   central	   results	   we	   have	   reached	   so	   far.	  
Firstly,	   we	   found	   out	   in	   section	   2.1	   that	   there	   is	   simply	   not	   enough	   calorific	   supply	   in	  
Zambia	   to	   fulfil	   the	   population’s	   needs	   for	   an	   active	   and	   healthy	   life.	   Therefore,	   my	  
indicator	  will	  focus	  on	  this	  most	  basic	  problem	  dimension:	  availability	  of	  food.	  Secondly,	  as	  
discussed	  in	  section	  2.2,	  due	  to	  the	  paramount	  importance	  of	  maize	  for	  the	  calorific	  supply	  
and	  the	  lack	  of	  resources	  to	  model	  every	  food	  source’s	  supply	  line,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  maize	  as	  a	  
proxy	  for	  food	  security.	  
With	  these	  two	  limitations,	  or	  guidelines,	  in	  mind	  I	  created	  a	  new	  indicator	  that	  is	  based	  on	  
the	  ADESA	  and	  will	  serve	  as	  the	  central	  FOM	  for	  my	  resilience	  analysis.	  As	  laid	  out	  in	  table	  
3,	   ADESA	   is	   an	   indicator	   that	   measures	   the	   availability	   of	   food	   (DES)	   in	   relation	   to	   the	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demand.	  While	   the	   availability	   is	   solely	   determined	   by	   the	   total	   amount	   of	  maize	   in	   the	  
market,	   and	  does	   not	   account	   for	   problems	   concerning	   the	   access	   dimension,	   demand	   is	  
determined	  by	  the	  Average	  Dietary	  Energy	  Requirements	  (ADER).	  The	  ADESA	  calculated	  as	  
a	  ratio	  using	  the	  following	  equation:	  DES/ADER.	  So	  if	  for	  example,	  the	  demand	  for	  food	  per	  
person	   is	   3000	   kcal/day,	   but	   only	   2000	   kcal/day	   can	   be	   consumed	   due	   to	   a	   lack	   of	  
availability,	   the	   ADESA	   takes	   the	   value	   of	   0,67.	   Corollary,	   a	   value	   of	   one	   for	   the	   ADESA	  
indicates	  that	  demand	  is	  met	  completely,	  while	  a	  value	  of	  zero	  shows	  that	  no	  food	  at	  all	  is	  
available.	  
The	   indicator	   I	   intend	   to	   use	   as	   the	   FOM	   for	   my	   resilience	   analysis	   is	   called	   “Adjusted	  
Dietary	   Energy	   Supply	   with	   Maize”	   (ADESM).	   It	   is	   a	   modification	   of	   the	   ADESA	   in	   four	  
respects:	   firstly,	   since	  we	   are	   just	   looking	   at	   the	  maize	   sector	   it	   is	   only	   concerned	  with	  
maize	  instead	  of	  all	   food	  sources.	  Secondly,	  I	  am	  looking	  at	  the	  population	  of	  Zambia	  as	  a	  
whole	  and	  therefore	  aggregate	  all	   individuals’	  ADER	  to	  one	  national	  demand.	  Thirdly,	  my	  
model	  includes	  feedback	  loops	  that	  alter	  demand	  as	  a	  result	  of	  changes	  in	  availability.	  The	  
demand	  in	  the	  model	   is	   thus	  adjusted	  to	  represent	  parts	  of	   the	  access	  dimension	  as	  well.	  
Fourthly,	   the	   availability	   of	   maize	   (equivalent	   to	   the	   DES)	   is	   measured	   in	   terms	   of	  
consumption.	   This	   rests	   on	   the	   simple	   and	   plausible	   assumption	   that	   consumers	   will	  
consume	  whatever	  amount	  they	  demand	  when	  that	  maize	  is	  available	  to	  them.	  
Like	  the	  ADESA,	  the	  ADESM	  is	  measured	  as	  a	  ratio	  between	  zero	  and	  one,	  with	  a	  value	  of	  
one	   representing	   a	   full	   servicing	   of	   the	   adjusted	   demand,	   and	   zero	   indicating	   that	   no	  
consumption	  takes	  place	  at	  all.	  Hence,	  the	  ADESM	  is	  calculated	  using	  the	  following	  formula:	  
𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑆𝑀 =
𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑧𝑒  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑧𝑒  	  
The	  stability	  dimension	   is	   incorporated	   into	  my	  analysis	   insofar	   that	   I	  will	  put	   the	  model	  
under	   stress	   by	   running	   different	   production	   shock	   scenarios.	   The	   development	   of	   the	  
ADESM	  under	  stress	  will	   therefore	  provide	   information	  about	   the	  stability,	  as	  well.	  Thus,	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my	  analysis	  will	  encompass	  three	  of	  the	  four	  dimensions	  of	  food	  security,	  even	  though	  the	  
focus	  is	  clearly	  on	  the	  availability	  dimension.	  
	  
4.	  The	  Model	  
4.1	  Scoping	  
As	  the	  purpose	  should	  determine	  the	  scope	  and	  nature	  of	  a	  model,	   I	  want	  to	  recall	  to	  the	  
reader’s	  attention	  that	  the	  purpose	   is	   to	  answer	  the	  research	  question,	  namely:	  What	  are	  
the	  resilience	  properties	  of	  the	  maize	  value	  chain	  in	  Zambia	  towards	  production	  shocks	  in	  
terms	   of	   ensuring	   sufficient	   maize	   supply,	   and	   how	   can	   the	   resilience	   be	   improved	  
endogenously?	  
The	  main	   indicator	   for	  assessing	  this	   is	   the	  ADESM.	  The	  model	   thus	  needs	  to	  represent	  a	  
plausible	  dynamic	  hypothesis	   for	   the	  behaviour	  of	   the	  ADESM	  –	  which	   then	   can	   later	  be	  
used	  to	  examine	  the	  responses	  to	  production	  shocks	  and	  thus	  assess	  the	  resilience	  of	  the	  
value	  chain	   towards	   these	  shocks.	  But	  before	  presenting	  my	  simulation	  model	   in	  detail,	   I	  
want	  to	  discuss	  the	  rationale	  for	  the	  boundaries	  I	  have	  chosen	  for	  my	  model.	  
4.1.1	  Vertical	  Scoping	  
When	  scoping	  a	  model	  of	  a	  value	  chain,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  start	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  definition	  
of	  what	  a	  value	  chain	  actually	  represents.	  Kaplinsky	  &	  Morris	   (2001:	  p.	  4)	  define	  a	  value	  
chain	   as	   „the	   full	   range	   of	   activities	   which	   are	   required	   to	   bring	   a	   product	   or	   service	   (...)	  
through	   the	   different	   phases	   of	   production	   (involving	   a	   combination	   of	   physical	  
transformation	  and	  the	  input	  of	  various	  producer	  services),	  delivery	  to	  final	  consumers,	  and	  
final	  disposal	  after	  use“.	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A	  value	  chain	  can	  thus	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  supply	  chain	  involving	  a	  multitude	  of	  actors	  that	  
together	  supply	  the	  consumer	  with	  the	  final	  product	  she	  demands	  for	  consumption	  –	  in	  our	  
case	   maize	   meal.	   It	   is	   called	   value	   chain	   because	   every	   activity	   in	   the	   process	   adds	  
economic	  value	  to	  the	  original	  product,	  as	  it	  becomes	  more	  refined	  towards	  better	  meeting	  
the	  demands	  of	  the	  consumers.	  	  
The	  next	   question	   to	   clarify	   is	  which	   inputs	   do	  we	  define	   as	   being	   the	   start	   of	   the	   value	  
chain?	  In	  the	  case	  of	  maize	  meal,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  focus	  on	  maize,	  as	  it	  is	  the	  central	  raw	  
material	   required	   to	   produce	   maize	   meal	   (along	   with	   the	   labour	   and	   capital	   needed	   to	  
refine	  it	  towards	  meal).	  I	  thus	  define	  the	  start	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  as	  being	  the	  production	  of	  
raw	  maize	  by	  farmers	  in	  Zambia.	  Adopting	  this	  product-­‐based	  view	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  then	  has	  to	  be	  the	  consumption	  of	  the	  maize	  meal	  by	  consumers.	  
Since	  a	  central	  aim	  of	  my	  analysis	  is	  to	  uncover	  the	  possible	  frictions	  between	  the	  different	  
actors	   in	   the	   maize	   value	   chain	   in	   Zambia,	   and	   to	   understand	   the	   dynamics	   of	   their	  
interactions,	  I	  will	  define	  raw	  maize	  grain	  as	  the	  original	  input	  and	  not	  go	  into	  the	  details	  of	  
its	   production.	   On	   the	   one	   hand	   this	   helps	   to	   achieve	   conceptual	   clarity,	   as	   maize	  
production	   (transformation	   from	   labour,	   capital	   and	   seed	   inputs	   to	   maize	   grain)	   takes	  
place	  within,	  and	  not	  in	  between,	  a	  single	  class	  of	  actors	  –	  namely	  farmers	  –	  and	  thus	  has	  its	  
own	  peculiar	   logic.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   this	  helps	   to	  keep	  my	   thesis	  within	  a	  manageable	  
scope,	  as	  the	  agricultural	  production	  sector	  alone	  is	  complex	  enough	  to	  constitute	  work	  for	  
another	  research	  endeavour	  (Gerber,	  2015).	  
4.1.2	  Time	  Scoping	  
In	   terms	   of	   choosing	   the	   appropriate	   time	   step	   for	   my	   model,	   it	   was	   important	   for	   my	  
model	   to	   be	   able	   to	   reflect	   the	   strong	   seasonality	   that	   occurs	   throughout	   the	   year	   in	  
Zambia’s	  maize	  sector.	  This	  seasonality	  is	  closely	  connected	  to	  the	  different	  stages	  of	  maize	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marketing	  that	  appear	  throughout	  the	  maize	  marketing	  year3	  in	  Zambia:	  the	  green	  harvest	  
comes	  in	  in	  March	  and	  April,	  followed	  by	  the	  main	  harvest	  in	  May	  and	  June.	  While	  private	  
buyers	   start	   purchasing	   maize	   from	   smallholder	   farmers	   right	   away	   when	   the	   harvest	  
becomes	   available,	   FRA	   only	   purchases	   maize	   in	   the	   official	   government-­‐announced	  
marketing	   season,	   which	   usually	   lasts	   from	   June/July	   until	   the	   end	   of	   September	   or	  
beginning	  of	  October	  (Nyanga,	  2015b).	  While	  maize	  is	  usually	  well	  available	  in	  the	  months	  
following	   the	  harvest	   (the	  “plenty	  season”),	   supplies	  dry	  up	   later	   in	   the	  year	  (Jayne	  et	  al.	  
2009).	  This	  happens	  either	  because	  the	  harvest	  was	  too	  small	  to	  service	  domestic	  demand,	  
or	  because	  large	  FRA	  purchases	  have	  locked	  up	  all	  the	  remaining	  maize	  in	  the	  formal	  value	  
chain,	  so	  that	  consumers	  in	  the	  informal	  chain	  are	  devoid	  of	  supply.	  This	  will	  be	  explained	  
in	  greater	  detail	   later	  on.	  This	  series	  of	  discrete	  events	  and	  the	  observed	  seasonality	  thus	  
required	  my	  model	   to	   run	   in	  months	   and	   include	   a	   number	   of	   discrete	   events	   so	   that	   it	  
could	  capture	  the	  periodic	  dynamics	  of	  the	  maize	  marketing	  sector.	  
In	   terms	   of	   the	   length	   of	   the	   simulation,	   I	   chose	   to	   simulate	   into	   the	   future	   until	   2020.	  
Although	  shocks	  by	  definition	  happen	  quickly	  and	  within	  one	  year,	  I	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  see	  
if	   there	   are	   ensuing	   changes	   in	   the	   patterns	   of	   behaviour	   of	   the	   model	   in	   the	   years	  
following	   the	   shock.	  Furthermore,	   simulating	   several	  years	   into	   the	   future	  enables	  me	   to	  
analyse	   the	   impact	   of	   different	   shock	   events	   happening	   in	   consecutive	   years.	   To	  provide	  
appropriate	   historical	   calibration	   for	   the	   6	   years	   of	   future	   simulation,	   I	   am	   starting	   the	  
simulation	   in	   the	   year	   2004,	   when	   FRA	   started	   (again)	   purchasing	   relevant	   amounts	   of	  
maize	  (Kuteya	  et	  al.,	  2014),	  thereby	  changing	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Zambian	  maize	  market	  to	  
the	  current	  state.	  	  
4.1.3	  Geographical	  and	  Political	  Scoping	  
Since	  my	  aim	  is	  to	  understand	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  maize	  value	  chain	  in	  Zambia,	   it	  seems	  
trivial	   to	  say	   that	   the	  geographical	  boundary	  of	  my	  analysis	  will	  be	  Zambia	  as	  a	  political,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Marketing year refers to the 12-month period, generally from the beginning of a new harvest, over which a crop is 
marketed. In the case of maize in Zambia, the marketing year thus starts in March when the green harvest starts 
coming in and ends at the end February.	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economic	  and	  geographic	  entity.	  However,	   this	  has	   important	   implications	   for	  my	  model.	  
While	  export	  and	  import	  decisions	  are	  made	  and	  financed	  according	  to	  internal	  dynamics,	  
and	  are	  thus	  represented	  in	  the	  model,	  food	  aid	  is	  administered	  by	  external	  agents	  and	  thus	  
not	   portrayed.	   This	   is	   because	   food	   aid	   constitutes	   a	   transfer	   of	   goods	   from	   other	  
geographical	  areas	  and	  political	  entities	  that	  is	  ultimately	  at	  donor	  discretion	  and	  cannot	  be	  
influenced	   by	   actors	   from	   Zambia.	   Since	   the	   research	   question	   is	   to	   find	   out	   what	   the	  
resilience	   properties	   of	   the	   maize	   value	   chain	   in	   Zambia	   are,	   and	   what	   can	   be	   done	   in	  
Zambia	  to	  enhance	  those,	  looking	  at	  food	  aid	  does	  not	  help	  answering	  the	  question	  and	  is	  
thus	  excluded.	  
4.2	  Overview	  of	  the	  Model	  
4.2.1	  Central	  Stock-­‐and-­‐Flow	  Structure	  
The	   first	   task	   in	  creating	   the	  model	  was	   to	  define	   the	  central	   stock-­‐and-­‐flow	  structure	  of	  
the	  value	  chain.	  Building	  on	  the	  research	  of	  USAID	  &	  COMPETE	  (2009),	  Keyser	  (2007)	  and	  
Leathers	  (1999)	  Kang’ethe	  (2011)	  and	  Kirimi	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  about	  agricultural	  value	  chains	  
in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  I	  conceptualized	  the	  main	  actors	  in	  the	  value	  chain	  to	  be:	  
• Farmers:	  producing	  the	  original	  product	  of	  maize	  grain	  
• Assemblers:	  acting	  as	  brokers	  for	  grain	  between	  farmers	  and	  millers	  
• Millers:	  milling	  and	  refining	  the	  grain	  to	  different	  types	  of	  meal	  
• Wholesalers:	  brokering	  the	  meal	  from	  large	  scale	  millers	  to	  retailers	  
• Retailers:	  selling	  the	  final	  product	  to	  consumers	  
• Consumers:	  purchasing	  and	  consuming	  maize	  meal	  
Transforming	   this	   information	   into	   a	   stock-­‐and-­‐flow	   structure	   of	   maize,	   the	   relations	  
would	  look	  like	  displayed	  in	  figure	  4.	  




Figure	  4:	  First	  conceptual	  formal	  maize	  value	  chain	  model	  
However,	  from	  the	  aforementioned	  sources	  it	  also	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  real	  dynamics	  of	  
the	  maize	  value	  chain	  in	  Zambia	  were	  messier	  and	  less	  strictly	  compartmentalized	  than	  in	  
the	  conceptual	  view	  presented	  above.	  The	  most	  important	  differences	  were:	  
• There	   is	   a	   second,	   less	   formalized	   value	   chain	   involving	   consumers	   buying	   their	  
grain	  directly	  from	  farmers	  or	  grain	  retailers	  and	  milling	  it	  themselves	  using	  small	  
hammer	  mills	  throughout	  the	  country	  (USAID	  &	  COMPETE,	  2009:	  chapter	  4).	  
• Farmers	  do	  not	  always	  sell	  to	  assemblers,	  some	  also	  directly	  sell	  to	  millers	  or	  even	  
to	  grain	  retailers	  (Leathers,	  1999:	  chapter	  5).	  
• Wholesale	  and	  retail	  marketing	  activities	  can	  in	  Zambia	  not	  clearly	  be	  distinguished	  
from	  each	  other.	  Many	  actors	  partake	  in	  selling	  meal	  from	  millers	  to	  consumers	  and	  
they	  mostly	  do	  not	  fulfil	  clearly	  specified	  roles	  in	  the	  sales	  process	  (Nyanga,	  2015b).	  
• The	  FRA	  has	  a	  very	  large	  impact	  on	  the	  maize	  market	  (N.	  M.	  Mason	  &	  Myers,	  2011),	  
which	   can,	   depending	   on	   political	   decisions	   for	   funding	   and	   purchase	   goals,	  
completely	  alter	  the	  market	  dynamics	  in	  a	  given	  year	  (Kuteya	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  
Bearing	  these	  findings	  in	  mind,	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  adapt	  the	  stock-­‐and-­‐flow	  from	  figure	  4	  






















Figure	  5:	  Adapted	  stock-­‐and-­‐flow	  structure	  maize	  value	  chain	  
As	  you	  will	  notice,	  the	  new	  structure	  represents	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  essentially	  two	  value	  
chains	  for	  maize	  in	  Zambia:	  
There	   is	   the	  more	   formalized	  avenue	   shown	  at	   the	  bottom	   in	   figure	  4,	   involving	   farmers	  
selling	  either	  directly	  or	  through	  small-­‐scale	  assemblers	  to	  large	  commercial	  millers,	  these	  
millers	  milling	  and	  refining	   the	  grain	   to	  different	   types	  of	  meal,	   selling	   it	   to	  retailers	  and	  
these	  retailers	  then	  selling	  their	  bags	  of	  maize	  meal	  to	  consumers,	  who	  finally	  consume	  the	  
product.	   The	   FRA	   is	   also	   involved	   in	   this	   avenue,	   as	   it	   purchases	   large	   amounts	   of	   grain	  
from	  farmers,	  then	  selling	  it	  to	  large	  commercial	  millers	  later	  in	  the	  year.	  (N.	  M.	  Mason	  &	  
Myers,	  2011)	  
However,	   there	   is	  also	   the	   less	   formalized	  avenue,	  which	   is	   formed	  by	  consumers	  buying	  
grain	   directly	   from	   farmers	   (in	   rural	   settings),	   or	   from	   informal	   grain	   retailers	   that	  
purchase	  grain	  from	  small	  maize	  assemblers	  or	  farmers.	  These	  consumers	  then	  bring	  their	  
grain	  to	  small	  hammer	  mills	  throughout	  the	  country	  to	  transform	  it	  into	  whole	  grain	  maize	  
meal,	  which	  is	  then	  taken	  home	  and	  eventually	  consumed	  by	  them	  (Leathers,	  1999:	  chapter	  
5).	   I	   will	   call	   this	   the	   “informal	   value	   chain”	   from	   now	   on,	   as	   the	   name	   represents	   the	  
division	  between	  this	  avenue	  that	  involves	  many	  small-­‐scale	  informal	  actors,	  and	  the	  other	  
avenue	   discussed	   in	   the	   paragraph	   above,	   which	   includes	   bigger	   actors	   with	   more	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Apart	  from	  adding	  the	  informal	  value	  chain	  and	  FRA	  to	  the	  structure,	  you	  will	  notice	  that	  
also	  the	  formal	  value	  chain	  has	  changed	  from	  the	  first	  conceptual	  sketch	  in	  figure	  4.	  I	  will	  
discuss	  the	  changes	  in	  detail	  below.	  
Since	   there	   is	   hardly	   any	   information	   about	   residence	   or	   adjustment	   times	   for	   many	  
processes	   in	   the	  maize	  value	   chain	   in	   the	   literature,	   I	   relied	  on	  estimates	  by	  experts.	  My	  
interview	  with	   Nyanga	   (2015b)	   concluded	   that	   urban	   retailers	   only	   stock	  maize	   for	   1-­‐2	  
weeks,	  as	  the	  majority	  of	  urban	  maize	  sales	  is	  done	  through	  street	  vendors	  or	  in	  big	  market	  
spaces	   consisting	   of	   a	   congregation	   of	   small	   independent	   salesmen.	   With	   the	   residence	  
time	  of	   the	  stock	  being	  so	  small	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  model’s	   time	  step,	   I	  chose	  to	  represent	  
retailing	  as	  a	   flow	   instead	  of	  a	   stock.	   I	   further	  added	  milling	   to	   that	   flow	  because	  milling	  
takes	  only	  a	  few	  hours	  and	  is	  thus	  so	  negligible	  as	  a	  delay	  that	  it	  I	  felt	  it	  could	  be	  subsumed	  
into	  the	  retailing	  flow	  in	  the	  formal	  value	  chain.	  
Concerning	   retailing	   in	   the	   informal	   value	   chain:	   in	   rural	   areas,	   there	   is	   normally	   no	  
developed	  retail	  sector	  at	  all:	  local	  smallholder	  farmers	  just	  keep	  their	  grain	  stored	  and	  sell	  
it	  directly	  to	  other	  people	  in	  the	  area	  at	  their	  farm	  gate.	  In	  urban	  areas,	  small-­‐scale	  informal	  
retailers	  buy	  grain	  from	  farmers	  or	  assemblers	  and	  sell	  it	  to	  consumers.	  (Nyanga,	  2015b)	  I	  
subsumed	  these	  activities	  in	  the	  “informal	  grain	  retailing”	  flow	  that	  brings	  the	  maize	  from	  
smallholder	  farmers	  to	  consumers.	  	  
Furthermore,	   you	  will	   notice	   that	   the	  wholesale	   sector	   does	   not	   explicitly	   appear	   in	   the	  
model	   any	  more.	   This	   is	   due	   to	   the	   finding	   that	   there	   simply	   is	   no	   developed	  wholesale	  
market	  with	  wholesalers	   stocking	  meaningful	   amounts	   of	  maize	   or	   performing	   strategic	  
purchasing	   and	   selling	   behaviour	   (Nyanga,	   2015b).	   Instead,	   those	   small-­‐scale	  
entrepreneurs	  who	  perform	  functions	  closest	  to	  what	  one	  might	  understand	  as	  wholesaling	  
(linking	  meal/grain	  producers	  to	  retailers),	  mostly	  act	  as	  mere	  agents	  of	  retailer	  demand	  
for	   maize.	   Furthermore,	   in	   many	   cases	   the	   retailer	   himself	   purchases	   directly	   from	   the	  
producer,	  especially	  in	  the	  informal	  value	  chain.	  It	  thus	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  subsume	  their	  
activities	  into	  the	  retailing	  flow	  as	  well.	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Finally,	  I	  assume	  that	  millers	  prefer	  to	  store	  their	  maize	  in	  the	  form	  of	  grain	  and	  only	  keep	  
a	   small	   storage	   of	   milled	  maize,	   as	   maize	  meal	   is	   much	  more	   vulnerable	   to	   loss	   due	   to	  
moisture	   or	   pests.	   I	   therefore	   neglect	   the	   miller’s	   maize	   storage	   in	   my	   value	   chain	  
structure.	  
4.2.2	  Overview	  of	  Dynamics	  
Before	  we	  delve	   into	   the	  specifics	  of	   the	  model,	   I	  want	   to	  provide	   the	  reader	  with	  a	  very	  
short	  overview	  in	  the	  main	  dynamics	  of	  the	  model	  that	  will	  help	  to	  categorize	  the	  detailed	  
information	  provided	  later	  in	  this	  chapter.	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The	   first	   thing	   I	   want	   to	   draw	   attention	   to	   is	   the	   typical	   backwards-­‐induced	   feedback	  
structure	  of	   the	   value	   chain,	  where	  demand	   from	  downstream	  actors	  drives	   the	  demand	  
from	  the	  next	  actor	  upstream	  in	  a	  cascade;	  this	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  positive	  links	  between	  
the	  flows.	  
Next,	   we	   see	   two	   loops	   altering	   informal	   demand	   in	   response	   to	   availability.	   The	  
counteracting	   loop	   C1	   represents	   how	   informal	   consumers	   adjust	   their	   demand	  
downwards	  in	  times	  of	  limited	  availability,	  and	  ensuing	  high	  prices	  for	  maize.	  Note	  that	  this	  
downward	   adjustment	   is	   limited	   by	   a	   lower	   bound	   that	   corresponds	   to	   the	   minimum	  
dietary	  energy	  requirements	  by	  FAO	  (2014).	  	  
C2	  shows	   that,	  when	  not	  enough	  maize	   is	  available	   in	   the	   informal	  value	  chain	   to	   satisfy	  
even	  the	  adjusted	  lower	  demand,	  the	  informal	  consumers	  will	  have	  to	  resort	  to	  buying	  the	  
more	  expensive	  roller	  meal:	  this	  reduces	  demand	  in	  the	  informal	  value	  chain	  and	  increases	  
demand	   in	   the	   formal	   value	   chain.	   This	   spill	   over	   of	   demand	   happens	   progressively	  
stronger	  in	  the	  lean	  season	  as	  grain	  in	  the	  informal	  value	  chain	  becomes	  scarcer;	  and	  this	  
process	   leads	   to	   fluctuations	   and	   an	   ensuing	   bullwhip	   effect	   in	   the	   formal	   value	   chain.	  
When	  maize	  becomes	  available	  in	  the	  informal	  value	  chain	  again	  with	  the	  next	  harvest,	  the	  
demand	  returns	  to	  the	  level	  of	  the	  original	  informal	  demand.	  
The	  link	  between	  the	  informal	  customer	  demand	  and	  the	  consumption	  is	  only	  represented	  
as	  a	  dotted	  line	  because	  the	  consumption	  only	  depends	  on	  the	  demand	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  upper	  
bound.	  However,	   the	   gap	  between	  demand	  and	   consumption	   is	   actually	   is	   caused	  by	   the	  
lack	  of	  maize	  supply	  coming	  through	  the	  flows	  from	  upstream.	  The	  loop	  involving	  this	  link	  
is	  therefore	  not	  really	  a	  reinforcing	  loop	  and	  I	  thus	  did	  not	  label	  it	  accordingly.	  
Loop	  C3	  represents	  FRA’s	  policy	  to	  release	  its	  reserves	  when	  there	  is	  a	  supply	  shortage	  in	  
the	   formal	  value	  chain	  to	  stabilize	  prices	  and	  supply.	  The	  feedback	  from	  the	  FRA	  sales	  to	  
consumption	   is	   implicit	   in	   the	   flow	   structure	   bringing	   the	   maize	   from	   the	   FRA	   to	  
consumers	  –	  the	  more	  maize	  FRA	  releases,	  the	  more	  is	  of	  course	  available	  to	  consumers	  in	  
the	   long	   run	   for	   consumption.	   Note,	   however,	   that	   this	   feedback	   loop	   is	   limited	   by	   the	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amount	  of	  FRA’s	  reserves	  –	  once	   they	  have	  released	  everything	   in	   their	  storage,	   the	   loop	  
cannot	  unfold	  any	  more	  impact.	  
Moreover,	  I	  want	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  FRA’s	  purchasing	  decisions	  for	  the	  
behaviour	  of	  the	  value	  chain.	  The	  more	  maize	  FRA	  purchases,	  the	  fewer	  maize	  is	  available	  
for	   private	   traders	   to	   buy	   from	   smallholder	   farmers	   –	   and	   the	   fewer	   they	   can	   buy,	   the	  
smaller	  becomes	  the	  supply	  with	  maize	  for	  the	  informal	  value	  chain.	  This	  again	  has	  effects	  
on	  when	  the	  demand	  spill	  over	  loop	  becomes	  active.	  
Finally,	   note	   that	   there	   are	   a	  number	  of	   stocks	   and	  delays	   involved	   in	   the	   route	   that	   the	  
maize	   takes	   from	   harvest	   to	   consumption.	   These	   will	   become	   important	   later	   in	   my	  
analysis,	  as	  they	  mediate	  the	  effects	  of	  production	  shocks	  on	  the	  ADESM.	  
4.3	  Assumptions	  
Since	  any	  model	   is	  an	  abstraction	  of	  reality,	   it	  always	  has	  to	  rely	  on	  a	  set	  of	  assumptions	  
that	  allow	  a	  simplification	  of	  the	  real	  world’s	  complexity.	  As	  my	  model	   is	  no	  exception	  to	  
that	  rule,	  I	  had	  to	  work	  with	  a	  number	  of	  assumptions	  that	  I	  will	  make	  explicit	  and	  discuss	  
in	  this	  section.	  
4.3.1	  Modelling	  Impact	  of	  Prices	  
A	   certain	   limitation	   of	  my	  model	   in	   terms	   of	   depicting	   reality	   one-­‐to-­‐one	   is	   the	   fact	   that	  
price	  is	  not	  included	  explicitly.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  proved	  impossible	  to	  get	  data	  
about	  prices	  in	  such	  largely	  informal	  markets	  without	  extensive	  field	  research.	  However,	  I	  
used	   information	   about	   relative	   availability	   of	  maize	   and	  permanent	  price	  differences	   as	  
proxies	  for	  the	  effects	  of	  price.	  Whenever	  possible,	  I	  tried	  to	  ground	  these	  effects	  in	  expert	  
estimates	  or	  academic	  literature.	  These	  implicit	  impacts	  of	  price	  will	  be	  presented	  in	  detail	  
in	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  model	  structure	  in	  chapters	  4.4	  through	  4.8.	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4.3.2	  Post-­‐Harvest	  Losses	  
Most	   physical	   losses	   of	   maize	   in	   the	   post-­‐harvest	   handling	   of	   maize	   occur	   due	   to	  
inappropriate	   storage	   that	   allows	   fungi	   and	   other	   pests	   to	   thrive	   (Hodges	   &	   Bernard,	  
2014).	  Although	   these	   losses	   can	  occur	   at	   almost	   any	   level	   of	   the	   value	   chain,	   I	   chose	   to	  
only	  explicitly	  incorporate	  them	  into	  my	  model	  where	  they	  appear	  at	  a	  relevant	  scale.	  This	  
means	  leaving	  out	  those	  instances	  where	  losses	  are	  negligibly	   low	  due	  to	  the	  use	  of	  good	  
storage	  facilities	  or	  small	  residence	  time	  in	  the	  storage.	  This	  applies	  to	  the	  customer	  meal	  
and	  grain	  storages,	  which	  only	  have	  residence	  time	  of	  1	  and	  respectively	  3	  months	  in	  my	  
model4,	   and	   to	   the	   commercial	   millers	   which	   only	   stock	  maize	   for	   1	  month	   and	   can	   be	  
assumed	   to	   have	   quite	   good	   storage	   facilities.	   The	   residence	   time	   for	   maize	   in	   all	   the	  
storages	  I	  just	  mentioned	  stays	  below	  the	  critical	  3	  months-­‐mark;	  and	  only	  after	  3	  months	  
do	   losses	   really	   start	   to	   become	   relevant	   according	   to	   the	   African	   Postharvest	   Losses	  
Information	  System	  (2015).	  Losses	  in	  the	  milling	  process	  are	  explicitly	  modelled	  according	  
to	  data	  from	  academic	  literature	  due	  to	  their	  rather	  large	  extent.	  
4.3.3	  Animal	  Maize	  Feed	  
Looking	  at	  the	  model,	  the	  reader	  might	  wonder	  why	  there	  is	  no	  explicit	  representation	  of	  
the	  demand	  for	  maize	  as	  animal	  feed,	  which	  according	  to	  USAID	  &	  COMPETE	  (2009:	  table	  
8)	   does	   exist.	   The	   reason	   for	   that	   is	   twofold:	   first,	   the	   only	   large	   commercial	   animal	  
products	  producer	  of	  the	  country	  “Zambeef”	  also	  possesses	  large	  amounts	  of	  farmland	  that	  
can	  provide	   for	   their	  own	  animals’	  dietary	  needs	   (Zambeef	  Products	  PLC,	  2015).	  Second,	  
there	  is	  a	  big	  amount	  of	  bran	  and	  germ	  meal	  production	  involved	  in	  the	  commercial	  milling	  
process:	  9%	  as	  estimated	  by	  Keyser	   (2007:	   table	  49).	  According	   to	  Tambulukani	   (2014),	  
livestock	   farmers	   only	   use	   bran	   or	   germ	  meal	   for	   animal	   feed	   –	   probably	   because	   it	   is	  
cheaper	  than	  the	  meal	  from	  the	  kernel	  (which	  is	  the	  one	  sold	  to	  consumers),	  and	  to	  avoid	  
political	  controversies	  about	  the	  use	  of	  consumer	  maize	  for	  animal	  feed.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  To	  be	  precise,	  these	  are	  the	  coverage	  times	  for	  the	  respective	  stocks,	  but	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  
customers	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  problems	  of	  long	  storage	  times	  for	  maize	  and	  thus	  consume	  maize	  according	  to	  
the	  “last	  in	  first	  out”	  principle.	  




Maize	  exports	  in	  Zambia	  are	  strongly	  driven	  by	  discretionary	  political	  decisions	  rather	  than	  
pure	  market	  dynamics,	  and	  are	  thus	  very	  hard	  to	  conceptualize	  in	  all	  their	  complexity	  and	  
messiness.	   The	   government	   uses	   a	  multitude	   of	   tools,	   incl.	   export	   bans,	   to	   influence	   the	  
external	  maize	  trade.	  (Dorosh,	  Dradri,	  &	  Haggblade,	  2009;	  N.	  M.	  Mason	  &	  Myers,	  2011).	   I	  
therefore	   needed	   to	   make	   a	   few	   assumptions	   to	   be	   able	   to	   formulate	   the	   dynamics	   for	  
maize	  exports.	  First,	  I	  assume	  that	  only	  FRA	  and	  big	  commercial	  farmers	  have	  the	  means	  to	  
export,	  while	  smallholder	  generally	  do	  not	  due	  to	  their	  limited	  overall	  business	  capabilities.	  
Second,	   I	   assume	   that	   the	  government	   lifts	   the	  export	  bans	   for	  big	   farmers	  only	   in	  years	  
when	  smallholder	  production	  is	  well	  sufficient	  to	  meet	  domestic	  demand	  (see	  chapter	  4.6.4	  
for	  more	  details).	  Third,	  since	  FRA	  is	  a	  political	   tool	   to	  ensure	  sufficient	  maize	  supply	  for	  
the	  population,	  I	  assume	  that	  it	  would	  not	  make	  sense	  for	  them	  to	  export	  while	  there	  is	  still	  
domestic	  demand	  for	  their	  maize.	  Following	  Nyanga's	  (2015a)	  observation	  that	  FRA	  starts	  
trying	   to	   offload	   their	   excess	   stocks	   (those	   exceeding	   their	   desired	   buffer	   stocks)	   when	  
they	  receive	  information	  about	  the	  new	  harvest	  trough	  the	  new	  Crop	  Forecast	  Survey	  (CFS)	  
in	   March,	   I	   assume	   that	   FRA	   sells/exports	   their	   excess	   stocks	   starting	   in	   March	   and	  
finishing	  in	  May	  before	  their	  next	  purchasing	  season	  starts.	  
Finally,	  I	  have	  to	  note	  that	  FRA	  maize	  is	  often	  not	  competitive	  on	  international	  markets	  due	  
to	   their	   above-­‐market	   purchasing	  prices.	  However,	   since	   FRA’s	   silo	   capacity	   is	   still	   quite	  
limited	  compared	  to	   the	  volumes	  they	  purchased	   in	   the	   last	  years	  (Bou	  Schreiber,	  2015),	  
and	   losses	   in	   their	   non-­‐silo	   storages	   grow	   exponentially	   with	   the	   residence	   time	   of	   the	  
maize,	  I	  assume	  that	  FRA	  prefers	  to	  sell	  their	  excess	  stocks	  at	  a	  deficit	  rather	  than	  to	  have	  
them	  simply	  rot	  away.	  
4.3.5	  Imports	  
I	  assume	  that	  private	  maize	  imports	  are	  negligible,	  as	  they	  are	  generally	  discouraged	  and	  
hindered	   through	   discretionary	   government	   interventions,	   inefficient	   bureaucratic	  
processes	  and	   the	   fear	  of	  having	   to	  compete	  with	  subsidized	  FRA	  maize	  on	   the	  domestic	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market	  (Dorosh	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  In	  my	  model,	  all	  imports	  thus	  run	  through	  FRA,	  which	  is	  the	  
agency	  charged	  with	  carrying	  out	  governmental	  maize	  imports.	  
Concerning	   black	   cross-­‐border	   trade	   with	   the	   neighbouring	   countries,	   there	   is	   hardly	  
reliable	   information	   on	   it,	   but	   estimates	   show	   that	   the	   volume	   is	   so	   negligibly	   low	   in	  
relation	  to	  the	  domestic	  market	  (Chapoto,	  Chisanga,	  Kuteya,	  &	  Kabwe,	  2015),	  that	  it	  seems	  
justifiable	  to	  neglect	  them	  in	  the	  model,	  as	  well.	  
4.3.6	  Capacity	  constraints	  
The	  value	  chain	  in	  my	  model	  does,	  except	  for	  storage	  facilities	  in	  FRA,	  not	  feature	  capacity	  
constraints.	  The	  rationale	  behind	  this	  is	  that	  consumer	  demand	  (except	  in	  the	  case	  of	  FRA)	  
determines	  the	  quantities	  handled	  upstream	  in	  the	  value	  chain,	  and	  that	  per	  capita	  demand	  
for	   the	   staple	   food	  maize	   is	   very	   unlikely	   to	   suddenly	   and	   significantly	   change	   its	   scope	  
from	  one	  year	  to	  another.	  As	  such,	  actors	  in	  the	  value	  chain	  can	  well	  adapt	  to	  the	  long-­‐term	  
and	  rather	  smooth	  upward	  changes	  in	  demand,	  making	  it	  unlikely	  that	  they	  suddenly	  find	  
themselves	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  an	  unexpected	  spike	  in	  total	  demand	  necessitates	  handling	  
a	   significantly	   higher	   volume	   of	   maize	   and	   lets	   them	   face	   capacity	   constraints.	  
Furthermore,	   even	   in	   the	   years	   of	   unusually	   high	   bumper	   harvest	   (2010-­‐14),	  millers	   or	  
retailers	  have	  not	   empirically	  been	  observed	   to	  have	   significant	  problems	   to	  process	   the	  
requested	  amounts	  of	  maize.	  
4.4	  Subsistence	  Sector	  
Subsistence	   production	   is	   maize	   that	   is	   produced	   and	   then	   consumed	   by	   the	   producing	  
farmers	  themselves.	  It	  never	  enters	  the	  market	  and	  the	  value	  chain	  and	  is	  thus	  not	  relevant	  
for	  my	  analysis.	  However,	  subsistence	  production	  is	  still	  important	  for	  my	  model	  insofar	  it	  
satisfies	  a	  certain	  share	  of	  national	  demand.	  Fluctuations	   in	  the	  subsistence	  demand	  thus	  
simply	   mean	   for	   my	   model	   that	   those	   75%	   of	   smallholders	   who	   produce	   mainly	   for	  
subsistence	  (Zulu	  et	  al.,	  2007)	  were	  able	  to	  satisfy	  their	  own	  demand	  for	  maize	  to	  a	  greater	  
or	  lesser	  degree	  than	  in	  the	  previous	  year.	  Corollary,	  their	  need	  to	  top	  up	  their	  own	  maize	  
stocks	  with	  externally	  purchased	  maize	  just	  becomes	  lower	  or	  higher	  by	  the	  same	  amount	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that	  subsistence	  production	  fluctuates.	  The	  subsistence	  production	  is	  thus	  simply	  deducted	  
from	  total	  demand	  (including	  a	  mark-­‐down	  for	  losses	  occurring	  in	  storage	  and	  milling)	  to	  
yield	  the	  demand	  for	  marketed	  maize.	  
4.5	  Demand	  Sector	  
Since	  reliable	  data	  about	  maize	  demand	  in	  Zambia	  could	  not	  be	  found,	  I	  had	  to	  devise	  a	  way	  
to	  calculate	  it	  myself.	  I	  did	  this	  the	  following	  way:	  multiplying	  the	  total	  population	  with	  the	  
ADER	  for	  Zambia	  of	  2112	  calories/day	  (FAO,	  2014)	  and	  with	   the	  ratio	  of	  calorific	  supply	  
that	   is	   covered	  with	  maize	   (0,502	  according	   to	  FAO	   (2015b))	   gives	   the	   total	  demand	   for	  
maize	  in	  kcal	  per	  day.	  Dividing	  this	  value	  by	  the	  calories	  per	  metric	  ton	  of	  maize	  (UNHCR,	  
UNICEF,	  WFP,	  2002:	  annex	  5)	  and	  multiplying	  it	  with	  the	  number	  of	  days	  per	  year	  gives	  the	  
yearly	   demand	   for	   metric	   tons	   of	   maize	   in	   Zambia.	   From	   this,	   I	   deduct	   the	   subsistence	  
production	   in	   the	  manner	   explained	   above	   to	   get	   the	   total	   yearly	   demand	   for	  marketed	  
maize	  in	  Zambia.	  	  
The	  next	  step	  is	  to	  divide	  the	  demand	  between	  consumers	  that	  prefer	  to	  buy	  grain	  (driving	  
the	   “informal	   consumption”)	   and	   those	   who	   prefer	   commercially	   produced	   roller	   meal	  
(driving	  the	  “formal	  consumption).	  In	  general,	  low-­‐income	  households	  prefer	  to	  buy	  grain	  
over	   meal,	   as	   purchasing	   grain	   and	   bringing	   it	   to	   local	   hammer	   mills	   is	   distinctively	  
cheaper	   than	   buying	   readymade	   commercially	   milled	   maize	   meal	   (Jayne	   et	   al.,	   2009:	  
chapter	   6).	   Since	   the	   rural	   population	   is	   generally	   poorer	   than	   the	   urban	   population,	   it	  
seems	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  ratio	  of	  maize	  demand	  for	  grain	  is	  higher	  in	  rural	  than	  
urban	  areas.	  Using	  data	  for	  maize	  grain	  vs.	  meal	  consumption	  in	  selected	  cities	  in	  Zambia	  
from	   the	   latest	   available	   urban	   consumption	   survey	   (Nicole	   Mason	   &	   Jayne,	   2009),	   I	  
calculated	  a	  national	  average	  for	  urban	  consumers:	  when	  grain	  supply	  is	  not	  constrained,	  
33%	  of	  urban	  consumers	  prefer	  to	  buy	  grain	  and	  67%	  prefer	  to	  buy	  meal	  (cf.	  appendix	  C.5).	  
For	   the	   consumers	   in	   rural	   areas,	  however,	   such	  micro-­‐data	   is	  not	  available,	  wherefore	   I	  
had	   to	   rely	   on	   expert	   estimates:	   Nyanga	   (2015a)	   estimated	   that	   95%	   of	   the	   rural	  
population	  prefer	  to	  buy	  grain	  –	  the	  5%	  who	  resort	  to	  meal	  are	  a	  small	  class	  made	  up	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
	  
37
mainly	  of	  wealthy	  civil	  servants	   that	  have	  higher	   incomes	  and	  regularly	   travel	   to	   the	  city	  
where	  they	  can	  buy	  maize	  meal.	  Using	  this	  information,	  I	  can	  calculate	  the	  monthly	  demand	  
for	   grain	   (“original	   demand	   informal”)	   and	   the	   monthly	   demand	   for	   meal	   (“original	  
demand	  formal”).	   I	  chose	  the	  term	  “original”,	  since	  the	  feedback	  from	  shifting	  availability	  
and	   prices	   is	   not	   accounted	   for	   yet.	   An	   overview	   of	   the	   demand	   sector	   can	   be	   found	   in	  
figure	  7.	  
	  
Figure	  7:	  Demand	  sector	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4.6	  Formal	  Value	  Chain	  
An	  overview	  of	  the	  formal	  value	  chain	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  figure	  8.	  The	  stock-­‐and-­‐flow	  structure	  
is	   just	  as	  described	   in	  chapter	  4.2.	   In	  the	   following	  section,	   I	  will	  explain	  the	  dynamics	  of	  
the	   formal	   value	   chain	   in	   greater	   detail	   and	   establish	   the	   links	   to	   the	   literature	   by	  
explaining	  why	  I	  chose	  to	  model	  the	  structure	  in	  the	  way	  presented.	  Since	  the	  value	  chain’s	  
behaviour	  is	  driven	  by	  consumer	  demand,	  I	  will	  start	  my	  explanation	  with	  the	  consumers	  
and	   successively	  move	   upstream,	   just	   as	   the	   information	   feedback	   along	   the	   value	   chain	  
does.	  
4.6.1	  Millers	  and	  consumers	  
	  
Figure	  9:	  Millers	  and	  consumers	  
Since	  FRA’s	  behaviour	  is	  mostly	  driven	  by	  highly	  discretionary	  political	  decisions	  (Chapoto	  
et	  al.,	  2015;	  N.	  M.	  Mason	  &	  Myers,	  2011),	  modelling	  their	  behaviour	  as	  a	  perfectly	  rational	  
economic	   agent	   did	   not	   work.	   For	   the	   other	   actors	   further	   upstream	   (millers,	   retailers,	  
consumers),	   however,	   I	   assume	   they	   exhibit	   typical	   behaviour	   of	   economic	   agents	   in	   a	  
market,	  i.e.	  trying	  to	  maximize	  their	  utility	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  resources	  spent.	  I	  thus	  used	  an	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adaptation	  of	   the	  well-­‐established	   framework	   for	  modelling	   supply	   chain	   interactions,	   as	  
laid	  out	  by	  Sterman	  (2000:	  chapters	  17-­‐18).	  
The	   original	   driver	   for	   behaviour	   in	   the	   formal	   maize	   value	   chain	   is	   the	   demand	   by	  
consumers	  for	  maize	  meal.	  This	  demand	  determines	  the	  consumption	  of	  maize	  from	  their	  
home	  storages,	  which	  is	  typically	  in	  the	  form	  of	  large	  bags	  of	  maize	  meal	  intended	  to	  cover	  
1	  month’s	  consumption	  (Nyanga	  2015a).	  In	  order	  to	  keep	  up	  an	  adequate	  home	  storage	  of	  
maize	  and	  to	  cover	  their	  daily	  consumption,	  consumers	  purchase	  maize	  from	  retailers.	  As	  
explained	  in	  section	  4.2.1,	  intermediate	  traders	  are	  subsumed	  into	  the	  flow	  from	  millers	  to	  
consumers;	   so	   that	   the	   consumer’s	   demand	   for	  maize	   refill	   directly	   governs	   the	   “milling	  
and	   retailing”	   outflow	   from	   the	  millers’	   storage.	   Furthermore,	   millers	   also	   sell	   maize	   to	  
breweries	  producing	  maize	  beer	  (USAID	  &	  COMPETE,	  2009).	  
Since	   commercial	  millers	   typically	   produce	   roller	  meal	   of	   higher	   finesse,	   the	  maize	   bran	  
and	  germ	  are	  separated	  from	  the	  kernel	  before	  milling,	  and	  about	  9%	  of	  the	  weight	  is	  lost	  
in	   the	   transformation	   from	   grain	   to	   roller	  meal.	   Adding	   other	   production	   losses	   to	   this,	  
Keyser	   (2007:	   table	   49)	   estimates	   that	   a	   total	   weight	   loss	   of	   11%	   occurs	   in	   the	   roller	  
milling	   process.	   I	   assume	   that	   commercial	   milling	   companies	   know	   their	   production	  
process	   quite	   well	   and	   thus	   adjust	   their	   internal	   order	   rate	   upwards	   to	   account	   for	   the	  
losses	  –	  so	  that	  their	  final	  output	  will	  match	  downstream	  demand.	  Their	  internal	  order	  rate	  
then	   determines	   the	  millers’	   demand	   for	  maize	   grain:	   they	  want	   to	   cover	   one	  month	   of	  
production	  and	  adjust	  for	  their	  outflows.	  
Millers	   have	   three	   options	   where	   to	   purchase	   the	   grain	   they	   need:	   directly	   from	  
smallholder	  farmers,	  or	  from	  brokers	  that	  buy	  from	  smallholders	  themselves	  (subsumed	  in	  
the	  “commercial	  maize	  assemblage”	  flow);	  from	  big	  commercial	  farmers;	  or	  from	  FRA.	  To	  
reflect	  the	  fact	  that	  FRA	  maize	  is	  usually	  more	  expensive	  than	  maize	  from	  other	  sources	  (N.	  
M.	  Mason	  &	  Myers,	  2011),	  I	  modelled	  the	  millers’	  purchasing	  behaviour	  so	  that	  they	  prefer	  
to	  buy	  from	  farmers	  first,	  and	  only	  if	  that	  source	  dries	  up,	  they	  turn	  to	  FRA	  for	  purchases.	  
Furthermore,	   it	   can	   take	   longer	   to	   purchase	   from	   FRA	   due	   to	   bureaucratic	   procedures	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(reflected	  in	  the	  higher	  adjustment	  time)	  (Nyanga,	  2015a),	  which	  further	  contributes	  to	  the	  
millers’	  preference	  to	  purchase	  from	  sources	  other	  than	  FRA.	  
4.6.2	  The	  Food	  Reserve	  Agency	  
The	  next	  actor	  upstream	  from	  the	  millers	  is	  the	  Food	  Reserve	  Agency	  (FRA),	  an	  overview	  of	  
the	  corresponding	  model	  structure	  is	  visible	  in	  figure	  10.	  
	  
Figure	  10:	  FRA	  structure	  
FRA	  has	  different	  kinds	  of	  storages	  in	  many	  locations	  around	  Zambia.	  Farmers	  first	  bring	  
their	   maize	   to	   the	   nearest	   local	   FRA	   sales	   point,	   which	   normally	   consists	   of	   temporary	  
storage	   facilities,	   such	   as	   slabs.	   These	   facilities	   are	   usually	   not	   well	   protected	   and	   thus	  
exhibit	   high	   loss	   ratios.	  Maize	   is	   then	  moved	   from	   there	   to	   satellite	   storages	   in	   regional	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centres,	  which	  feature	  more	  elaborate	  permanent	  storage	  facilities,	  such	  as	  sheds	  and	  silos.	  
Sheds,	  however,	  still	  have	  quite	  high	   loss	  ratios	   in	   the	  medium	  term	  and	  only	  silos	  really	  
keep	  maize	  largely	  unaffected	  by	  pests,	  moisture	  and	  fungi.	  (Bou	  Schreiber,	  2015)	  
I	   therefore	   assume	   that	   FRA	   puts	   as	   much	   maize	   into	   their	   silos	   as	   their	   silo	   capacity	  
allows.	  Once	  these	  are	  full,	  the	  next	  best	  storage	  option	  is	  to	  put	  the	  maize	  into	  the	  sheds.	  
And	  only	  if	  these	  are	  also	  already	  full	  (something	  that	  only	  occurred	  in	  the	  bumper	  harvest	  
years	  2010-­‐14	  when	  FRA	  bought	   very	   large	   amounts	  of	  maize),	  maize	   is	   left	   in	   the	   local	  
slab	  structures.	  	  
Building	  a	  model	  structure	  that	  could	  adequately	  measure	  the	  maize	  loss	  in	  FRA	  storages	  
proved	   to	   be	   one	   of	   the	   trickiest	   parts	   of	   the	   work.	   After	   experimenting	   with	   different	  
solutions	   it	   became	   increasingly	   clear	   that	   I	   could	   not	  work	  with	   the	   traditional	   way	   of	  
measuring	   residence	   times	   (dividing	   a	   stock	   by	   its	   outflows),	   because	   the	   strong	  
seasonality	   of	  my	  model	   lead	   to	   extreme	   fluctuations	   in	   the	   residence	   time	   that	   did	   not	  
yield	   any	   realistic	   values.	   I	   thus	   adapted	   the	   age	   measurement	   structure	   from	   Bou	  
Schreiber	  (2015)	  which	  proved	  to	  work	  well	  despite	  the	  seasonality	  in	  my	  model.	  It	  works	  
the	   following	   way:	   when	   new	   maize	   is	   purchased,	   the	   current	   time	   (in	   months)	   is	  
multiplied	  by	  the	  purchase	  volume	  (in	  weight),	  and	  the	  thereby	  “age-­‐tagged”	  maize	  volume	  
is	  accumulating	   in	  the	  co-­‐flow	  structures	  visible	   in	   figure	  10	  above	  the	  value	  chain	  flows.	  
Thus,	  dividing	  the	  maize	  currently	  on	  storage	  by	  the	  accumulated	  age-­‐weight	  stock	  in	  the	  
co-­‐flow	  returns	  the	  average	  time	  when	  the	  maize	  on	  storage	  came	  into	  the	  stock	  (average	  
entry	  time).	  
As	  maize	  is	  sold,	  old	  and	  new	  maize	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  mixed	  for	  sale,	  so	  that	  on	  average,	  
the	  maize	  sold	  (or	  moved	  to	  better	  storage	  facilities,	  in	  case	  of	  the	  first	  FRA	  stock)	  has	  the	  
average	   age	   of	   all	   the	  maize	   in	   store.	   This	   procedure,	   as	   opposed	   to	   e.g.	   selling	   only	   the	  
oldest	  maize	  first,	  is	  followed	  because	  the	  longer	  maize	  is	  on	  storage,	  the	  more	  its	  quality	  is	  
adversely	  affected	  by	  moisture,	  fungi	  etc.	  –	  and	  the	  stronger	  quality	  is	  affected,	  the	  lower	  is	  
the	  price	  for	  which	  the	  maize	  can	  be	  sold.	  Therefore,	  old	  maize	  is	  mixed	  with	  newer	  maize	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in	  order	   to	  be	  able	   to	  sell	   it	   for	  a	  good	  price.	  For	  more	  details	  on	   this,	   see	  Bou	  Schreiber	  
(2015).	  The	  outflow	  from	  the	  age-­‐weight	  co-­‐flow	  is	  thus	  not	  multiplied	  by	  the	  current	  time,	  
but	  by	  the	  average	  age	  (Average	  entry	  time)	  of	  the	  maize	  in	  stock.	  
Now,	  to	  measure	  the	  average	  time	  that	  the	  maize	  in	  stock	  has	  actually	  spent	  on	  storage	  (the	  
“relative	   age”),	   one	   simply	   has	   to	   take	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   current	   time	   and	   the	  
average	   entry	   time.	   The	   relative	   age	   (i.e.	   time	   spent	   on	   storage)	   of	   the	   stock	   then	  
determines	   the	   loss	   ratio,	   which	   is	   exponentially	   rising	   with	   relative	   age	   to	   reflect	   the	  
exponential	  effects	  of	  spreading	  moisture,	  fungi	  and	  pest	  populations.	  Multiplying	  the	  loss	  
ratio	  with	  the	  stock	  then	  determines	  the	  actual	  loss	  outflow.	  
Since	  Bou	  Schreiber's	   (2015)	  original	   structure	  was	   intended	   to	  measure	   the	   losses	  over	  
one	  annual	  cycle,	  the	  outflow	  has	  to	  be	  divided	  by	  12	  months	  in	  order	  to	  transform	  the	  time	  
horizon	  and	  return	  the	  correct	  loss	  values.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  permanent	  storage	  structure,	  
the	  combined	  loss	  ratio	  also	  depends	  on	  which	  ratio	  of	  the	  maize	  is	  in	  silos	  and	  which	  ratio	  
is	  in	  sheds,	  since	  the	  two	  storage	  types	  exhibit	  distinctly	  different	  loss	  ratios	  (cf.	  appendix	  
C.3).	  
FRA	   then	   sells	   its	  maize	   according	   to	   domestic	   demand	   to	   contracted	  millers,	   but	   not	   to	  
retailers	  or	  consumers	  (N.	  M.	  Mason	  &	  Myers,	  2011).	  This	  is	  important	  since	  it	  means	  that	  
maize	  once	  purchased	  by	  FRA	  is	  effectively	  locked	  up	  in	  the	  formal	  value	  chain	  and	  cannot	  
be	   supplied	   to	   informal	   consumers	   any	  more.	   If	   there	   is	   still	   excess	  maize	   left	   in	   FRA’s	  
storages	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  marketing	  year	  and	  it	  cannot	  be	  sold	  domestically,	  FRA	  exports	  
the	   amount	   exceeding	   its	   desired	   security	   stocks.	   For	  more	  details	   on	   these	   exports,	   see	  
section	  4.3.4.	  
Furthermore,	   I	   assume	   that	  FRA	  wants	   to	  keep	  a	  certain	  share	  of	   security	   stocks	   to	   fulfil	  
their	  original	  mandate,	  which	   is	  stabilizing	  the	  maize	  price	  with	  strategic	  maize	  reserves.	  
However,	  I	  included	  a	  switch	  structure	  that	  sets	  the	  desired	  reserves	  to	  zero	  when	  we	  have	  
a	  year	  with	  a	  structural	  maize	  deficit.	  This	  reflects	  that	  FRA,	  whose	  mandate	  is	  secure	  the	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maize	   supply	   for	   the	   population,	   would	   not	   keep	   stocks	   locked	   up	   while	   domestic	  
consumers	  demand	  more	  maize	  to	  fulfil	  their	  basic	  needs.	  
4.6.3	  Smallholder	  Maize	  Sales	  
FRA,	   as	  well	   as	  millers	   and	   grain	   retailers,	   buys	   its	   grain	   from	   smallholder	   farmers.	   The	  
dynamics	   of	   to	   whom	   and	   when	   smallholders	   sell	   their	   maize	   is	   critical	   for	   the	   overall	  
model	  behaviour,	  as	   it	  determines	  how	  much	  maize	  goes	   into	   the	   informal	  vs.	   the	   formal	  
value	  chain.	  	  
At	   large,	   smallholders	  have	   three	  options	   for	   selling	   their	  maize	  grain:	  either	   to	   informal	  
grain	   retailers	   (who	   sell	   grain	   to	   consumers	   in	   the	   informal	   value	   chain),	   to	   commercial	  
assemblers	  that	  broker	  grain	  to	  milling	  companies,	  or	  to	  FRA	  itself.	  Note	  that	  the	  popular	  
notion	  that	  heavy	  FRA	  intervention	  is	  needed	  to	  enable	  smallholders	  to	  market	  their	  grain	  
seems	  not	  to	  be	  true,	  as	  the	  past	  has	  shown	  that	  FRA	  and	  private	  maize	  buyers	  are	  easily	  
interchangeable:	  as	  FRA	  purchasing	  activity	  goes	  up,	  private	  engagement	  is	  crowed	  out,	  but	  
quickly	   fills	   the	  gap	   if	  FRA	  reduces	   its	  purchase	  volume	  (Chapoto	  &	   Jayne,	  2011).	  This	   is	  
reflected	  in	  my	  model	  by	  the	  fact	  that,	  given	  sufficient	  downstream	  demand,	  smallholders	  
are	  always	  able	  to	  sell	  their	  maize	  to	  private	  maize	  brokers	  through	  the	  “commercial	  maize	  
assemblage”	  flow	  –	  no	  matter	  how	  much	  the	  current	  sales	  deviate	  from	  previous	  sales.	  
For	   FRA	   purchases,	   there	   is	   an	   officially	   government-­‐announced	   purchasing	   season	   that	  
usually	   lasts	   from	   beginning/middle	   of	   June	   until	   the	   end	   of	   September	   or	   beginning	   of	  
October,	  reaching	  the	  highest	  purchase	  volume	  around	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  purchasing	  season	  
during	  late	  July	  and	  early	  August	  (Nyanga,	  2015b).	  I	  modelled	  this	  as	  a	  normal	  distribution	  
of	   annual	   FRA	   purchases	   over	   4	   months	   (from	   the	   beginning	   of	   June	   until	   the	   end	   of	  
September).	  	  
However,	  since	  the	  bulk	  of	  FRA’s	  purchases	  occurs	  quite	  some	  time	  after	  the	  main	  harvest	  
comes	   in,	   there	   is	   a	   danger	   of	   smallholders	   in	   my	   model	   selling	   too	   much	   of	   their	  
production	   in	   the	   first	  months	   and	   not	   leaving	   enough	  maize	   for	   FRA	   to	   purchase.	   Such	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model	   behaviour	  would	   ignore	   the	   strategic	   behaviour	   of	  many	   smallholders,	  who	   often	  
sell	  some	  crops	  to	  private	  buyers	  early	  on	  to	  satisfy	   immediate	  cash	  needs,	  but	  generally	  
prefer	   to	  wait	  until	   FRA	   starts	  buying	   in	  order	   to	  profit	   from	   their	  better	  price	   (Nyanga,	  
2015a).	   To	   reflect	   this	   behaviour,	   which	   carries	   the	   implicit	   assumption	   that	   FRA	   will	  
always	  be	   able	   to	  purchase	   the	   amounts	   they	  want	  due	   to	   the	  higher	  prices	   they	  offer,	   I	  
constructed	  a	  switch	  that	  limits	  smallholder	  sales	  to	  non-­‐FRA	  buyers.	  The	  structure	  of	  that	  
switch	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  figure	  11	  below:	  
	  
Figure	  11:	  Non-­‐FRA	  smallholder	  sales	  switch	  structure	  
The	   basic	   idea	   behind	   this	   switch	   is	   that	   non-­‐FRA	   buyers	   of	   smallholder	   grain	   only	  
purchase	  so	  much,	  that	  enough	  is	  left	  for	  FRA	  to	  satisfy	  its	  desired	  purchase	  volume.	  This	  is	  
done	  by	  first	  calculating	  the	  total	  available	  smallholder	  grain	  for	  this	  year,	  which	  is	  the	  sum	  
of	  any	  smallholder	  carryover	  maize	  stocks	  from	  last	  year	  and	  the	  harvest	  that	  will	  become	  
available	   the	   current	   year.	   The	   available	   purchase	   volume	   for	   non-­‐FRA	   buyers	   is	   then	  
computed	  by	  deducting	  the	  desired	  FRA	  purchases	  and	  the	  storage	   losses	   from	  that	   total	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available	   amount	   of	   available	   maize.	   Once	   the	   total	   non-­‐FRA	   smallholder	   sales	   have	  
reached	   this	   ceiling,	   the	   switch	   turns	   to	   zero,	   prohibiting	   further	   non-­‐FRA	   sales	   by	  
smallholders	   in	   the	   current	   year.	   The	   stock-­‐and-­‐flow	   structures	   are	   basically	   there	   to	  
transform	  monthly	   into	  yearly	  data	  by	  accumulating	  monthly	  data	  and	  emptying	   it	  at	   the	  
end	  of	  the	  year,	  so	  that	  we	  can	  work	  with	  the	  total	  yearly	  purchase	  volume.5	  
4.6.4	  Farmers	  
The	  final	  actors	  at	  the	  upstream	  end	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  are	  of	  course	  the	  farmers.	  Building	  
this	   part	   involved	   solving	   the	   recurring	   challenge	   to	   integrate	   data	   from	   different	   time	  
scales	   and	   discrete	   events	   into	   my	   model.	   This	   proved	   especially	   tricky	   since	   System	  
Dynamics	  is	  generally	  made	  to	  portray	  continuous,	  and	  not	  discrete	  events	  A	  good	  example	  
for	  how	  I	  went	  about	  this	  is	  are	  the	  harvest	  inflows:	  harvests	  volumes	  are	  usually	  reported	  
per	   year,	   but	   in	   reality	   do	   occur	   only	   during	   a	   certain	   time	   in	   the	   year.	   To	   reflect	   this,	   I	  
created	  a	  variable	  called	   “Yearly	  Counter”	   that	  used	   iThink’s	  COUNTER	   function	   to	  count	  
the	  months	  of	  the	  year.	   I	   then	  used	  logical	   functions	  to	  represent	  the	  seasonality,	  such	  as	  
the	  one	  for	  the	  Smallholder	  Surplus	  Harvest:	  




This	  allowed	  the	  flow	  to	  come	  in	  during	  a	  specified	  period	  of	  the	  year	  every	  time	  around	  
(here	  in	  May	  and	  June).	  I	  used	  this	  approach	  for	  all	  three	  production	  inflows.	  The	  fact	  that	  
much	  of	  my	  data	  was	   in	   years	   also	   explains	  why	   you	  will	   see	  many	   variables	   like	   “main	  
harvest	   months	   per	   year”	   in	   my	   model	   that	   transform	   the	   time	   horizon	   from	   years	   to	  
months.	  
Concerning	  the	  big	  commercial	  millers	  (visible	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  value	  chain),	  following	  
Keyser	  (2007:	  p.65)	  I	  assume	  they	  only	  sell	  directly	  to	  big	  commercial	  mills	  and	  store	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  There	   is	   a	   slight	   problem	   with	   this	   structure,	   as	   some	   losses	   occur	   after	   the	   ceiling	   has	   been	   reached,	  
thereby	   effectively	   reducing	   the	   amount	   that	   FRA	   can	   buy.	   However,	   the	   deviation	   per	   year	   between	   the	  
purchase	  data	  and	  the	  FRA	  purchases	  in	  the	  model	  are	  <0,05%	  and	  thereby	  statistically	  insignificant.	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production	   for	   6	   months	   in	   appropriate	   storage	   facilities	   to	   be	   able	   to	   sell	   in	   the	   lean	  
season	  and	   thus	  get	  a	  better	  price.	  According	   to	  Nyanga	   (2015b),	   these	  millers	  generally	  
prefer	   to	   export	   whenever	   they	   succeed	   in	   lobbying	   for	   a	   lift	   of	   export	   bans	   with	   the	  
government.	   This	   is	   because	   they	   are	   very	   competitive	   in	   their	   production	   due	   to	  
economies	  of	  scale	  and	  rather	  advanced	  production	  methods,	  and	  can	  make	  good	  profit	  by	  
selling	  to	  neighbouring	  deficit	  countries	  like	  Zimbabwe	  or	  the	  DRC	  Congo.	  Moreover,	  they	  
fear	  competition	  by	  the	  unpredictable	  FRA	  in	  the	  domestic	  market.	  	  
To	  reflect	   the	  dynamics	  of	   the	  governmental	  export	  bans	  (N.	  M.	  Mason	  &	  Myers,	  2011),	   I	  
built	  the	  switch	  structure	  visible	  in	  figure	  12	  below.	  
	  
Figure	  12:Commercial	  farmers	  exports	  switch	  
The	  basic	  idea	  is	  that	  the	  Zambian	  government	  assesses	  how	  much	  has	  been	  harvested	  by	  
smallholder	   farmers	   in	   the	   current	   year,	   and	   if	   this	   amount	   significantly	   exceeds	   the	  
projected	  demand,	  I	  assume	  that	  commercial	  farmers	  will	  succeed	  in	  their	  lobbying	  efforts	  
for	   lifting	   export	   bans.	   In	   that	   case,	   they	   export	   their	   production.	   In	   years	   where	   the	  
smallholder	   harvest	   is	   not	   judged	   to	   be	   sufficient	   to	   feed	   the	   domestic	   population,	   the	  
government	   is	   assumed	   to	   insist	   on	   commercial	   farmers	   having	   to	   sell	   domestically	   and	  
thus	  keep	  up	  the	  export	  bans.	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4.7	  The	  Informal	  Value	  Chain	  
Compared	   to	   the	   formal	   value	   chain,	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   informal	   value	   chain	   is	   less	  
complicated.	  It	  mostly	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  typical	  demand-­‐driven	  supply	  chain,	  and	  is	  thus	  
also	   an	   adaptation	   of	   Sterman's	   (2000:	   chapter	   17-­‐18)	   classic	   supply	   chain	  
conceptualization.	  
	  	  
The	  dynamics	   start	  with	   the	  monthly	   informal	  demand	   that	   is	   computed	   as	  described	   in	  
chapter	   4.5.	   Informal	   demand	   then	   determines	   the	   consumption	   and,	   together	   with	   the	  
coverage	   time,	   the	  size	  of	   the	  desired	  meal	   storage	   to	  be	  kept	  at	  home.	  Adjusting	   for	   the	  
difference	   between	   the	   desired	   and	   actual	   informal	   consumer	   meal	   storage	   as	   well	   as	  
outflows	   gives	   the	   Desired	   Acquisition	   Rate	   (DAR)	   for	   hammer-­‐milled	   meal.	   However,	  
there	   is	  a	   loss	  of	  5%	   involved	   in	   the	  hammer	  milling	  process	   (Keyser,	  2007:	   table	  49).	   It	  
Figure	  13:	  Informal	  Value	  Chain	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seems	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  consumers	  know	  about	  this	  loss	  and	  account	  for	  it	  with	  a	  
rule	  of	  thumb,	  so	  that	  I	  presume	  they	  put	  a	  5%	  mark-­‐up	  on	  their	  meal	  orders	  here.	  	  
Yet,	   since	  consumers	  buy	   the	  grain	   themselves	  and	   then	  bring	   it	   to	   the	  hammer	  mill,	   the	  
demand	  for	  purchasing	  grain	  comes	  from	  the	  original	  consumer	  demand	  and	  not	  from	  the	  
hammer	   mills.	   The	   logic	   is	   the	   same	   as	   with	   the	   other	   inflows:	   according	   to	   a	   desired	  
coverage	   time	   and	   the	   demand,	   a	   desired	   storage	   is	   computed.	   	   The	   gap	   between	   this	  
desired	   and	   actual	   smallholder	   grain	   storage,	   together	   with	   orders	   accounting	   for	   the	  
consumption	  outflow,	  determine	  the	  DAR	  for	  grain	  purchases	  and	  retailing	  (subsumed	  in	  
the	  “informal	  grain	  retailing”	  flow).	  
To	  implicitly	  reflect	  the	  effect	  of	  rising	  prices	  on	  grain	  demand,	  I	  built	  a	  feedback	  loop	  from	  
the	   informal	   grain	   retailing	   to	   informal	   demand.	   As	   grain	   gets	   scarcer,	   and	   thus	   more	  
expensive,	  the	  ratio	  of	  demand	  for	  grain	  (DAR	  informal	  retailing)	  that	  cannot	  be	  fulfilled	  is	  
rising.	  This	  is	  perceived	  by	  consumers	  and	  has	  an	  influence	  on	  their	  consumption.	  Since	  the	  
consumers	   in	   the	   informal	   value	   chain	   are	   typically	   the	   poorer	   part	   of	   the	   Zambian	  
population,	  it	  can	  be	  assumed	  that	  they	  lack	  the	  means	  to	  allocate	  significantly	  more	  money	  
to	   their	  maize	  purchasing	  budget.	   Instead,	   they	   try	   to	  save	  money	  by	  stretching	   the	   time	  
over	  which	  they	  consume	  a	  given	  amount	  of	  maize	  (Nyanga,	  2015a).	  This	  means	  they	  are	  
effectively	   reducing	   their	   daily	   consumption.	   However,	   as	   Nyanga	   (2015a)	   pointed	   out,	  
there	  is	  a	  certain	  lower	  bound	  to	  that	  behaviour	  –	  people	  would	  rather	  sell	  assets	  or	  reduce	  
other	  expenses	  before	  they	  go	  into	  starvation.	  I	  thus	  assume	  the	  lower	  bound	  for	  this	  effect	  
is	  such	  that	  consumer	  never	  go	  below	  the	  Minimum	  Dietary	  Intake,	  as	  defined	  for	  Zambia	  
by	  the	  FAO	  (2014).	  
4.8	  Demand	  Spill-­‐Over	  from	  the	  Informal	  to	  Formal	  Value	  Chain	  
Due	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  market,	  there	  are	  times	  when	  grain	  in	  the	  informal	  value	  chain	  
is	   simply	  not	  available	  any	  more.	  Consumers	   then	  have	  no	  choice	  but	   to	  switch	   from	  the	  
cheaper	  self-­‐hammer-­‐milled	  meal	  to	  the	  more	  expensive	  roller	  meal.	  In	  that	  case,	  they	  stick	  
to	   their	   lower	   daily	   maize	   consumption	   a	   fortiori	   (Nyanga,	   2015a).	   However,	   21,9%	   of	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households	  also	  change	   to	  other	  carbohydrate	  sources,	   such	  as	  rice,	  bread	  or	  cassava	  (N.	  
Mason	   &	   Jayne,	   2009:	   Table	   17)6.	   I	   modelled	   this	   by	   letting	   the	   gap	   between	   informal	  
demand	  and	  consumption,	  after	   it	   is	  adjusted	  for	  the	  change	  of	  some	  consumers	  to	  other	  
crops,	  spill	  over	  into	  the	  formal	  value	  chain’s	  demand.	  Once	  grain	  becomes	  available	  again,	  
the	  demand	  shifts	  back	   to	   the	   informal	  value	  chain,	  as	   the	  poor	  consumers	  are	  of	   course	  
happy	  to	  go	  back	  to	  their	  cheaper	  self-­‐milled	  maize	  supply.	  
We	  have	  now	  discussed	  the	  whole	  model	  and	  can,	  equipped	  with	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  
model	  structure,	  start	  to	  explore	  the	  behaviour	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  
	  
5.	  Base	  Run	  
Before	  we	  are	  able	  to	  start	  answering	  the	  central	  research	  question	  by	  discussing	  scenarios	  
and	  analysing	  the	  resilience	  of	  the	  model	  towards	  different	  shocks,	   it	   is	  necessary	  for	  the	  
reader	   to	   acquire	   a	   good	   understanding	   of	   the	   central	   dynamics	   behind	   the	   model	  
behaviour.	  To	  this	  end,	  I	  will	  first	  deliberate	  the	  assumptions	  used	  for	  the	  external	  inputs	  in	  
section	  5.1	  and	  then	  discuss	  the	  resulting	  model	  behaviour	  in	  section	  5.2.	  	  
5.1	  Inputs	  and	  Assumptions	  
The	  model	  is	  running	  from	  2004	  –	  2020,	  where	  the	  external	  inputs	  up	  to	  2014	  are	  based	  on	  
data,	   while	   the	   six	   years	   from	   2015	   through	   2020	   are	   based	   on	   assumptions	   about	   the	  
future	  behaviour	  of	  the	  following	  inputs:	  
1. Rural	  population	  
2. Urban	  population	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Note	   that	   I	   took	   the	   data	   for	   Lusaka	   here,	   as	   it	   is	   statistically	  more	   likely	   to	   be	   representative	   for	   all	   of	  
Zambia	  than	  the	  other,	  rather	  small	  or	  remote,	  towns	  listed.	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3. Maize	  imports	  
4. Commercial	  farmers	  production	  
5. Smallholder	  surplus	  production	  
6. Subsistence	  production	  
7. FRA	  purchases	  
8. Desired	  FRA	  reserves	  
9. FRA	  Shed	  capacity	  
10. FRA	  Silo	  capacity	  
As	   these	   exogenous	   inputs	  play	   a	   big	   role	   in	  determining	   the	  behaviour	  of	  my	   resilience	  
indicators,	  I	  will	  discuss	  them	  in	  depth	  in	  the	  following	  paragrahps.	  
Population	  
Concerning	  the	  population,	   I	  am	  assuming	  that	   it	  will	   follow	  the	  steady	  growth	  trajectory	  
projected	  by	  UNDESA	  (2012),	  with	  the	  relative	  weight	  of	  the	  urban	  population	  growing	  due	  
to	  urbanization	  processes.	  Population	  is	  an	  important	  parameter	  in	  my	  model,	  as	  it	  directly	  
influences	  total	  demand,	  and	  thereby	  the	  ADESM.	  
	  




























For	  simplicity,	  and	  because	   I	  am	   interested	   in	   the	  endogenous	  development	  of	   the	  maize	  
sector	  in	  Zambia	  without	  external	  influences,	  I	  assume	  that	  the	  trend	  of	  the	  last	  three	  years	  
holds	  and	  no	  maize	  is	  imported.	  
Maize	  Production	  
My	  data	   for	   the	  base	  run	  comes	   from	  the	  base	  run	  of	  Gerber's	   (2015)	  production	  model.	  
While	   he	   only	   splits	   his	   data	   in	   sold	   and	   not	   sold	   (i.e.	   subsistence)	   production,	   I	   further	  
distinguish	  between	   sold	  production	   from	   smallholders	   and	   commercial	   farmers.	   To	   this	  
end,	  I	  assume	  that	  the	  relation	  of	  8%	  commercial	  and	  92%	  smallholder	  production	  of	  the	  
total	  sold	  production	  will	  stay	  constant	  for	  the	  next	  years.	  The	  development	  of	  the	  resulting	  
yearly	  maize	  production	  that	  is	  fed	  into	  my	  model	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  figure	  15.	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FRA	  Storage	  Capacity	  
The	   information	   about	   FRA	   storage	   capacity	   comes	   from	   data	   collected	   and	   projections	  
made	   by	   Bou	  
Schreiber	   (2015).	   As	  
you	   can	   see,	   FRA	   has	  
much	  more	   shed	   than	  
silo	   capacity	   since	  
silos,	  even	  though	  they	  
preserve	   and	   protect	  
the	   maize	   much	  
better,	  are	  much	  more	  
expensive	   to	  
construct.	   Temporary	  
storage	   capacity	   like	  
slabs	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  
unlimited,	   as	   it	   can	  
easily	  and	  quickly	  be	  set	  up	  as	  it	  is	  needed.	  
FRA	  Policy	  Parameters	  
Concerning	  FRA	  purchase	  and	  storage	  policies,	   I	   assume	   that	   they	  scale	  back	  on	   the	  vast	  
purchase	  volumes	  they	  had	  in	  the	  bumper	  harvest	  years	  from	  2010-­‐2014.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  
these	   interventions	   cost	   the	   government	   a	   lot	   of	   money,	   an	   amount	   of	   spending	   that	   it	  
might	  not	  be	  able	  or	  willing	   to	   sustain	  over	   the	  next	  years	  given	   its	   tight	  budget.	  On	   the	  
other	  hand,	  the	  harvests	  in	  Gerber’s	  (2015)	  forecast	  regress	  to	  the	  historical	  mean	  and	  the	  
total	  maize	  volume	  traded	  simply	  becomes	  much	  lower,	  so	  that	  even	  if	  FRA	  wanted	  to	  keep	  
buying	  a	   certain	   share	  of	   the	  production,	   they	  do	  not	  need	   to	  buy	  as	  much	  as	   in	   the	   last	  
years.	   I	   thus	  assume	   that	  FRA	  aims	   to	  buy	  half	   of	   the	   smallholder	   surplus	  harvest	   in	   the	  








FRA	  	  Storage	  Capacity	  (in	  1000	  tons)	  
Sheds	  
Silos	  
Figure	  16:	  Shed	  and	  silo	  capacity	  FRA	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purchases	   as	   security	  
stocks.	   Saving	   only	   that	  
much	   would	   also	   enable	  
FRA	   to	   keep	   all	   their	  
carryover	   stocks	   well	  
preserved	   in	   silos.	   Note,	  
however,	   that	   changes	   in	  
historical	   FRA	   purchase	  
volumes	   have	   been	   quite	  
erratic	   at	   times	   	   –	   as	   such,	  
predictions	   about	   FRA	  
behaviour	   will	   always	  
involve	   a	   large	   amount	   of	  
uncertainty.	  
The	   assumptions	   about	   the	   variables	   discussed	   will	   stay	   the	   same	   in	   all	   runs,	   unless	  
otherwise	   is	   explicitly	   remarked.	   For	   details	   on	   the	   values	   and	   sources	   of	   the	   inputs	  
mentioned,	  please	  consult	  appendix	  C.	  
5.2	  Discussion	  of	  Behaviour	  
5.2.1	  Dynamics	  Behind	  the	  Development	  of	  the	  ADESM	  
An	   analysis	   of	   the	   behaviour	   of	   the	   base	   run	   should	   be	   based	   on	   the	   evaluation	   of	   the	  
behaviour	   of	   the	   central	   variable,	   which	   is	   the	   ADESM.	   Since	   the	  model	   runs	   in	  months	  
from	  January	  2004	  on,	  the	  time	  units	  on	  the	  graphs	  should	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  following	  
way:	  month	  1	  is	  the	  beginning	  (January)	  of	  2004,	  month	  2	  is	  February	  2004,	  month	  13	  is	  
January	  2005…	  and	  so	  forth	  up	  to	  month	  204,	  which	  is	  December	  2020.	  
A	   short	   note	   on	   the	   scale	   of	   all	   the	   iThink	   graphs	   showing	   the	   ADESM:	   the	   scale	   of	   the	  










FRA	  Purchases	  and	  Reserves	  (in	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  tons)	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Figure	  17:	  FRA	  reserves	  and	  purchases	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appearing	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  scale	  (cf.	  figure	  18)	  is	  just	  there	  due	  to	  iThink’s	  setting	  to	  not	  
show	  decimal	  numbers	  on	  that	  scale.	  
	  
Figure	  18:	  ADESM	  base	  run	  
The	  first	   thing	  that	  you	  will	  notice	  when	  looking	  a	  the	  ADESM’s	  behaviour	   in	   figure	  18	   is	  
the	   strong	   seasonality:	   every	   year,	  with	   the	   exception	  of	   summer	  2013	   to	   summer	  2015	  
(months	   112-­‐136),	   the	   ADESM	   fluctuates	   throughout	   the	   year.	   That	   has	   to	   do	   with	   the	  
seasonality	  of	  the	  maize	  harvest:	  while	  there	  is	  some	  green	  harvest	  coming	  in	  every	  year	  in	  
March	  and	  April,	  it	  only	  has	  a	  share	  of	  7.5%	  of	  the	  total	  production.	  The	  main	  harvest	  then	  
becomes	   available	   in	  May	   and	   June,	  which	   is	  when	   you	   see	   the	   ADESM	   spiking	   up.	   This	  
behaviour	  reflects	  the	  typical	  alternation	  between	  the	  “plenty	  season”	  and	  “lean	  season”	  in	  
Zambia	   (Nicole	   Mason	   &	   Jayne,	   2009),	   where	   maize	   is	   well	   available	   in	   the	   months	  
following	  the	  harvest	  and	  becoming	  very	  scarce	  in	  the	  months	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  marketing	  
year.	  Since	  the	  first	  and	  last	  years	  of	  the	  simulation	  are	  years	  of	  structural	  maize	  deficit,	  the	  
domestic	  maize	  consumption	  is	  used	  up	  after	  a	  few	  months	  following	  the	  harvest	  and	  the	  
ADESM	  thus	  drops	  to	  zero.	  Note	  that	  Zambia	  did	  receive	  food	  aid	  in	  those	  years	  that	  most	  
probably	  prevented	  the	  maize	  supply	  from	  completely	  drying	  up,	  but	  since	  we	  are	  focusing	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on	  the	  internal	  dynamics	  of	  maize	  production	  these	  are	  neglected,	  as	  discussed	  in	  section	  
4.1.3.	  
The	  increasing	  size	  of	  the	  drops	  in	  the	  ADESM	  in	  the	  lean	  seasons	  of	  2018-­‐2020	  (months	  
169-­‐204)	  is	  because	  Zambia	  experiences	  a	  roughly	  steady	  yearly	  production	  from	  2015	  on,	  
while	  the	  population	  gradually	  grows.	  The	  gap	  between	  production	  and	  demand	  therefore	  
becomes	  increasingly	  bigger.	  
A	   little	  exception	   to	   that	  general	   seasonality	  pattern	   is	   the	  smaller	  spike	   that	   the	  ADESM	  
shows	  from	  zero	  to	  about	  0,6	  in	  the	  months	  23-­‐24	  (November-­‐December	  2005).	  This	  is	  due	  
to	  the	  incoming	  harvest	  by	  commercial	  farmers	  that	  I	  assume	  to	  start	  selling	  in	  the	  height	  
of	   the	   lean	   season	   in	   order	   to	   receive	   better	   prices.	  However,	   as	   their	   share	   of	   the	   total	  
traded	  production	  drops	   over	   the	   following	   years,	   the	   impact	   of	   their	   production	   on	   the	  
ADESM	  declines	  as	  well.	  
The	   reader	   will	   further	   notice	   that	   the	   ADESM	   often	   stagnates	   at	   a	   level	   of	   0,84.	   This	  
happens	  when	   the	   supply	   of	  maize	   grain	   for	   consumers	   in	   the	   informal	   value	   chain	   has	  
dried	   up,	   making	   them	   lower	   their	   consumption	   and	   eventually	   start	   purchasing	  
commercial	   roller	  meal	   from	   the	   formal	   value	   chain.	   The	   fact	   that	   this	   behaviour	   occurs	  
even	   in	   years	   of	   surplus	   production,	   such	   as	   2010-­‐12	   (months	   73-­‐96),	   is	   due	   to	  
dysfunctional	  FRA	  policies.	  	  
A	   good	   year	   to	   explain	   the	   dynamics	   behind	   this	   phenomenon	   is	   2010	   (months	   73-­‐84):	  
while	   this	   year	   actually	   features	   a	   good	  harvest	   that	   exceeds	  demand	  by	   a	   great	  margin,	  
FRA	   purchases	   such	   vast	   amounts	   of	   maize	   (878.750	   tons	   out	   of	   the	   total	   yearly	  
smallholder	   production	   of	   1.062.010	   tons),	   that	   not	  much	   is	   left	   to	   purchase	   for	   private	  
buyers.	  Millers,	  via	  small	  commercial	  maize	  assemblers,	  and	   informal	  grain	  retailers	  then	  
compete	  for	  this	  relatively	  small	  amount	  of	  maize	  grain	  available	  to	  private	  buyers.	  Thus,	  
their	   demand	   cannot	   be	   satisfied,	   which	   ultimately	   leads	   to	   supply	   shortages	   in	   the	  
informal	  value	  chain.	  





Figure	  19:	  Smallholder	  maize	  purchases	  
In	   figure	   19,	   we	   can	   see	   how	   this	   logic	   translates	   into	   behaviour:	   “commercial	   maize	  
assemblage”	  and	  “informal	  grain	  retailing”	  reach	  zero	  around	  month	  80.	  This	  means	  that	  all	  
the	  maize	   that	   smallholders	   have	   not	   contracted	   to	   FRA	   and	   that	  was	   thus	   available	   for	  
private	   buyers	   has	   been	   sold.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   “non	   FRA	   smallholder	   sales	   switch”	   (cf.	  
section	   4.6.3)	   turns	   to	   zero.	   The	   flows	   of	   informal	   grain	   retailing	   and	   commercial	  maize	  
assemblage	  therefore	  also	  drop	  to	  zero	  at	  that	  time.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  inflow	  of	  maize	  to	  
the	  informal	  value	  chain	  stops	  and	  consumers	  respond	  by	  gradually	  lowering	  their	  monthly	  
consumption,	  which	  makes	  ADESM	  gradually	  approach	  0,84	  as	  a	  response.	  
The	  problem	  with	  FRA’s	  purchase	  and	  sales	  policies	   is	  not	   just	  that	  they	  often	  dry	  up	  the	  
informal	  market,	  but	  also	  that	  they	  purchase	  much	  more	  than	  they	  can	  sell	  or	  want	  to	  store	  
as	   security	   stocks.	   This	   leads	   to	   long	   residence	   times	   of	   the	  maize	   in	   their	   storages	   and	  
ensuing	   high	   losses.	   Hence,	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	  marketing	   year,	   they	   are	   faced	  with	   a	   bad	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choice:	  either	  let	  their	  excess	  maize	  rot	  away	  with	  exponentially	  rising	  loss	  ratios	  (cf.	  figure	  
20),	  or	  export	  it	  under	  unfavourable	  terms	  of	  trade.7	  
	  
Figure	  20:	  FRA	  maize	  stocks	  
An	  exception	  to	  the	  constantly	  recurring	  mismatch	  between	  demand	  and	  supply	  described	  
so	  far	  is	  the	  time	  between	  summer	  2013	  and	  summer	  2015	  (months	  113-­‐140),	  where	  the	  
ADESM	  in	  figure	  18	  nearly	  constantly	  displays	  a	  value	  of	  1,	  indicating	  the	  full	  satisfaction	  of	  
maize	  demand.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  2013	  and	  2014,	  harvests	  were	  very	  good	  and	  
FRA	  purchases	  sufficiently	   low,	  so	   that	   the	  available	  purchase	  volume	   for	  private	   traders	  
was	   high	   enough	   to	   service	   the	   demand	   from	   the	   informal	   value	   chain	   throughout	   the	  
whole	  year.	  
As	  you	  can	  see,	  the	  key	  to	  understanding	  the	  model	  behaviour	  really	  is	  the	  distribution	  of	  
the	  smallholder	  maize	  sales:	  they	  determine	  if	  the	  maize	  goes	  into	  the	  formal	  or	  informal	  
value	  chain,	  or	  is	  locked	  up	  at	  FRA’s	  storage	  facilities	  and	  lost	  to	  pests.	  Once	  the	  maize	  has	  
entered	   one	   of	   the	   value	   chains	   from	   the	   smallholder	   stocks,	   or	   is	   sold	   by	   FRA,	   it	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  These	   are	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   FRA	   usually	   purchases	   maize	   at	   an	   above-­‐market	   price	   that	   they	   cannot	  
demand	  when	  selling	  maize	  abroad.	  They	  therefore	  often	  sell	  at	  a	  loss	  and	  it	  is	  just	  a	  matter	  of	  choosing	  the	  
lesser	  bad	  for	  them	  in	  that	  situation.	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processed	  and	  consumed	  according	  to	  the	  rules	  laid	  out	  in	  chapters	  4.6	  and	  4.7.	  However,	  
since	   the	  relative	  distribution	  of	  smallholder	  maize	  sales	  between	  the	  value	  chains	   is	  not	  
only	  determined	  by	  supply,	  but	  also	  the	  demand	  for	  smallholder	  maize	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  
DAR	   informal	  grain	  retailing	   and	   the	  miller’s	   demand	   driving	   the	   commercial	  assemblage	  
flow,	  I	  will	  explain	  their	  dynamics	  in	  more	  depth	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  
5.2.2	  Dynamics	  Behind	  Private	  Traders’	  Demand	  for	  Smallholder	  Maize	  
First,	   let	   us	   examine	   the	   informal	   value	   chain.	   As	   demand	   for	   informal	   grain	   retailing	  
(DAR	   informal	   retailing)	   is	   quite	   steady	   in	   years	   of	   constantly	   sufficient	   supply,	   the	  
dynamics	   behind	   the	   seasonal	   fluctuations	   in	   this	   variable	   can	  best	   be	  understood	  when	  
looking	   at	   a	  marketing	   season	  with	   changing	   availability	   of	  maize	   for	   the	   informal	   value	  
chain.	  A	  good	  example	  is	  therefore	  the	  time	  from	  July	  2012	  to	  June	  2013	  (months	  103-­‐114).	  
	  
Figure	  21:	  Development	  DAR	  informal	  retailing	  
As	   we	   can	   see	   in	   figure	   21,	   starting	   in	   July	   where	   smallholder	   maize	   is	   well	   available	  
(represented	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  DAR	  and	  the	  grain	  retailing	  flow	  have	  the	  same	  value),	  the	  
DAR	  informal	  retailing	  is	  steady	  and	  quite	  low.	  Since	  the	  informal	  customer	  grain	  storage	  is	  
full	  and	  at	  the	  desired	  level,	  the	  DAR	  just	  aims	  to	  replace	  the	  outflow	  of	  losses	  and	  hammer	  
Development DAR informal retailing
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milling.	  However,	  later	  in	  the	  year	  (around	  month	  104,5),	  grain	  supply	  dries	  up	  because	  the	  
non-­‐FRA	  smallholder	  purchase	  switch	  goes	   to	  zero,	   as	   can	  be	  seen	   in	   figure	  22.	   Informal	  
consumers	  now	  satisfy	  their	  demand	  by	  emptying	  their	  grain	  storage,	  while	  no	  new	  grain	  
flows	   in,	   so	   that	   the	   grain	   storage	   is	   progressively	   depleted.	   As	   the	   storage	   becomes	  
smaller,	   the	  gap	  grows	  bigger	  and	   the	  DAR	  shoots	  up	  because	  consumers	  wish	   to	   fill	   the	  
growing	   gap	  between	  desired	   and	   actual	   grain	   storage	   (cf.	   figure	  21).	   The	   growth	   in	   the	  
DAR	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  gap	  because	  it	  is	  multiplied	  by	  the	  desired	  coverage	  time.	  Around	  
month	  107,	  the	  storage	  is	  completely	  empty	  and	  the	  DAR	  peaks.	  Thereafter,	  the	  DAR	  stays	  
more	  or	  less	  steady	  at	  this	  high	  level,	  rising	  slightly	  with	  rising	  overall	  demand.	  
	  
Figure	  22:	  Development	  demand	  informal	  
While	   the	  non-­‐FRA	  smallholder	  purchase	   switch	   turns	   to	  1	   again	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  
new	   year	   in	   month	   109,	   this	   does	   not	   help	   because	   all	   the	   remaining	   grain	   from	   the	  
preceding	  harvest	  has	  by	  now	  been	  bought	  by	  FRA,	  so	   that	  smallholders	  have	  nothing	   to	  
sell	   before	   the	   new	  harvest	   comes	   in.	   In	  month	   108,	   all	   the	   stocks	   in	   the	   informal	   value	  
chain	   have	   been	   emptied,	   so	   that	   the	   gap	   between	   informal	   demand	   and	   consumption	  
shoots	  up	  and	  spills	  over	  into	  the	  formal	  value	  chain	  (cf.	  figure	  22)	  –	  representing	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  customers	  from	  the	  informal	  value	  chain	  now	  have	  to	  resort	  to	  consuming	  roller	  
Development demand informal
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meal.	  The	  delay	  between	  this	  event,	  and	  the	  time	  when	  the	  grain	  storage	  is	  emptied	  (month	  
107)	  is	  due	  to	  the	  remaining	  maize	  in	  the	  informal	  customer	  meal	  storage	  that	  consumers	  
can	  live	  off	  for	  a	  short	  time.	  	  
The	  depression	  in	  the	  informal	  demand	  between	  months	  105	  and	  113	  reflects	  that	  informal	  
consumers	  reduce	  their	  daily	  consumption	  due	  to	  diminishing	  grain	  supply	  (cf.	  figure	  22).	  
This	  depression	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  the	  DAR	  in	  figure	  21.	  
However,	   in	   figure	   21	   we	   can	   see	   that	   in	   month	   111	   the	   new	   green	   harvest	   becomes	  
available	   and	   the	   grain	   retailing	  begins	   again	   at	   the	   low	   level	   that	   the	   green	  harvest	   can	  
supply.	  Consumers	  then	  change	  back	  from	  roller	  meal	  to	  their	  preferred	  grain	  supply	  and	  
the	  gap	  drops	  (cf.	  figure	  22).	  In	  month	  113	  (May),	  the	  main	  harvest	  becomes	  available	  and	  
the	  supply	  is	  now	  so	  plenty	  that	  not	  only	  current	  consumption	  can	  be	  satisfied,	  but	  also	  the	  
storage	  gap	  can	  be	  closed.	  The	  retailing	  flow	  thus	  rises	  to	  the	  level	  of	  the	  DAR,	  and	  as	  the	  
gap	  is	  quickly	  closed	  they	  return	  to	  the	  initial	  equilibrium	  state	  (cf.	  figure	  21).	  
Next,	   let	   us	   examine	   the	   dynamics	   behind	   the	   development	   of	   demand	   for	   smallholder	  
maize	   in	   the	   formal	   value	   chain.	   Note	   that	   due	   to	   different	   adjustment	   times	   for	   the	  
different	  sources	   that	  millers	  buy	   from,	   there	   is	  no	  uniform	  “DAR	  Millers”	  variable	   in	   the	  
model.	   I	   therefore	   plotted	   the	   two	   variables	   making	   up	   the	   DAR,	   the	   gap	   between	   the	  
desired	  and	  actual	  miller	  maize	  storage	  (Gap	  miller	  strg)	  and	  the	  sum	  of	  all	  the	  outflows	  of	  
the	  millers’s	  grain	  storage	  (Outflows	  millers)	  instead.	  
Looking	  at	  figure	  23,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  formal	  value	  chain	  is	  in	  equilibrium	  state	  before	  
month	   108.	   The	   DARs	   just	   replace	   the	   steady	   outflows,	   steadily	   and	   slightly	   rising	  with	  
increasing	  demand.	  The	  outflows	  of	  the	  millers	  are	  steadily	  higher	  than	  the	  DAR	  for	  milling	  
and	  retailing	  because	  millers	  also	  sell	  maize	  to	  breweries	  and	  have	  to	  order	  more	  to	  make	  
up	   for	   the	   losses	   in	   their	  milling	   process.	   However,	   in	  month	   108	   the	   informal	   demand	  
spills	   over	   due	   the	   dynamics	   explained	   above	   and	  we	   can	   see	   a	   classical	   bullwhip	   effect	  
(Sterman,	  2000:	  chapter	  18)	  happening:	  there	  is	  a	  step	  in	  the	  formal	  demand	  that	  leads	  to	  a	  
higher	   spike	   in	   the	   DAR	  milling	   and	   retailing,	   and	   an	   even	   higher	   spike	   in	   the	   miller’s	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ordering	  variables,	  if	  we	  look	  at	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  Gap	  miller	  storage	  and	  Outflows	  millers.	  This	  
happens	  because	  the	  upstream	  actors	  not	  only	  increase	  their	  orders	  to	  service	  the	  higher	  
demand	  they	  get	  from	  downstream,	  but	  also	  adjust	  their	  desired	  storage	  to	  be	  able	  to	  cover	  
the	  new	  demand	  for	  a	  certain	  time.	  Thus,	  they	  order	  even	  more	  from	  their	  suppliers,	  who	  
then	   repeats	   this	   pattern.	   That	  way,	   the	   original	   step	   in	   demand	   is	   amplified	  with	   every	  
new	  actor.	  
	  
Figure	  23:	  Bullwhip	  effect	  formal	  value	  chain	  
However,	   as	   the	   gaps	   between	   the	   new	   desired	   and	   the	   actual	   storage	   are	   successively	  
filled,	  the	  DARs	  settle	  into	  a	  new	  equilibrium	  stage	  around	  month	  110	  (cf.	  figure	  23).	  Yet,	  in	  
month	  111	  the	  new	  harvest	  comes	  in	  and	  the	  informal	  consumers	  revert	  back	  to	  buying	  the	  
now	   available	   grain.	   The	   formal	   demand	   therefore	   then	   drops	   to	   the	   initial	   equilibrium	  
level	  and	  the	  DARs	  of	  the	  upstream	  actors	  go	  to	  zero	  (except	  for	  the	  millers	  outflows	  due	  to	  
the	  steady	  difference	  explained	  above),	  as	  their	  storage	  is	  now	  much	  too	  big	  in	  relation	  to	  
the	  current	  demand.	  Yet,	  over	  time	  they	  empty	  their	  storage	  towards	  the	  new	  desired	  level	  
and	  start	  purchasing	  again	  so	  that	  the	  DARs	  go	  back	  the	  equilibrium	  value	  around	  month	  
114.	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So	  how	  do	  the	  dynamics	  described	  play	  out	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  distribution	  of	  smallholder	  non-­‐
FRA	  sales	  between	  the	  formal	  and	  informal	  value	  chain?	  Looking	  at	  figure	  24,	  we	  can	  see	  
that	   the	   informal	   grain	   retailing	   flow	   becomes	   very	   big	   compared	   to	   the	   commercial	  
assemblage	   in	   May	   (month	   113)	   when	   the	   new	   main	   harvest	   become	   available.	   This	   is	  
because	  the	  DAR	  informal	  retailing	  is	  much	  bigger	  than	  the	  outflows	  and	  storage	  gap	  of	  the	  
commercial	  millers	   combined,	   and	   the	   informal	   retailing	   flow	   rises	   up	   to	   the	   level	   of	   its	  
DAR	  when	  the	  necessary	  maize	  becomes	  available.	  	  
	  
Figure	  24:	  Smallholder	  private	  trader	  sales	  
The	   result	   of	   these	   dynamics	   is	   that	   a	   much	   larger	   share	   of	   the	   annually	   available	  
smallholder	   sales	   for	  private	   traders	   is	   channelled	   into	   the	   informal	  value	   chain	   in	  years	  
when	   there	   is	  no	  supply	  shortage	   in	   the	   formal	  value	  chain	   (like	   the	  one	   just	  described).	  
After	   the	   gap	   in	   the	   informal	   grain	   storage	   is	   closed,	   the	   commercial	   assemblage	   and	  
informal	   grain	   retailing	   flows	   settle	   to	   an	   equilibrium	   state	   where	   the	   greater	   overall	  
original	  demand	  for	  maize	  in	  the	  informal	  value	  chain	  is	  reflected	  by	  the	  relation	  between	  
the	  two	  flows	  (cf.	  figure	  24).	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Note,	  however,	  that	  the	  formal	  value	  chain	  exhibits	  a	  similar	  behaviour	  to	  what	  I	  described	  
for	  the	  informal	  value	  chain	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  rising	  storage	  gap	  and	  ensuing	  higher	  demand	  in	  
years	  where	   the	   formal	   value	   chain	   also	   experiences	   a	   supply	   shortage.	   In	   that	   case,	   the	  
initial	   value	   of	   the	   “commercial	   assemblage”	   flow	   becomes	   bigger	   and	   thus	   the	   relative	  
share	  of	   the	  maize	   that	   the	   informal	  value	  chain	  can	  attract	  becomes	  smaller	   than	   in	   the	  
scenario	  described.	   	  We	   can	   thus	   conclude	   that	   the	  distribution	  of	  maize	   in	  between	   the	  
value	  chains	  in	  the	  current	  marketing	  year	  is	  strongly	  affected	  by	  the	  availability	  of	  maize	  
in	  the	  respective	  value	  chains	  in	  the	  preceding	  marketing	  year.	  
5.2.3	  Summary	  of	  Behavioural	  Dynamics	  
Summing	  up,	  the	  following	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  rule	  of	  thumb	  for	  understanding	  the	  dynamics	  
behind	   the	   fluctuations	   in	   our	   key	  parameter	  ADESM:	   it	   usually	   rises	   in	  May	   as	   the	  new	  
harvest	   comes	   in,	   staying	   at	   a	   plateau	   value	   of	   one	   that	   indicates	   the	   full	   servicing	   of	  
demand	   in	   both	   value	   chains.	   The	   grain	   supply	   then	  dries	   up	   either	   because	   the	  harvest	  
was	  simply	  too	  small	  to	  satisfy	  total	  demand,	  or	  because	  FRA	  has	  locked	  up	  large	  amounts	  
of	  maize	  in	  the	  formal	  value	  chain.	  ADESM	  then	  falls	  to	  a	  value	  around	  0,84	  indicating	  that	  
people	  who	  would	   prefer	   to	   consume	   grain	   have	   to	   reduce	   their	   daily	   consumption	   and	  
eventually	  resort	  to	  buying	  expensive	  maize	  meal.	  The	  time	  when	  this	  shift	  occurs	  depends	  
on	  how	  much	  smallholder	  maize	  was	  channelled	  into	  the	  informal	  value	  chain.	  This	  in	  turn	  
depends	  on	  the	  availability	  of	  maize	  in	  the	  formal	  and	  informal	  value	  chain	  in	  the	  preceding	  
marketing	  year	  and	  is	  mediated	  through	  the	  dynamics	  described	  in	  chapter	  5.2.2.	  
If	  the	  total	  harvest	  in	  the	  current	  marketing	  year	  was	  smaller	  than	  total	  yearly	  demand,	  the	  
supplies	  in	  the	  formal	  value	  chain	  eventually	  also	  dry	  up,	  leaving	  the	  ADESM	  to	  fall	  to	  zero.	  
If	  it	  was	  a	  surplus	  year,	  ADESM	  stays	  at	  0,84.	  As	  the	  next	  main	  harvest	  comes	  in	  in	  May,	  the	  
cycle	  begins	  again.	  Only	  when	  the	  difference	  between	  smallholder	  surplus	  harvest	  and	  FRA	  
purchases	  is	  big	  enough	  to	  allow	  private	  traders	  and	  grain	  retailers	  to	  satisfy	  demand	  for	  
grain	  all	  year	  round,	  the	  ADESM	  stays	  at	  1	  throughout	  the	  whole	  year.	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The	  sales	  by	  commercial	  farmers	  later	  in	  the	  year	  and	  the	  incoming	  green	  harvest	  in	  March	  
and	  April	  do	  bring	  some	  relief	  in	  the	  lean	  season,	  but	  they	  generally	  are	  rather	  insignificant	  
due	  to	  their	  small	  size	  in	  comparison	  to	  total	  yearly	  harvest	  and	  demand.	  Furthermore,	  as	  
commercial	   farmers	  only	  sell	   to	  the	  formal	  value	  chain,	   their	  production	  does	  not	  help	  to	  
reduce	  the	  gap	  in	  demand	  in	  the	  informal	  value	  chain,	  and	  thus	  will	  not	  change	  the	  value	  of	  
the	  ADESM	  if	  it	  is	  at	  0,84.	  
One	  more	   important	  determinant	  of	   the	  ADESM’s	  behaviour	   is	   the	  existence	  of	  carryover	  
maize	   stocks	   from	   last	   year.	   If	   the	   current	   year	   shows	   a	   structural	   maize	   deficit,	   the	  
consumption	  of	  stocks	  that	  have	  been	  accumulated	  in	  a	  better	  preceding	  year	  can	  stabilize	  
the	  ADESM.	  I	  will	  come	  back	  to	  this	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  chapter	  8.3.	  
	  
6.	  Validation	  
To	  have	  confidence	  in	  the	  results	  of	  my	  study,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  be	  confident	  that	  the	  model	  
I	   am	   using	   to	   generate	   those	   findings	   is	   valid.	   Model	   validation	   in	   System	   Dynamics	   is	  
mostly	  understood	  as	  the	  gradual	  process	  of	  establishing	  confidence	  in	  the	  soundness	  and	  
usefulness	  of	  a	  model	  (Forrester	  &	  Senge,	  1980).	  As	  such,	  it	  was	  an	  on-­‐going	  process	  that	  I	  
went	   through	   when	   building	   and	   working	   with	   the	   model.	   However,	   the	   results	   of	   this	  
process	   need	   to	   be	   formally	   demonstrated	   to	   the	   reader,	   to	   which	   end	   I	   use	   a	   set	   of	  
standardized	  validation	  tests.	  
A	   limitation	   in	   terms	   of	   validation	   is	   that	   there	   was	   no	   reference	   data	   for	   my	   central	  
variables,	  including	  most	  notably	  the	  ADESM.	  I	  thus	  cannot	  use	  the	  most	  prominent	  tool	  of	  
validation:	   matching	   data	   and	   simulation	   results	   for	   the	   reference	   mode	   of	   behaviour.	  
However,	   in	  his	  seminal	  paper	  on	  validation	   in	  SD,	  Barlas	   (1996)	  outlined	  a	  whole	  set	  of	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other	  test	  that	  are	  able	  to	  establish	  high	  confidence	  in	  a	  model,	  which	  I	  will	  employ	  in	  this	  
chapter.	  
6.1	  Direct	  Structure	  Tests	  
Direct	  structure	  tests	  are	  test	  that	  assess	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  model	  structure	  through	  direct	  
comparison	   of	   available	   knowledge	   about	   the	   real	   system	   with	   the	   model.	   They	   do	   not	  
involve	  simulation	  
6.1.1	  Structure	  and	  parameter	  confirmation	  test	  
This	   test	   requires	   the	   comparison	   of	   the	  model	  with	   available	   knowledge	   about	   the	   real	  
system.	   I	   approached	   this	   by	   grounding	   every	   relation	   and	  parameter	   value	   in	   academic	  
research,	  reliable	  numerical	  databases,	  reports	  by	  political	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  UN,	  or	  
if	   that	   was	   not	   available,	   expert	   knowledge.	   In	   case	   where	   direct	   information	   about	   a	  
relation	  or	  parameter	  was	  not	  available,	  I	  used	  plausible	  assumptions	  that	  were	  themselves	  
grounded	   in	   other	   sources	   of	   the	   types	   just	   described.	   The	   detailed	   justification	   for	  
relations,	   parameter	   formulations	   and	   values	   used	   in	   the	   model	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	  
discussion	  of	  the	  model	  in	  chapter	  4	  and	  the	  documentation	  of	  the	  model	  in	  appendix	  A.	  
6.1.2	  Dimensional	  consistency	  test	  
This	  test	  requires	  all	  variables	  in	  the	  model	  to	  be	  dimensionally	  consistent.	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  
in	  figure	  25	  below,	  my	  model	  passed	  the	  automatic	  unit	  consistency	  test	  in	  iThink	  and	  thus	  
conforms	  to	  these	  standards.	  Details	  concerning	  the	  equations	  and	  units	  used	  in	  the	  model	  
can	  be	  found	  in	  appendix	  A.	  




Figure	  25:	  Dimensional	  consistency	  test	  in	  iThink	  
However,	   Barlas	   (1996)	   rightfully	   remarks	   that	   this	   test	   is	   only	   relevant	   in	   conjunction	  
with	  a	  successfully	  passed	  structure	  confirmation	  test,	  meaning	  that	  the	  model	  should	  not	  
contain	  meaningless	   “dummy	   variables”	   to	  make	   it	   consistent.	   As	   the	   reader	  will	   notice	  
looking	   at	   my	   model,	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	   variables	   that	   on	   first	   sight	   might	   seem	  
suspicious	  to	  be	  such	  dummy	  variables,	  e.g.	  the	  “main	  harvest	  months	  per	  year”.	  Yet,	  they	  
do	   actually	  have	   a	  meaning	   and	   function	  on	   their	   own,	   as	   they	   transform	  variables	   from	  
one	   time	   scale	   into	   another	   –	   e.g.	   yearly	   data	   into	   monthly	   output	   so	   that	   the	   seasonal	  
dynamics	   can	   be	   reflected.	   E.g.	   the	   “main	   harvest	  months	   per	   year”	   variable’s	   value	   of	   2	  
months	   serves	   to	   distribute	   the	   yearly	   production	   in	   two	   even	   parts	   over	   the	   two	  main	  
harvest	  months	  in	  Zambia,	  May	  and	  June.	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6.1.3	  Direct	  Extreme	  Condition	  Test	  
This	   test	   involves	   “evaluating	  the	  validity	  of	  model	  equations	  under	  extreme	  conditions,	  by	  
assessing	  the	  plausibility	  of	  the	  resulting	  values	  against	  the	  knowledge/anticipation	  of	  what	  
would	  happen	  under	  a	  similar	  condition	  in	  real	  life”	  (Barlas,	  1996:	  p.	  190).	  As	  opposed	  to	  the	  
behaviour	   extreme	   conditions	   test,	   this	   test	   does	   not	   involve	   simulation.	   In	   building	   the	  
model,	  I	  always	  tried	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  the	  impact	  of	  extreme	  conditions	  and	  designed	  all	  the	  
equations	   so	   that	   they	   would	   behave	   logically.	   Even	   though	   it	   would	   take	   up	   too	  much	  
space	   to	   go	   through	   all	   the	   equations	   here,	   they	   can	   be	   visited	   in	   appendix	   A	   by	   the	  
interested	   reader	   and	   inspected	   in	   detail	   there.	   At	   this	   point,	   let	   us	   look	   at	   the	   Desired	  
Acquisition	  Rate	  for	  roller	  meal	  by	  consumers	  (DAR_milling_and_retailing)	  as	  an	  illustrative	  
example.	  I	  used	  similar	  structures	  several	  times	  in	  my	  model	  and	  they	  are	  crucial	  as	  they	  
drive	   the	   behaviour	   of	   the	   value	   chain	   through	   passing	   the	   information	   feedback	   from	  
upstream	  consumers	  to	  downstream	  suppliers	  and	  producers.	  	  
The	  equation	  for	  DAR_milling_and_retailing	  is	  the	  following:	  
MAX(0,Consumption_Formal+Gap_formal_customer_meal_strg/AT_milling_and_retailing)	  
Let	  us	  now	  assume	  two	  extreme	  scenarios	  for	  this	  variable:	  
a) The	  demand	  becomes	  extremely	  high.	  This	  will	   also	   increase	   the	  gap	  between	   the	  
desired	  and	  actual	  customer	  meal	  storage,	  as	  the	  desired	  meal	  storage	  is	  a	  function	  
of	  demand	  and	  coverage	  time.	  What	  will	  happen	  to	  DAR	  is	  that	  both	  the	  gap	  and	  the	  
consumption	  (if	  there	  is	  enough	  maize	  to	  consume	  in	  the	  stock)	  shoot	  up,	  strongly	  
driving	  up	  the	  DAR	  as	  well.	  This	  behaviour	  seems	  plausible.	  
b) The	   demand	   drops	   to	   zero.	   This	   would	   lead	   to	   zero	   consumption	   and	   actually	   a	  
negative	  gap,	  as	   the	  desired	  meal	  storage	  would	  also	  become	  zero	  while	   the	  stock	  
still	  holds	  a	   certain	  positive	  value	  of	  maize.	  Zero	  minus	  a	  negative	  value	  would	  of	  
course	   make	   the	   DAR	   become	   negative,	   which	   would	   not	   make	   sense	   since	   you	  
cannot	  order	  negative	  meal	  from	  a	  miller	  or	  retailer.	  I	  thus	  added	  a	  MAX	  function	  to	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prevent	   this	   potentially	   illogical	   behaviour.	  With	   this	   addition,	   the	   variable	   value	  
now	  becomes	  zero	  and	  would	  be	  plausible.	  	  
The	   formulation	   thus	   passes	   the	   direct	   extreme	   condition	   test.	   It	   has	   in	   similar	   form	  
therefore	  been	  used	  for	  other	  desired	  acquisition	  rates	  in	  the	  model	  as	  well.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
the	   millers’	   acquisition,	   I	   do	   not	   compute	   a	   single	   DAR	   because	   adjustment	   times	   are	  
different	   for	   their	   different	   suppliers.	   However,	   each	   flow	   has	   been	   set	   to	   be	   a	   uniflow,	  
which	  is	  the	  equivalent	  of	  a	  MAX	  function,	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  the	  same	  plausible	  behaviour	  
discussed	  here.	  
6.2	  Structure-­‐Oriented	  Behaviour	  Tests	  
Structure-­‐oriented	  behaviour	  tests	  are	  used	  to	  assess	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  structure	  indirectly	  
by	  scrutinizing	  how	  the	  behaviour	  changes	  under	  a	  number	  of	  different	  conditions.	   If	   the	  
behaviour	  changes	  are	  plausible	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  conditions,	  confidence	  in	  
the	  model’s	  structure	  can	  be	  gained.	  
6.2.1	  Extreme	  Conditions	  Test	  
This	   test	   requires	   assigning	   extreme	   values	   to	   selected	   variables	   and	   evaluating	   if	   the	  
model	   behaves	   plausibly	   in	   response.	   The	  model	   behaviour	   is	   deemed	   plausible	  when	   it	  
reflects	  how	  the	  real	  system	  would	  react	  to	  such	  extreme	  changes.	  
Although	  I	  applied	   this	   test	   to	  many	  sub-­‐structures	  of	   the	  model,	   it	  would	   take	   too	  much	  
space	   to	   discuss	   all	   of	   these	   here.	   Luckily,	   we	   can	   assess	   the	   plausibility	   of	   all	   the	   sub-­‐
structures	  by	  analysing	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  model	  as	  a	  whole,	  since	  the	  entire	  model	  will	  
only	   behave	   correctly	   if	   the	   sub-­‐structures	   work	   correctly	   as	   well.	   As	   smallholder	  
production	  is	  probably	  the	  highest-­‐impact	  parameter	  in	  my	  model,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  use	  it	  
for	   extreme-­‐condition	   testing.	   To	   test	   the	   response	   to	   extremely	   low,	   as	   well	   as	   high	  
harvests,	  I	  set	  production	  to	  zero	  with	  a	  STEP	  up	  to	  3	  million	  tonnes	  per	  year	  at	  time	  100.	  
Imports	  and	  commercial	  production	  were	  set	  to	  zero	  for	  the	  whole	  length	  of	  the	  simulation.	  
The	  resulting	  behaviour	  for	  the	  ADESM	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  figure	  26.	  




Figure	  26:	  Behaviour	  of	  ADESM	  under	  extreme	  conditions 
As	  expected,	  with	  no	  production	  coming	   in,	   the	  ADESM	  drops	   to	  zero,	   staying	   there	  until	  
the	  step	  in	  production	  occurs,	  triggering	  a	  series	  of	  consecutive	  bumper	  harvests.	  With	  this	  
abundant	  supply,	  consumers	   in	  all	  parts	  of	   the	  value	  chain	  are	  able	   to	  purchase	  maize	  as	  
they	  wish,	   so	   that	  ADESM	  stays	  at	  1	   for	   the	   remainder	  of	   the	   simulation.	  This	  behaviour	  
makes	   perfect	   sense	   and	   shows	   that	   the	   structure	   produces	   plausible	   results	   under	  
extreme	  conditions.	  
6.2.2	  Behaviour	  Sensitivity	  Test	  
The	  behaviour	  sensitivity	  test	  involves	  “determining	  those	  parameters	  to	  which	  the	  model	  is	  
highly	   sensitive,	   and	   asking	   if	   the	   real	   system	  would	   exhibit	   similar	   high	   sensitivity	   to	   the	  
corresponding	   parameters”	   (Barlas,	   1996:	   p.	   191).	   I	   perform	   this	   test	   by	   changing	   the	  
parameter	   values	   upwards	   and	   downwards	   and	   evaluating	   the	   resulting	   change	   in	  
behaviour.	  	  
While	   most	   of	   my	   inputs	   are	   well	   grounded	   in	   reliable	   sources,	   the	   highest	   degree	   of	  
uncertainty	   exists	   concerning	   the	   different	   coverage	   and	   adjustment	   times,	   as	   they	   are	  
mostly	  based	  on	  expert	  estimates.	  The	  test	  shows	  that	  raising	  the	  coverage	  times	  (CT)	  or	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reducing	   the	   adjustment	   times	   (AT)	   in	   one	   of	   the	   value	   chains	   leads	   to	   that	   value	   chain	  
attracting	   a	   higher	   share	   of	   the	   privately	   traded	   smallholder	  maize	   in	   deficit	   production	  
years.	  This	  makes	  sense	  because	  with	  lower	  AT,	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  respective	  actors	  can	  
be	  processed	  faster;	  and	  due	  to	  their	  faster	  reaction,	  they	  are	  able	  to	  snatch	  a	  bit	  more	  from	  
the	  stock	  before	  competing	  buyers	  deplete	  the	  stock.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  raising	  the	  CT,	  we	  learn	  
that	  a	  higher	  CT	  leads	  to	  stronger	  initial	  demand	  to	  refill	  the	  depleted	  maize	  storages	  when	  
the	   new	   harvest	   becomes	   available:	   if	   you	   want	   to	   cover	   5	   months	   of	   100	   tons’	  
consumption	  instead	  of	  3	  months,	  your	  initial	  demand	  will	  inevitable	  be	  200	  tons	  higher.	  	  
That	  same	  logic	  also	  proved	  to	  work	  the	  other	  way	  around:	  with	  a	  higher	  AT	  or	  lower	  CT,	  
the	   respective	   value	   chain	  would	   ceteris	   paribus	   attract	   a	   smaller	   share	   of	   the	   available	  
maize.	  However,	  the	  effects	  of	  changing	  the	  AT	  or	  CT	  were	  not	  very	  pronounced:	  numerical	  
sensitivity	  to	  these	  parameters	  was	  very	  small,	  and	  changes	  in	  behaviour	  patterns	  were	  not	  
observed	  at	  all.	  In	  light	  of	  this	  low	  sensitivity,	  it	  seems	  well	  sufficient	  to	  work	  with	  expert	  
estimates	   for	   these	   time	   constants.	   Furthermore,	   the	   low	   sensitivity	   of	   the	  model	   seems	  
plausible,	   as	   we	   would	   also	   not	   expect	   the	   real	   value	   chain	   to	   significantly	   change	   its	  
behaviour	  just	  because	  a	  trader	  has	  doubled	  his	  coverage	  time	  or	  delivery	  speed.	  
Another	   variable	   that	   constitutes	   a	   major	   source	   of	   uncertainty	   was	   the	   Desired	   FRA	  
reserves,	   as	   these	   were	   purely	   based	   on	   assumptions	   due	   to	   lack	   of	   data.	   However,	  
sensitivity	   testing	   revealed	   that	   the	   model’s	   historical	   run	   is	   very	   insensitive	   to	   this	  
parameter,	   as	   the	   reserves	   switch	   structure	   represents	  a	   strong	   correcting	   feedback	   that	  
makes	   desired	   reserves	   drop	   to	   zero	   in	   case	   of	   a	   domestic	   maize	   shortage.	   The	   low	  
sensitivity	   due	   to	   the	   feedback	  mechanism	   seems	  plausible,	   as	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   imagine	   that	  
FRA	   can	  keep	   significant	   amounts	   of	  maize	   locked	  up	   in	   their	   storage	  during	   a	  domestic	  
maize	   shortage.	   Given	   the	   low	   sensitivity,	   it	   seems	   therefore	   justifiable	   to	   work	   with	  
assumptions	  for	  this	  parameter.	  
As	   there	   are	   no	   other	   major	   sources	   of	   uncertainty	   in	   my	   model,	   the	   remainder	   of	   the	  
behaviour	  sensitivity	  testing	  was	  about	  finding	  out	  which	  parameters	  have	  strong	  impact	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on	  the	  model’s	  behaviour.	  Production	  is	  a	  high-­‐impact	  parameter,	  as	  was	  shown	  in	  section	  
6.2.1.	   Furthermore,	   FRA	  purchases	  have	  quite	   a	   strong	   impact	  on	  behaviour:	  higher	  FRA	  
purchases	   lead	   to	   less	   maize	   being	   available	   for	   private	   buyers	   to	   purchase	   from	  
smallholders.	  This	  influences	  the	  amount	  of	  maize	  that	  can	  be	  channelled	  into	  the	  informal	  
value	  chain,	  which	  in	  turn	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  ADESM	  (cf.	  section	  5.2.2).	  
Consumer	  maize	  demand	  also	  has	  a	  strong	   impact	  on	  the	  ADESM	  due	  to	  the	   fact	   that	   the	  
ADESM’s	   equation	  directly	  depends	  on	  demand:	   the	  higher	   the	  demand,	   the	   lower	   is	   the	  
ADESM	   for	   a	   given	   supply,	   and	   the	  other	  way	   round.	   Finally,	   the	  model	   exhibited	   strong	  
sensitivity	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  perceived	  ratio	  of	  demand	  for	  grain	  that	  is	  unfulfilled	  on	  the	  
informal	  demand	  (Effect_of_perc_ratio_on_informal_demand).	  The	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  model	  to	  
this	  parameter	  does	  make	  sense,	  as	  the	  ADESM	  is	  a	  function	  of	  consumption	  and	  demand.	  
However,	  the	  theory	  and	  expert	  estimates	  underlying	  this	  graphical	  function	  seem	  so	  well	  
justified	  to	  me	  (cf.	  section	  4.7)	  that	  I	  deem	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  source	  to	  be	  on	  a	  par	  with	  
the	  relative	  importance	  of	  this	  parameter	  in	  the	  model.	  
6.2.3	  Qualitative	  Features	  Analysis	  
This	  test	  involves	  specifying	  the	  major	  qualitative	  features	  of	  the	  expected	  behaviour	  of	  the	  
model	  under	  specific	  test	  conditions,	  and	  then	  comparing	  these	  expectations	  to	  the	  actual	  
simulation	  results.	  As	  the	  reader	  will	  have	  noticed,	  I	  already	  employed	  this	  approach	  in	  the	  
sections	   describing	   the	   extreme	   conditions	   and	   sensitivity	   testing	   by	   assessing	   the	  
plausibility	  of	   the	   results	  against	  a	   reasonable	  expectation	  of	  how	   the	   real	   system	  would	  
behave.	  As	  the	  model	  has	  produced	  plausible	  behaviour	  in	  the	  base	  run	  and	  throughout	  the	  
different	  tests,	  I	  feel	  confident	  to	  say	  that	  the	  model	  also	  successfully	  passes	  the	  qualitative	  
features	  analysis.	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6.3	  Other	  Tests	  
6.3.1	  Integration	  Error	  Test	  
This	   test	  measures	   the	   sensitivity	   of	   the	   simulation	   results	   to	   changes	   in	   the	   integration	  
method	  and	  time	  step	  used	  in	  the	  model	  (Sterman,	  2000:	  chapter	  21).	  Cutting	  the	  DT	  in	  half	  
or	   changing	   the	   integration	  method	   between	   Euler’s	  Method,	   Runge-­‐Kutta	   2	   and	  Runge-­‐
Kutta	   4	   did	   not	   have	   any	   significant	   impact	   on	   the	   simulation	   output.	   The	   model	   thus	  
passes	  this	  test,	  as	  well.	  
6.3.2	  Statistical	  Assessment	  of	  Behaviour	  
The	  highly	   transient	  behaviour	  of	   all	  main	   indicators	   in	  my	  model,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   lack	  of	  
reference	  data	  for	  those	  main	  indicators,	  rule	  out	  statistical	  tests	  of	  behaviour	  validity	  as	  a	  
viable	  option	   in	  my	  case	   (Barlas,	  1996).	   Such	   tests	   are	   therefore	  not	   carried	  out	   and	   the	  
focus	  is	  kept	  on	  structure-­‐oriented	  tests.	  
	  
7.	  Production	  Shock	  Scenarios	  
Having	  established	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  model,	  discussed	  its	  behaviour	  in	  the	  base	  run,	  and	  
gained	  confidence	  in	  it	  using	  validation	  tests,	  the	  next	  step	  towards	  answering	  the	  research	  
questions	  would	  be	  to	  simulate	  shock	  scenarios	  and	  analyse	  them	  using	  the	  methodological	  
framework	   explained	   in	   chapter	   3.	   However,	   before	   we	   can	   do	   that,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	  
choose	   and	   operationalize	   those	   scenarios	   that	   can	   then	   be	   used	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   the	  
resilience	  analysis.	  This	  process	  will	  be	  illustrated	  in	  chapter	  7.	  
As	  the	  reader	  knows,	  my	  resilience	  analysis	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  response	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  to	  
production	   shocks	   in	   the	   form	  of	   changes	   in	   the	  ADESM.	  The	  choice	  of	   shocks	   that	   I	  will	  
expose	  the	  model	  to	  thus	  hinges	  on	  two	  main	  criteria:	  




How	   strong,	   and	   thereby	   relevant	   for	  my	   resilience	   analysis,	   can	   the	   impact	   of	   a	  
given	  shock	  scenario	  on	  the	  ADESM	  expected	  to	  be?	  
2. Plausibility:	  
How	  plausible	  is	  the	  occurrence	  of	  a	  given	  shock	  scenario?	  
There	  is	  a	  certain	  trade-­‐off	  between	  those	  two	  dimensions.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  if	  a	  scenario	  
has	   only	   a	   low	   probability	   of	   actually	   happening,	   but	   potentially	   devastating	   impacts,	   it	  
might	  still	  be	  considered	  worthwhile	  as	  an	  extreme	  case	  that	  shows	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  
value	  chain	  towards	  drastic	  and	  unexpected	  events.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  a	  scenario	  unfolds	  
a	   relatively	  weaker	   impact	  but	   is	   very	   likely	   to	  happen,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   investigate	   the	  
response	  of	  the	  model	  due	  to	  the	  high	  likelihood	  that	  this	  scenario	  becomes	  relevant	  for	  the	  
real	  system.	  
The	  different	   shock	  scenarios	   for	   the	  Zambian	  maize	  production	  will	  be	   simulated	   in	   the	  
maize	  production	  model	  for	  Zambia	  built	  by	  A.	  Gerber.	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  description	  of	  
that	  model,	  see:	  Gerber	  (2015).	  The	  changing	  maize	  output	  simulated	  with	  that	  model	  will	  
then	  constitute	  an	  external	  input	  to	  my	  value	  chain	  model.	  
7.1	  Impact	  Factors	  on	  Maize	  Production	  
I	   started	   my	   search	   for	   relevant	   scenarios	   by	   thinking	   about	   which	   factors	   might	  
conceptually	   constitute	   entry	   points	   for	   significant	   shocks	   in	   an	   agricultural	   production	  
system.	  On	  a	  very	  conceptual	  level,	  I	  theorized	  that	  the	  following	  variables	  could	  be	  high-­‐
impact	  parameters	  for	  production	  and	  therefore	  possible	  entry	  points	  for	  a	  shock:	  
• Cultivated	  land	  
• Agricultural	  workforce	  
• Production	  factors,	  such	  as:	  
o Capital	  (financial,	  machinery)	  
o Fertilizer	  




• Environmental	  factors,	  such	  as:	  
o Exposure	  to	  water	  
o Temperature	  
o Exposure	  to	  sun	  
o Properties	  of	  the	  soil	  
It	   was	   then	   necessary	   to	   clarify	   which	   of	   these	   potentially	   important	   factors	   actually	   is	  
relevant	  for	  the	  specific	  situation	  of	  maize	  production	  in	  Zambia.	  Building	  on	  the	  research	  
and	  model	  of	  Gerber	  (2015),	  I	  did	  this	  by	  looking	  at	  each	  variable	  mentioned	  in	  the	  list	  in	  
turn	   and	   determining	   its	   relevance	   for	   my	   analysis.	   A	   parameter	   is	   considered	   to	   be	  
relevant	  if	  it	  can	  reasonably	  be	  expected	  to	  change	  swiftly	  in	  a	  plausible	  shock	  scenario	  and	  
thereby	  unfold	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  total	  maize	  production	  in	  Zambia.	  
Cultivated	  land:	  This	  parameter	  has	  a	  high	  impact	  on	  production,	  as	  output	  is	  a	  function	  of	  
yield	  and	  land	  area	  cultivated	  (Gerber,	  2015).	  Even	  though	  changes	  in	  the	  cultivated	  land	  
usually	   happen	   slowly	   as	   farmers	   expand	   their	   business	   over	   the	   long	   term,	   natural	  
disasters	  like	  floods	  could	  be	  a	  plausible	  scenario	  for	  a	  sudden	  change	  in	  area	  cultivated.	  	  
Agricultural	   workforce:	   A	   loss	   of	   workforce	   in	   the	   agricultural	   sector	   would	   have	  
immediate	   negative	   consequences	   on	   the	   production.	   However,	   since	   the	   workforce	  
depends	  on	  the	  population,	  one	  would	  have	  to	  find	  a	  plausible	  scenario	  that	  would	  swiftly	  
and	   strongly	   alter	   the	   course	   of	   the	   overall	   development	   of	   Zambia’s	   population.	   Yet,	  
research	  shows	  that	  no	  remotely	  plausible	  scenario	  would	  significantly	  alter	  the	  trajectory	  
of	   Zambia’s	   population	   development	   in	   a	   short	   enough	   time	   to	   constitute	   a	   significant	  
shock.	  Even	  if	  we	  assume	  a	  worst-­‐case	  scenario	  like	  an	  Ebola	  outbreak	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  in	  
West	  Africa	   in	  2014,	  we	  see	  that	  “only”	  around	  11.000	  people	  died	  in	  the	  course	  of	  these	  
events	   (WHO,	   2015)	   –	   which	   is	   of	   course	   very	   tragic,	   but	   not	   a	   number	   that	   would	  
significantly	   change	   population	   dynamics	   for	   a	   country	   that	   is	   currently	   growing	   at	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260.000	   people	   per	   year	   (UNDESA,	   2012).	   Thus,	   we	   can	   rule	   this	   parameter	   out	   for	  
scenario	  building,	  despite	  its	  potentially	  high	  impact.	  
Capital:	  Since	  the	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  maize	  (92%	  in	  2013	  (CSO	  Zambia,	  2015;	  N.	  M.	  
Mason,	  Burke,	  Shipekesa,	  &	   Jayne,	  2011))	   in	  Zambia	   is	  produced	  by	  smallholder	   farmers,	  
who	  typically	  have	  rather	  basic	  means	  of	  production,	   financial	  capital	  and	  machinery	  are	  
not	  heavily	  used	  in	  Zambia’s	  maize	  production.	  Conceptually,	  this	  means	  that	  if	  we	  think	  of	  
the	   horizontal	   axis	   in	   figure	   27	   as	   the	   input	   of	   financial	   and	  machinery	   capital	   and	   the	  
vertical	   axis	   as	   production	   output,	   for	  
most	   smallholders	   we	   would	   be	  
somewhere	   around	   the	   red	   dot	   on	   the	  
graph.	   This	   implies	   that	   even	   if	   these	  
inputs	   drop	   to	   zero	   in	   case	   of	   an	  
extreme	   shock,	   the	   impact	   would	   be	  
rather	   small	   due	   to	   the	   overall	   low	  
current	   level	   of	   capital	   employment.	  
Hence,	  capital	  can	  be	  ruled	  out	  as	  well.	  
Fertilizer:	  The	  amount	  of	  fertilizer	  used	  directly	  influences	  agricultural	  yield	  and	  therefore	  
has	   a	   very	   strong	   impact	   on	   production.	   Although	   most	   farmers	   in	   Zambia	   do	   not	   use	  
fertilizer	  to	  the	  point	  of	  saturation,	  maize	  production	  in	  Zambia	  would	  react	  very	  sensitive	  
to	  a	  drop	   from	   the	  current	   level	   (Gerber,	  2015).	  The	  most	  plausible	   scenarios	   for	   shocks	  
affecting	  fertilizer	  use	  by	  farmers	  would	  be	  currency	  shocks	  (as	  most	  fertilizer	  is	  imported)	  
or	  a	  change	  in	  the	  fertilizer	  subsidy	  programmes.	  
Seeds:	   Since	   farmers	   typically	   retain	   a	   certain	   share	   of	   their	   harvest	   for	   the	   upcoming	  
seeding	  season,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  imagine	  what	  external	  factor	  would	  stop	  them	  from	  doing	  that.	  
Even	  though	  some	  farmers	  work	  with	  hybrid	  seeds	  that	  have	  higher	  yields	  in	  the	  first	  one	  
or	   two	   years	   of	   use	   (estimates	   seem	   quite	   unreliable	   here),	   the	   worst	   thing	   that	   could	  
happen	   if	   the	   access	   to	   new	   hybrid	   seeds	   dries	   up	   would	   be	   a	   regression	   towards	   the	  
Figure	  27:	  Conceptual	  relation	  capital	  input	  -­‐	  smallholder	  production	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normal	  yield	  after	  the	  second	  year.	  Due	  to	  this	  rather	  small	  expected	  impact	  on	  production	  
and	  the	  unreliability	  of	  data	  on	  usage,	  I	  will	  exclude	  this	  factor	  as	  a	  potential	  entry	  point	  for	  
a	  shock.	  
Exposure	   to	   water:	   This	   variable	   obviously	   has	   a	   great	   impact	   on	   agricultural	   yield:	  
without	   water,	   there	   can	   be	   no	   plant	   growth.	   And	   since	   droughts	   are	   a	   recurring	  
phenomenon	   in	  Zambia	   (Thurlow,	  Zhu,	  &	  Diao,	  2009),	   loss	  of	  exposure	   to	  water	   through	  
droughts	  will	  be	  a	  central	  scenario	  for	  my	  analysis.	  
Properties	  of	   the	   soil:	  The	  chemical	  properties	  of	  the	  soil	  do	  have	  a	  strong	  influence	  on	  
yield.	  However,	  they	  usually	  change	  very	  slowly	  and	  thus	  do	  not	  lend	  themselves	  to	  being	  
operationalized	  as	  a	  short-­‐to-­‐medium	  term	  shock	  scenario	  (Gerber,	  2015).	  
Temperature:	  The	  main	  impact	  of	  short-­‐term	  fluctuations	  in	  temperature	  is	  an	  increase	  in	  
evapotranspiration,	  which	  is	  already	  subsumed	  in	  the	  “exposure	  to	  water”	  variable.	  There	  
have	  been	  observations	  that	  higher	   temperature	   favours	   the	  occurrence	  of	  pests	   in	  other	  
parts	   of	   the	   world	   (Leschin-­‐Hoar,	   2015),	   but	   these	   observations	   are	   very	   vague	   and	   so	  
specifically	   dependent	   on	   local	   circumstances	   that	   they	   are	   hardly	   applicable	   to	   other	  
areas.	   Temperature	   will	   thus	   be	   ruled	   out	   as	   a	   standalone	   impact	   factor	   for	   my	   shock	  
scenarios.	  
Exposure	   to	   sun:	   Even	   though	   this	   factor	   obviously	   also	   has	   a	   strong	   impact	   on	   plant	  
growth	   and	   therefore	   yield,	   there	   is	   no	   plausible	   shock	   scenario	   that	  would	   significantly	  
alter	  it	  over	  the	  short	  term	  and	  I	  will	  thus	  rule	  this	  factor	  out,	  as	  well.	  
7.2	  Description	  of	  Shock	  Scenarios	  
Following	   the	   analysis	   in	   the	   preceding	   section,	   we	   have	   three	   variables	   that	   unfold	   a	  
potentially	   high	   impact	   on	   maize	   production	   in	   Zambia	   and	   can	   be	   expected	   to	   quickly	  
change	  as	  part	  of	  a	  plausible	  shock	  scenario.	  These	  factors	  are:	  
• Cultivated	  land	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• Exposure	  to	  water	  
• Fertilizer	  
Having	   established	   the	   possible	   entry	   points	   for	   production	   shocks,	   it	   remains	   to	   find	  
plausible	  scenarios	  that	  will	  alter	  these	  parameters	  and	  then	  operationalize	  these	  scenarios	  
for	   simulation	   in	   Gerber’s	  maize	   production	  model.	   I	   will	   discuss	   the	   scenarios	   for	   each	  
parameter	  in	  turn	  below.	  
Cultivated	   land:	  Economic	  shocks	  are	  unlikely	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  farmers	  
abandoning	  their	  land,	  as	  maize	  is	  mainly	  produced	  by	  smallholders	  who	  are	  typically	  not	  
very	   integrated	   in	   the	   world	   economy.	   Moreover,	   many	   of	   them	   farm	   not	   primarily	   for	  
profit	  but	  to	  ensure	  sufficient	  subsistence	  consumption	  for	  themselves.	  The	  only	  plausible	  
reason	   for	   a	   sudden	  change	   in	   cultivated	  area	  would	   then	  be	  natural	  disasters	  –	   and	   the	  
only	  major	  natural	  disaster	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  quick	  and	  significant	  losses	  of	  cultivated	  area,	  
which	  has	  been	  observed	  in	  Zambia	  so	  far,	  were	  floods	  (Thurlow	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  	  
Although	  floods	  normally	  occur	  on	  a	   local	   level,	   I	  also	  want	  to	  test	  the	  resilience	  towards	  
unexpectedly	  strong	  events,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  chapter	  7.	  Hence,	  I	  will	  assume	  
stronger	   than	   usual	   impacts	   on	   the	   cultivated	   area	   through	   floods.	   When	   plants	   are	  
partially	   or	   wholly	   submerged	   in	   water,	   oxygen	   intake	   is	   restricted	   and	   the	   plant	   is	  
damaged	   and	  ultimately	  dies	   (Vartapetian	  &	   Jackson,	   1997).	  By	   introducing	   a	  new	  effect	  
variable	   that	   decreases	   the	   cultivated	   land	   by	   a	   certain	   ratio,	   the	   impacts	   of	   the	  
hypothesized	   flood	   scenarios	   are	   –	   in	   varying	   degrees	   –	   moderated	   into	   Gerber’s	  
production	  model.	  The	  effect	  will	  range	  from	  1,0	  to	  0,7,	  meaning	  that	  between	  0%	  and	  30%	  
of	  the	  total	  cultivated	  area	  for	  agricultural	  plants	  (not	  only	  maize!)	  in	  Zambia	  is	  lost.	  	  
Exposure	   to	  water:	  Since	  droughts	  are	  a	  recurring	  phenomenon	  in	  Zambia	  and	  changing	  
precipitation	  makes	   up	   for	   the	  majority	   of	   the	   variations	   in	   the	   plants’	  water	   household	  
(Thurlow	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  I	  will	  parameterize	  the	  changes	  in	  exposure	  to	  water	  by	  feeding	  in	  
different	   numbers	   for	   annual	   rainfall	   into	   Gerber’s	   production	   model.	   Building	   on	   data	  
	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
	  
79
from	  Thurlow	  et	  al.	   (2009:	  p.18)	  and	  Gerber	  (2015),	   I	  computed	  a	  national	  average	   from	  
their	   rainfall/drought	   scenarios	   for	   the	   different	   agro-­‐ecological	   zones	   and	   refined	   the	  
gradation,	  leading	  to	  the	  scale	  visible	  in	  figure	  4:8	  
Drought	  Scenario	   Avg.	  National	  Rainfall	  (mm/year)	  
Extreme	  drought	   450	  
Severe	  drought	   510	  
Moderate	  drought	   630	  
Dry	  year	   740	  
Normal	  year	   879	  
Table	  4:	  Drought	  scenarios	  and	  annual	  rainfall	  in	  Zambia	  
According	   to	  Thurlow	   et	   al.	   (2009),	   severe	   droughts	   have	   been	   observed	   in	   3	   of	   5	   agro-­‐
ecological	  zones	  in	  one	  year,	  while	  moderate	  droughts	  have	  occurred	  in	  5	  of	  5	  in	  one	  year.	  	  
My	   scenarios	  will	   examine	   the	   effects	   of	   droughts	   in	   varying	   degrees,	   also	   going	   beyond	  
what	  has	  been	  observed	  so	  far	  to	  test	  the	  reaction	  towards	  extreme	  conditions,	  especially	  
as	  extreme	  weather	  events	  (i.e.	  droughts	  and	  floods)	  in	  Zambia	  might	  increase	  in	  the	  future	  
due	   to	   climate	   change	   (Deutsches	   Institut	   fürEntwicklungspolitik,	   2011).	   The	   amount	   of	  
precipitation	  directly	  influences	  the	  production	  function	  for	  maize	  in	  Gerber’s	  model.	  
Fertilizer:	  As	  laid	  out	  above,	  fertilizer	  use	  is	  a	  high-­‐sensitivity	  parameter	  in	  Zambia’s	  maize	  
production.	  The	  current	  situation	  is	  that	  most	  smallholders	  do	  not	  have	  the	  means	  to	  buy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  The	  value	  for	  an	  extreme	  drought	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  lower	  bound	  of	  the	  rainfall	  estimates	  of	  Thurlow	  et	  al.	  
(2009:	  p.18),	  while	  the	  data	  for	  a	  normal	  year	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  value	  for	  rainfall	  assumed	  in	  the	  base	  runs	  
of	  Gerber’s	  production	  model.	   Severe	   and	  moderate	  drought	  were	  defined	   for	   the	  different	   agro-­‐ecological	  
zones	   in	   Zambia	   by	   Thurlow	   et	   al.	   (2009),	   and	   I	   took	   a	  weighted	   average	   to	   transform	   them	   into	   national	  
averages.	  The	  category	  of	  “dry	  year”	  was	  included	  to	  close	  the	  gap	  between	  a	  moderate	  drought	  and	  a	  normal	  
year.	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as	   much	   fertilizer	   as	   they	   would	   like	   to,	   so	   the	   government	   heavily	   invests	   in	   fertilizer	  
subsidies	  through	  the	  Fertilizer	  Support	  Program	  (FSP)	  (World	  Bank,	  2010).	  	  
Since	  natural	  gas	  is	  in	  good	  supply	  these	  days	  due	  to	  shale	  gas	  exploitation,	  and	  real	  global	  
prices	  for	  potassium	  and	  phosphate	  products	  have	  been	  very	  stable	   in	  recent	  years,	  even	  
steadily	   trending	   downwards	   since	   2011	   (World	   Bank,	   2015a),	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   global	  
market	  prices	  for	  the	  most	  important	  fertilizer	  input	  factors	  suddenly	  increase	  in	  the	  near	  
future.	  However,	  since	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  fertilizer	  has	  been	  imported	  to	  Zambia	  in	  recent	  
years	  (FAO,	  2015a),	  and	  strong	  currency	  fluctuations	  have	  been	  observed	  for	  the	  Zambian	  
Kwacha	  in	  the	  last	  years	  (World	  Bank,	  2015b),	  it	  seems	  well	  possible	  that	  a	  currency	  shock	  
suddenly	   increases	   fertilizer	   prices	   for	   Zambian	   farmers.	   Due	   to	   the	   strong	   reliance	   on	  
fertilizer	   subsidies,	   another	   possible	   scenario	   leading	   to	   a	   shock	   in	   farmer’s	   access	   to	  
fertilizer	  would	  be	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  funds	  from	  the	  FSP	  in	  the	  course	  of	  a	  budget	  crisis.	  	  
While	  the	  fertilizer	  subsidy	  shock	  scenarios	  can	  easily	  be	  parameterized	  for	  Gerber’s	  model	  
by	  just	  changing	  the	  sum	  of	  money	  that	  goes	  into	  the	  subsidy	  programme,	  operationalizing	  
the	  impact	  of	  currency	  shocks	  on	  fertilizer	  availability	  is	  more	  difficult.	  
Fertilizer	   is,	   like	  most	  commodities,	   internationally	  traded	  in	  US	  Dollars	  (Dumas,	  2015)	  –	  
so	  that	  the	  domestic	  price	  in	  Zambia	  for	  imported	  fertilizer	  depends	  on	  the	  exchange	  rate	  
of	  the	  Zambian	  Kwacha	  against	  the	  US	  Dollar.	  If	  the	  value	  of	  the	  Kwacha	  against	  the	  Dollar	  
falls	   by	   e.g.	   50%,	   imported	   fertilizer	   effectively	   becomes,	   ceteris	   paribus,	   twice	   as	  
expensive.	   However,	   since	   Zambia	   has	   currently	   inactive	   domestic	   fertilizer	   production	  
facilities	   that	   are	   supposed	   to	   have	   a	   maximum	   production	   capacity	   of	   up	   to	   60.000	  
tons/year	   (Nitrogen	   Chemicals	   of	   Zambia	   Limited,	   2015),	   a	   dynamic	   response	   can	   be	  
expected	   in	   the	   case	   of	   a	   strong	   price	   rise	   in	   the	   form	  of	   re-­‐initiating	   domestic	   fertilizer	  
production.	  I	  incorporated	  this	  effect	  into	  my	  scenario	  by	  assuming	  that,	  with	  a	  delay	  of	  one	  
planting	  season,	  domestic	  production	  would	  be	  re-­‐initiated	  and	  gradually	  rise	  towards	  the	  
maximum	  capacity	  over	   the	  years	   if	   the	  unfavourable	  exchange	  rate	  persists.	  Assuming	  a	  
steady	  demand	  for	  fertilizer,	  the	  ratio	  of	  imported	  production	  would	  then	  gradually	  decline	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towards	   a	  minimum	  of	  0,73.	  The	   resulting	   variable	   “Effect	  of	  currency	  shocks	  on	  fertilizer	  
price”	   that	  will	   be	   fed	   into	  Gerber’s	   production	  model	  will	   therefore	   be	   computed	   in	   the	  
following	  way:	  
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦  𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 =   
𝑁𝑒𝑤  𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜  𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑟	  
As	  far	  as	  historically	  observed	  values	  for	  changes	  in	  the	  exchange	  rate	  are	  concerned,	  we	  
can	  see	  that	  as	  short	  back	  as	  from	  2008-­‐2009,	  the	  Kwacha’s	  value	  against	  the	  US	  Dollar	  fell	  
by	   35%	   in	   a	   year’s	   time	   (World	   Bank,	   2015b).	   I	   will	   thus	   test	   a	   scenario	   repeating	   this	  
increase,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  slightly	  stronger	  scenario	  where	  the	  Kwacha	  falls	  by	  50%.	  
	  
8.	  Resilience	  and	  Scenario	  Analysis	  
In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   will	   present	   the	   results	   of	   the	   different	   scenario	   simulation	   runs	   and	  
analyse	  them	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  resilience	  framework	  laid	  out	  in	  chapter	  3.	  Furthermore,	  I	  will	  
explore	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   model	   structure	   on	   the	   resilience	   properties	   exhibited.	   The	  
results	  will	  enable	  me	  to	  provide	  answers	  to	  the	  central	  research	  question.	  
8.1	  Changes	  in	  Scenario	  Run	  Models	  compared	  to	  Base	  Run	  Model	  
In	  order	  to	  reflect	  my	  assumption	  for	  the	  scenarios	  that	  FRA	  will	  pursue	  a	  policy	  of	  buying	  
half	  of	   the	  yearly	  smallholder	  surplus	  production,	  rather	  than	  entering	  new	  external	  data	  
for	   FRA	   purchases	   in	   every	   other	   simulation	   I	   found	   it	   easier	   to	   build	   a	   structure	   that	  
endogenously	   computes	   the	   value	   for	   the	   FRA	   purchases	   by	   multiplying	   the	   yearly	  
smallholder	  surplus	  production	  by	  0,5.	  To	  make	  this	  structure	  work,	  I	  furthermore	  had	  to	  
add	   a	   logical	   function	   to	   the	   FRA	   purchase	   flow	   and	   the	   non-­‐FRA	   smallholder	   purchase	  
switch	  structure	  that	  makes	  them	  choose	  the	  endogenously	  computed	  value	  instead	  of	  the	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external	  historic	  data	  from	  2015	  (month	  133)	  on.	  Apart	   from	  that,	   the	  model	  structure	  is	  
the	  same	  as	  presented	  in	  chapter	  4	  for	  the	  base	  run.	  
8.2	  Overview	  of	  Simulation	  Results	  for	  the	  Different	  Scenarios	  
Following	  the	  methodology	  laid	  out	  in	  chapter	  3,	  I	  will	  measure	  the	  resilience	  of	  the	  value	  
chain	   in	   terms	  of	   the	   integral	  between	  the	  curves	   for	   the	  ADESM	  in	  the	  base	  run	  and	  the	  
ADESM	  in	  the	  respective	  shock	  scenario	  runs.	  The	  maximal	   impact	  of	  a	  shock	  would	  thus	  
be	   that	   the	   ADESM	   goes	   to	   zero	   for	   all	   the	   six	   years,	   or	   72	   months,	   simulated	   into	   the	  
future.	  This	  would	  lead	  to	  an	  integral	  of	  60	  between	  the	  base	  run’s	  ADESM	  and	  the	  shocked	  
run’s	  ADESM.	  The	  minimum	  difference	  is	  of	  course	  0	  when	  there	  are	  no	  adverse	  effects	  on	  
the	  ADESM	   in	   the	   scenario	   run.	  Using	   this	   range	   as	   a	   yardstick,	  we	   can	   thus	   analyse	   the	  
resilience	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  towards	  the	  different	  production	  shock	  scenarios.	  The	  results	  
are	  summarized	  in	  table	  5.	  
Scenario	  	   Description	  of	  shock	   ADESM	  integral	  
final	  value	  
1	   Permanent	   Increase	   in	  Kwacha	  Value	  Towards	  US	  Dollar	  
by	  35%	  
5,57 
2	   Permanent	  Increase	  Kwacha	  Value	  Towards	  US	  Dollar	  by	  
50%	  
8,49 
3	   Flood	  Loss	  of	  Cultivated	  Area	  by	  10%	  in	  2015	   0,18 
4	   Flood	  Loss	  of	  Cultivated	  Area	  by	  20%	  in	  2015	   0,45 
5	   Flood	  Loss	  of	  Cultivated	  Area	  by	  30%	  in	  2015	   1,44 
6	   Flood	  Loss	  of	  Cultivated	  Area	  by	  20%	  in	  two	  consecutive	  
years	  (2015-­‐16)	  
1,95 
7	   Extreme	  3-­‐year	  Drought	  (2015-­‐17)	   20,08 
8	   Extreme	  2-­‐year	  Drought	  (2015-­‐16)	   12,44 
9	   Extreme	  1-­‐year	  Drought	  (2015)	   6,17 
	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
	  
83
10	   Severe	  2-­‐year	  Drought	  (2015-­‐16)	   10,33 
11	   Severe	  1-­‐year	  Drought	  (2015)	   5,02 
12	   Moderate	  2-­‐year	  Drought	  (2015-­‐16)	   6,71 
13	   Moderate	  1-­‐year	  Drought	  (2015)	   2,75 
14	   Extreme	  followed	  by	  Severe	  Drought	  (2015-­‐16)	   11,41 
15	   Steady	  Fertilizer	  Subsidies	  of	  1500	  Kwacha/Person/Year	   0 
16	   Fertilizer	   Subsidies	   Permanently	   Cut	   in	   Half	   to	   750	  
Kwacha	  per	  Person	  and	  Year	  
4,64 
17	   Fertilizer	  Subsidies	  Permanently	  Abandoned	   13,88 
18	   Flood	  Loss	  of	  Cultivated	  Area	  by	  20%	  and	  Zero	  Subsidies	  
in	   2015,	   followed	   by	   Subsidies	   Cut-­‐in-­‐Half	   to	   750	  
Kwacha/Person/Year	  in	  2016	  
3,96 
19	   Flood	  Loss	  of	  Cultivated	  Area	  by	  20%	  in	  2015	  and	  2017,	  
as	  well	  as	  Permanently	  Abandoned	  Fertilizer	  Subsidies	  
18,48 
20	   Severe	  Droughts	  in	  2015	  and	  2017	  and	  Extreme	  Drought	  
in	   2016,	   as	  well	   as	  Reduced	  Fertilizer	   Subsidies	   in	   2015	  
and	   2018	   (750	   Kwacha/Person/Year)	   and	   No	   Fertilizer	  
Subsidies	  in	  2016-­‐17	  
19,77 
21	   Severe	  Droughts	  in	  2015	  and	  2017	  and	  Extreme	  Drought	  
in	   2016,	   as	   well	   as	   Permanently	   Abandoned	   Fertilizer	  
Subsidies	  
26,31 
22	   Extreme	   Droughts	   in	   3	   consecutive	   years	   (2015-­‐17),	   as	  
well	  as	  Permanently	  Abandoned	  Fertilizer	  Subsidies	  
27,41 
Table	  5:	  Overview	  of	  scenarios	  and	  final	  ADESM	  integral	  value	  
Scenarios	  1-­‐17	  are	   “single-­‐shock	  scenarios”,	  where	  only	  one	   type	  of	   shock	  hits	   the	  maize	  
production	   system	   in	   Zambia,	   such	   as	   droughts	   or	   currency	   shocks.	   Scenarios	   18-­‐22	   are	  
“combined	   scenarios”,	   where	   the	   production	   system	   is	   exposed	   to	   simultaneous	   or	  
consecutive	   shocks	   of	   two	   types.	   Scenario	   15	   is	   untypical	   insofar	   it	   does	   not	   produce	   a	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shock.	   A	   detailed	   overview	   of	   the	   changes	   in	   the	  ADESM	   for	   each	   scenario	   featuring	   the	  
graphical	  simulation	  output	  can	  be	  found	  in	  appendix	  B.	  
8.3	  Analysis	  of	  Scenario	  Simulation	  Results	  under	  the	  Resilience	  Framework	  
Using	  the	  final	  value	  of	  the	  integral	  between	  the	  scenario	  and	  base	  run	  ADESM	  as	  a	  metric,	  
we	  can	  evaluate	  the	  relative	  resilience	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  towards	  the	  different	  production	  
shock	  scenarios.	  In	  order	  to	  keep	  the	  analysis	  as	  concise	  and	  informative	  as	  possible,	  I	  will	  
group	   the	   scenarios	   according	   to	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   shock	   scenario	   and	   evaluate	   the	  
resilience	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  to	  the	  different	  types	  of	  shock	  scenarios.	  In	  the	  course	  of	  this	  
analysis,	  especially	  in	  sections	  8.3.3	  and	  8.3.4,	  I	  will	  also	  explain	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  effects	  
of	  production	  shocks	  on	  the	  resilience	  metrics	  in	  greater	  detail.	  
8.3.1	  Exchange	  Rate	  Shock	  Scenarios	  (No.	  1-­‐2)	  
While	  currency	  shocks	  do	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  ADESM,	  their	  accumulated	  effect	  
is	   less	   pronounced	   in	   the	   medium	   to	   long	   term	   compared	   to	   the	   fertilizer	   subsidy	   and	  
drought	   scenarios.	   In	   terms	   of	   our	  methodological	   framework,	   the	   initial	   vulnerability	   is	  
not	  very	  high,	  but	  the	  permanence	  of	  the	  change	  undermines	  the	  adaptive	  capacity,	  so	  that	  
in	  the	  third	  year,	  the	  maize	  buffer	  stocks	  (i.e.	  stocks	  maize	  stocks	  that	  are	  carried	  over	  from	  
one	   year	   to	   the	   next	   to	   act	   as	   a	   security	   buffer	   in	   case	   of	   a	   shock)	   are	   depleted	   and	   the	  
structural	   maize	   (production	   to	   demand)	   deficit	   that	   is	   growing	   bigger	   over	   the	   years,	  
cannot	  be	  compensated	  any	  more.	  The	  ADESM	  therefore	  then	  breaks	  down	  to	  zero	  in	  2017	  
(months	  156	  –	  167)	  and	  the	  integral	  surges	  up.	  	  
	  




Figure	  28:	  Development	  of	  ADESM	  Integral	  for	  scenario	  1	  
However,	  due	  to	   the	  dynamic	  market	  response	  I	  assume	  (see	  chapter	  7.2),	   the	  producers	  
compensate	  for	  the	  more	  expensive	  fertilizer	  imports	  by	  raising	  domestic	  production.	  This	  
leads	   to	   decreasing	  marginal	   yearly	   impacts	   of	   the	   changed	   exchange	   rate	   value	   on	   the	  
ADESM,	  as	  can	  be	  see	  by	  the	  decreasing	  growth	  of	  the	  integral.	  The	  adaptive	  capacity	  thus	  
becomes	  stronger	  again	  over	  time.	  	  
8.3.2	  Flood	  Loss	  Scenarios	  (No.	  3-­‐6)	  
The	  maize	  value	  chain	  in	  Zambia	  is	  quite	  resilient	  towards	  flood	  losses	  of	  cultivated	  area,	  as	  
the	  relatively	  small	  maximal	  value	  of	  1,88	  for	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  flood	  scenarios	  shows.	  As	  
can	  be	  seen	  by	  comparing	  scenarios	  4	  (one-­‐year	  flood)	  and	  6	  (two-­‐year	  flood),	  the	  adverse	  
effects	  on	  the	  food	  supply	  rise	  exponentially	  when	  floods	  occur	  in	  two	  consecutive	  years:	  
one	  year	  with	  20%	  area	  loss	  has	  an	  effect	  of	  only	  0,45,	  while	  the	  same	  event	  occurring	  in	  
two	  consecutive	  years	  has	  an	  effect	  of	  1,95.	  The	  impact	  is	  thus	  more	  than	  four	  times	  as	  high	  
when	  the	  same	  flood	  loss	  shock	  is	  repeated	  in	  a	  consecutive	  year.	  
To	   investigate	   the	  reasons	   for	   this	   increasing	   impact,	   it	  we	  need	   to	   look	  at	   the	  change	  of	  
maize	  supply	  over	   the	   flood	  years	   (2015-­‐16).	  Maize	  can	  be	  supplied	   to	  consumers	  either	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from	  fresh	  production	  of	  the	  current	  year	  or	  from	  carryover	  stocks	  that	  were	  accumulated	  
over	  the	  last	  years.	  Comparing	  the	  graphs	  for	  SC	  6	  and	  the	  base	  run	  in	  figure	  29,	  we	  can	  see	  
that	   the	  difference	  between	  yearly	  maize	  production	   in	  both	  actually	  becomes	  smaller	   in	  
the	   second	   shock	   year	   of	   2016.	   Changes	   in	   the	   production	   for	   the	   current	   year	   can	  
therefore	  not	  explain	  the	  increasing	  impact.	  
	  
Figure	  29:	  Total	  yearly	  maize	  production	  under	  20%	  flood	  loss	  scenarios	  
The	  answer	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  difference	  of	  the	  total	  maize	  that	  is	  stored	  throughout	  the	  
value	   chain:	   for	   this	   parameter,	   the	   difference	   between	   scenario	   6	   and	   the	   base	   run	  
becomes	  much	  bigger	   in	  2016,	  as	  buffer	  stocks	  had	   to	  be	  used	  up	   in	  order	   to	  maintain	  a	  
sufficient	  supply	  in	  2015	  (see	  figure	  30).	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Figure	  30:	  Total	  maize	  stored	  in	  the	  value	  chain	  under	  20%	  flood	  loss	  scenarios	  
Since	  2016	  is	  a	  year	  with	  just	  enough	  production	  to	  prevent	  the	  ADESM	  from	  dropping	  to	  
zero,	   stored	  maize	   stocks	   are	   consumed	   and	   reach	   virtually	   zero	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  
2017	  marketing	   season.	   2017,	   however,	   is	   a	   year	  with	   an	   even	  worse	   supply-­‐to-­‐demand	  
ratio	  where	  buffer	  stocks	  would	  be	  needed	  even	  more.	  As	  these	  are	  now	  depleted,	  the	  low	  
production	  can	  –	  other	   than	   in	   the	  base	  run	  and	  scenario	  4,	  which	   feature	  enough	  buffer	  
stocks,	  not	  be	  offset	  and	  the	  ADESM	  drops	  to	  zero,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  figure	  31.	  This	  drop	  of	  
course	  leads	  to	  a	  strong	  increase	  in	  the	  integral	  between	  the	  scenario	  and	  base	  run	  ADESM	  
(cf.	   figure	  32),	  and	  therefore	  ultimately	  explains	  the	  big	  difference	  between	  two-­‐year	  and	  
one-­‐year	  flood	  shock	  scenarios.	  Since	  scenario	  6	  features	  higher	  production	  than	  the	  base	  
run	   in	   2017-­‐2020	   due	   to	   a	   rebound	   effect	   in	   production,	   it’s	   ADESM	   actually	   performs	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Figure	  31:	  ADESM	  comparison	  scenario	  to	  base	  run	  for	  scenario	  6	  
	  
Figure	  32:	  ADESM	  Integral	  for	  scenario	  6	  
The	  behaviour	  observed	   leads	  to	  an	   interesting	  conclusion:	   the	   initial	  vulnerability	  of	   the	  
value	  chain	  to	  the	  flood-­‐induced	  area	  losses	  is	  not	  that	  high,	  but	  there	  is	  a	  certain	  threshold	  
of	   time	  with	   consecutive	   shocks,	   after	  which	   the	   system	  becomes	  very	  vulnerable	   to	  any	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further	  perturbation	   in	  the	  production	  due	  to	  the	  depletion	  of	  buffer	  stocks.	  We	  can	  thus	  
attribute	   the	   resilience	   properties	   towards	   production	   shocks	   to	   two	   main	   factors:	   the	  
change	  in	  yearly	  production	  itself,	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  buffer	  the	  effects	  of	  production	  shocks	  
through	  carryover	  maize	  stocks	  from	  the	  preceding	  years.	  
The	  behaviour	  observed	  and	  described	  in	  the	  last	  paragraphs	  can	  be	  generalized	  across	  all	  
the	   scenarios	   simulated:	   while	   differences	   between	   the	   base	   run	   and	   scenario	   ADESM	  
normally	   are	   greatest	   in	   the	   years	   of	   the	   actual	   shock	   events,	   there	   usually	   is	   a	   lasting	  
adverse	  effect	  buffer	  maize	  stocks.	  Looking	  at	   these	  stocks	  and	   the	  current	  production	   is	  
the	  key	  to	  understanding	  the	  development	  of	  our	  resilience	  indicators.	  
The	   reader	   should	   note	   that	   in	   some	   scenarios,	   production	   lags	   behind	   in	   the	   years	  
following	  the	  shock	  by	  a	  small	  margin,	  e.g.	  the	  drought	  scenarios;	  while	  in	  other	  scenarios	  
yearly	   production	   actually	   overtakes	   the	   base	   run	   reference	   production	   due	   to	   a	  
compensation	  response.	  The	  latter	  is	  the	  case	  for	  the	  flood	  loss	  scenarios.	  However,	  these	  
responses	   are	   caused	   by	   dynamics	   in	   the	   production	   sector,	   are	   thus	   external	   and	   I	  
therefore	  will	  not	  expand	  on	  this	  topic.	  
While	   there	   is	   not	  much	   that	   actors	   in	   the	   value	   chain	   can	   do	   to	   change	   the	   production	  
output	  of	  maize,	  the	  finding	  about	  the	  buffer	  stocks	  is	  interesting	  in	  terms	  of	  my	  research	  
question	   of	   how	   resilience	   properties	   can	   be	   enhanced.	   If	   it	  was	   possible	   to	   accumulate	  
higher	  buffer	  stocks	  in	  the	  value	  chain,	  the	  impact	  of	  shock	  events	  could	  be	  mitigated	  and	  
the	   resilience	   properties	   thereby	   ameliorated.	   This	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   more	   detail	   in	  
section	  9.2.	  	  
8.3.3	  Drought	  Scenarios	  (No.	  7	  –	  14)	  
Drought	  scenarios	  have	  the	  highest	  impact	  of	  all	  the	  single-­‐shock	  scenarios.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
three	  consecutive	  extreme	  droughts	  in	  scenario	  7,	  the	  final	  integral	  value	  of	  20,08	  shows	  a	  
substantial	   impact,	   which	   amounts	   to	   more	   than	   a	   third	   of	   the	   integral	   value	   that	   a	  
complete	   loss	   of	   supply	  would	   cause.	  We	   can	   thus	   conclude	   that	   the	   value	   chain	   is	   very	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vulnerable	  to	  drought	  scenarios,	  mainly	  because	  the	  adverse	  effects	  of	  droughts	  on	  maize	  
production	  are	  very	  substantial	  compared	  to	  other	  scenarios.	  
	  
Figure	  33:	  Marginal	  yearly	  impact	  of	  drought	  scenario	  on	  ADESM	  integral	  
Just	  like	  the	  flood	  scenarios,	  drought	  scenarios	  show	  an	  increasing	  marginal	  yearly	  impact	  
on	   our	   resilience	   indicator.	   This	   is	   due	   to	   the	   same	   reasons	   as	   discussed	   for	   the	   flood	  
scenarios,	  namely	  the	  progressively	  depleted	  buffer	  stocks.	  However,	  since	  the	  overall	  loss	  
in	   yearly	   production	   is	   much	   higher	   in	   these	   scenarios,	   the	   effect	   of	   change	   in	   current	  
production	   is	   so	   great	   that	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   buffer	   stock	   development	   is	   relatively	   less	  
important.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  the	  small	  relative	  growth	  in	  marginal	  impact	  compared	  to	  
the	  flood	  loss	  scenarios,	  displayed	  in	  figure	  33.	  
8.3.4	  Fertilizer	  Subsidy	  Scenarios	  (No.	  15	  -­‐17)	  
The	  fertilizer	  subsidy	  shock	  scenarios	  are	  different	  from	  the	  other	  classes	  of	  shocks,	  as	  the	  
system	   faces	   a	   permanent	   change	   without	   a	   built-­‐in	   compensation	   response	   like	   in	   the	  
exchange	   rate	   shock	   scenarios.	   Subsidies	   are	   cut	   in	   half	   (scenario	   16),	   or	   abandoned	  
completely	  (scenario	  17)	  in	  2015	  and	  then	  stay	  that	  way	  all	  through	  to	  2020.	  This	  leads	  to	  
production	   constantly	  being	  around	  6,5%	   lower	  every	  year	   compared	   to	   the	  base	   run	   in	  
scenario	  16	  and	  around	  19,5%	  lower	  in	  scenario	  17	  throughout	  all	  six	  years.	  Looking	  at	  the	  
graphs	   for	   scenario	   16,	   we	   can	   see	   how	   this	   translates	   into	   changing	   our	   resilience	  
indicators.	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Figure	  34:	  Comparison	  of	  ADESM	  and	  maize	  stocks	  for	  scenario	  16	  
	  
Figure	  35:	  Development	  of	  ADESM	  Integral	  against	  yearly	  demand	  and	  production	  for	  scenario	  16	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The	  logic	  behind	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  resilience	  indicators	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  explained	  in	  
section	   8.3.2.	   There	   is	   only	   a	   relatively	   small	   excess	   original	   demand9	  (i.e.	   demand	  
exceeding	   production)	   in	   2015,	   so	   that	   the	   production	   deficit	   can	   be	   buffered	   by	   the	  
consumption	   of	   carryover	   stocks.	   The	   size	   of	   the	   carryover	   stocks	   is	   represented	   by	   the	  
local	   minima	   of	   the	   purple	   line	   in	   figure	   34.	   In	   2016,	   however,	   the	   difference	   between	  
production	  and	  original	  demand	  rises	  and	   the	  buffer	  stocks	  are	  now	   lower	   than	   the	  year	  
before.	  The	  growing	  gap	   in	  2016	  cannot	  be	  redeemed	  by	  consuming	  the	  already	  reduced	  
buffer	   stocks	   and	   the	   ADESM	   drops	   to	   zero	   later	   in	   the	   2016-­‐17	   marketing	   year.	   The	  
permanently	   low	   production	   and	   the	   rising	   population	   lead	   to	   an	   ever-­‐growing	   gap	   in	  
demand	  vs.	  production	  that	  does	  not	  allow	  carryover	  stocks	  to	  be	  built	  up.	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  
breakdowns	   in	   ADESM	   becoming	   progressively	   bigger	   in	   every	   consecutive	   year’s	   lean	  
season.	  The	  only	  reason	  why	   the	  growth	  of	   the	   integral	   slows	  down	   in	  2019-­‐20	  (months	  
181-­‐204)	  is	  that	  the	  base	  run	  also	  performs	  worse	  over	  time.	  	  
While	  the	  initial	  vulnerability	  is	  quite	  low,	  as	  indicated	  by	  the	  shallow	  initial	  growth	  of	  the	  
integral,	   due	   to	   the	   permanence	   of	   the	   effect,	   the	   adaptive	   capacity	   of	   the	   system	   is	  
undermined	   as	   buffer	   stocks	   are	   depleted.	   The	   shock	   effects	   therefore	   accumulate	   to	   a	  
significant	  level	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  If	  the	  shocks	  were	  only	  to	  occur	  in	  one	  or	  two	  consecutive	  
years,	   the	   impact	   on	   the	   ADESM	  would	   be	   comparatively	   small,	   probably	   comparable	   to	  
what	  we	  have	  seen	  for	  the	  flood	  loss	  scenarios.	  I	  therefore	  conclude	  that	  resilience	  of	  the	  
value	  chain	  towards	  shocks	  in	  the	  fertilizer	  subsidies	  is	  relatively	  high	  compared	  to	  other	  
shock	  types	  when	  they	  feature	  the	  same	  number	  of	  impact	  years.	  
Before	  moving	   on	   to	   discuss	   the	   combined	   scenarios,	   I	   would	   like	   to	   draw	   the	   reader’s	  
attention	   to	   a	   phenomenon	   that	   is	   important	   in	   understanding	   the	   resilience	   analysis.	  
There	   is	   effectively	   a	   “threshold”	  behaviour	   for	   the	  ADESM	   in	  my	  model:	   since	   there	   are	  
only	   effectively	   two	   compensation	   mechanisms	   in	   terms	   of	   demand	   adjustment	   when	  
maize	  becomes	   scarce	   (eating	   less	  per	  day	  and	  changing	   to	  other	   carbohydrate	   sources),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  „Original	  demand“	  refers	  to	  the	  demand	  before	  it	  is	  adjusted	  for	  dynamic	  consumer	  responses	  to	  scarcity,	  as	  
explained	  in	  chapters	  4.7	  and	  4.8	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the	  ADESM	  either	  stays	  at	  0,84	  where	  both	  mechanisms	  are	  at	  play	  and	  the	  consumption	  is	  
sufficiently	  reduced	  to	  not	  exceed	  supply	  –	  or	  it	  collapses	  to	  zero	  very	  quickly	  as	  all	  maize	  
stores	  in	  the	  value	  chain	  are	  depleted.	  Whenever	  this	  sometimes	  fine	  threshold	  is	  crossed	  
and	  the	  ADESM	  thus	   falls	   to	  zero	   in	   the	  scenario	  run,	  but	   just	  manages	   to	  stay	  at	  around	  
0,84	  in	  the	  base	  run,	  the	  integral	  surges	  up.	  
8.3.5	  Combined	  Scenarios	  (No.	  18-­‐22)	  
The	   combined	   scenarios	   have	   –	   except	   for	   scenario	   18	   –	   a	   very	   strong	   impact	   on	   the	  
ADESM.	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  combined	  scenarios	  reflects	  what	  we	  have	  found	  out	  about	  the	  
resilience	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  to	  the	  different	  single-­‐shock	  scenarios:	  the	  lower	  the	  resilience	  
of	  the	  value	  chain	  is	  to	  the	  single	  shocks	  that	  make	  up	  the	  combined	  scenario,	  the	  greater	  is	  
the	  impact	  of	  the	  combined	  scenario	  as	  well.	  The	  underlying	  dynamics	  of	  the	  translation	  of	  
production	   shocks	   to	   changes	   in	   the	   ADESM	   are	   essentially	   the	   same	   as	   described	   in	  
sections	  8.3.1	  through	  8.3.4	  and	  I	  will	  thus	  not	  go	  into	  detail	  about	  them	  again.	  
An	   interesting	   observation	   is	   that	   the	   combined	   scenarios	   have	   a	   lower	   impact	   on	   the	  
ADESM	  than	   the	  sum	  of	   the	   two	  single-­‐shock	  scenarios.	  For	  example,	   the	  3-­‐year	  extreme	  
drought	   leads	   to	   a	   final	   value	   of	   the	   integral	   of	   20,08	   and	   the	   abandonment	   of	   fertilizer	  
subsidies	   to	   an	   integral	   of	   13,88.	   Yet,	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   combined	   shock	   scenario	   22,	  
featuring	  both	  of	   these	  developments,	  does	  not	  amount	   to	  an	   integral	  value	  of	  33,96,	  but	  
instead	   only	   27,41.	   The	   reason	  
for	   this	   is	   that	   the	   production	  
sector	   shows	   a	   decreasing	  
marginal	  impact	  on	  yearly	  maize	  
production	   when	   shocks	   are	  
added	   up.	   In	   graphical	   terms,	  
the	   relationship	   would	  
conceptually	  look	  like	  the	  graph	  
in	   figure	   36,	   where	   the	  
Figure	  36:	  Relation	  between	  strength	  of	  shock	  and	  impact	  on	  ADESM	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horizontal	   axis	   would	   represent	   the	   rising	   strength	   of	   the	   shock	   by	   adding	   up	   different	  
types	  of	  shocks,	  and	  the	  vertical	  axis	  would	  embody	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  ADESM	  in	  the	  model.	  
8.4	  Conclusions	  Resilience	  and	  Scenario	  Analysis	  
To	   close	   this	   part	   of	  my	   analysis,	   I	   want	   to	   sum	   up	   the	  most	   central	   findings	   from	   this	  
chapter.	  These	  findings	  also	  provide	  a	  preliminary	  answer	  to	  my	  central	  research	  question	  
about	  the	  resilience	  properties	  of	  the	  value	  chain:	  
• The	  value	  chain	   is	  quite	   resilient	   towards	  flood	  events	  causing	  loss	  of	  cultivated	  
area,	  as	  well	  as	  towards	  exchange	  rate	  shocks.	  
• The	   value	   chain	   is	  moderately	   resilient	   towards	   fertilizer	   subsidy	   shocks.	   The	  
moderately	  strong	  effect	  of	  these	  scenarios	  is	  mostly	  attributable	  to	  the	  permanence	  
of	  the	  change.	  The	  effect	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  rather	  small	  when	  assuming	  that	  the	  
shock	  only	   lasts	   one	  or	   two	   seasons,	   as	   the	   initial	   vulnerability	   of	   the	   value	   chain	  
towards	  fertilizer	  subsidy	  shocks	  was	  shown	  to	  be	  low.	  
• The	   value	   chain	   is	   vulnerable	   towards	   a	   prolonged	   drought.	   While	   a	   drought	  
lasting	  only	  one	  year	  still	  has	  only	  limited	  impact	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  the	  ADESM	  can	  
be	   mitigated	   through	   the	   consumption	   of	   carryover	   stocks,	   already	   a	   second	  
consecutive	  medium	  to	  extreme	  drought	  year	  depletes	  the	  buffer	  stocks	  and	  unfolds	  
increasingly	  strong	  impacts	  on	  the	  maize	  supply.	  
• Even	   though	   there	   is	   a	   decreasing	   impact	   on	   the	   ADESM	   when	   combining	   two	  
shocks,	   the	   value	   chain	   is	   generally	   very	   vulnerable	   towards	   a	   combination	   of	  
shocks	  hitting	  it	  simultaneously	  or	  consecutively.	  
• In	   general,	   the	   resilience	   of	   the	   value	   chain	   towards	   a	   one-­‐time	   shock	   (only	  
occurring	   in	   one	   production	   season)	   is	   quite	   good	   and	   it	   exhibits	   a	   low	   initial	  
vulnerability.	  However,	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  is	  faced	  with	  consecutive	  shocks,	  the	  adaptive	  
capacity	  quickly	  wears	  off	  as	  buffer	  stocks	  are	  soon	  depleted	  after	  one	  or	  maximum	  
two	  years,	  and	  the	  impacts	  on	  the	  ADESM	  become	  very	  significant.	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• There	  are	   two	  main	  determinants	   for	   the	  effect	   that	  a	  shock	  has	  on	   the	  ADESM	  in	  
the	  value	  chain:	  the	  change	  in	  the	  current	  year’s	  production,	  and	  the	  availability	  of	  
carryover	  stocks	  that	  can	  act	  as	  a	  buffer.	  The	  policy	  analysis	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  will	  
therefore	   focus	   on	   how	   buffer	   stocks	   can	   be	   used	   to	   enhance	   the	   resilience	  
properties	  of	  the	  value	  chain.	  
8.5	  Impacts	  of	  Model	  Structure	  and	  Feedbacks	  on	  Resilience	  Properties	  
Trying	  to	  keep	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  different	  resilience	  responses	  of	  the	  model	  as	  concise	  as	  
possible,	   I	   focused	  on	  the	  most	   important	   impact	   factors	   that	  actually	  change	   in	  between	  
the	  scenarios	  and	  therefore	  explain	  the	  differences	  observed.	  These	  are,	  as	  we	   learned	  in	  
the	  preceding	  sections,	  maize	  production	  and	  buffer	  stocks.	  The	  model	  structure	  itself	  did	  
not	   change	  across	   the	   scenarios,	  wherefore	   I	  did	  not	   explicitly	  mention	   its	   effects	  on	   the	  
ADESM	  in	  chapters	  8.2	  to	  8.4.	  However,	  even	  though	  we	  found	  out	  over	  the	  course	  of	  my	  
analysis	  that	  the	  resilience	  properties	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  concerning	  production	  shocks	  are	  
to	  a	   large	  degree	  determined	  by	   changes	   in	  external	   input;	   the	   feedback	   structure	  of	   the	  
value	  chain	  model	  significantly	  influences	  the	  results	  of	  the	  resilience	  analysis	  as	  well.	  How	  
exactly	   this	   relationship	  between	   structure	   and	  behaviour	   looks	   like	  will	   be	  discussed	   in	  
this	  section.	  
Since	   the	   ADESM	   is	   computed	   using	   demand	   and	   supply,	   the	   demand	   adjustment	   loops	  
naturally	  have	  a	  strong	  influence	  on	  the	  ADESM’s	  development.	  Remember	  that	  there	  are	  
two	  demand	  adjustment	  feedback	  loops:	  the	  reduction	  of	  daily	  consumption	  by	  customers	  
in	  the	  informal	  value	  chain,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  spill-­‐over	  of	  demand	  from	  the	  informal	  to	  formal	  
value	   chain,	   including	   a	   certain	   share	   of	   consumers	   changing	   to	   other	   crops	   (cf.	   section	  
4.2.2).	   To	   see	   the	   effect	   of	   these	   loops	   on	   the	   ADESM,	   I	   simulated	   scenario	   16	   in	   three	  
different	  instances:	  
1) Structure	  as	  usual	  
2) No	  demand	  adjustment	  in	  relation	  to	  availability	  in	  the	  informal	  value	  chain	  
3) No	  spill	  over	  of	  demand	  to	  the	  formal	  value	  chain	  or	  other	  crops	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4) Neither	  demand	  adjustment	  nor	  demand	  spill	  over	  
	  
Figure	  37:	  Comparison	  of	  ADESM	  integral	  under	  different	  demand	  feedback	  conditions	  for	  scenario	  16	  
Looking	  at	  the	  comparison	  of	  the	  different	  ADESM	  integrals	  (between	  the	  base	  run	  and	  the	  
respective	  simulated	  conditions	  of	  scenario	  16)	  in	  figure	  37,	  we	  see	  that	  the	  differences	  are	  
very	   significant.	   Taking	   away	   the	   demand	   adjustment	   (2)	   raises	   the	   integral	   by	   57%,	  
indicating	  that	  this	  compensation	  mechanism	  is	  vital	  for	  the	  value	  chain’s	  capacity	  to	  deal	  
with	  production	  shocks.	  	  
Even	  stronger	  was	  the	  impact	  of	  switching	  off	  the	  demand	  spill-­‐over	  loop	  (3),	  which	  led	  the	  
ADESM	  integral	  to	  rise	  by	  232%	  compared	  to	  the	  “structure	  as	  usual”	  scenario	  -­‐	  showing	  
the	   even	   higher	   importance	   of	   this	   coping	   behaviour	   for	   the	   value	   chain’s	   resilience	  
properties.	  Finally,	  I	  simulated	  a	  condition	  where	  both	  feedbacks	  were	  inactive	  (4),	  which	  
produced	  a	  rise	  in	  the	  ADESM	  integral	  by	  275%,	  confirming	  the	  importance	  of	  each	  loop.	  
Comparison of ADESM integral under different demand feedback conditions
Page 1
























Figure	  38:	  Comparison	  of	  ADESM	  under	  different	  demand	  feedback	  conditions	  for	  scenario	  16	  
Studying	  the	  ADESM’s	  behaviour	  under	  the	  different	  conditions	  in	  figure	  38	  indicates	  what	  
the	   reasons	  behind	   the	   impacts	  observed	  were.	  Without	   the	  demand	  adjustment	   (2),	   the	  
informal	  consumers	  did	  not	  adapt	  their	  daily	  consumption	  downwards	  in	  times	  of	  scarcity,	  
leading	  to	  an	  ADESM	  value	  of	  1	  instead	  of	  0,84	  in	  2015	  (months	  133-­‐144).	  However,	  they	  
thereby	   depleted	   their	   buffers	   stocks	   and	  were	  more	   vulnerable	   to	   the	   structural	  maize	  
deficit	   emerging	   in	   2016	   (months	   145-­‐156),	   where	   consumption	   therefore	   collapsed	  
earlier	  and	  stronger	  around	  month	  157	  due	  to	  the	  higher	  daily	  consumption	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  
buffer	  stocks.	  While	  the	  buffer	  stocks	  are	  also	  depleted	  in	  the	  “structure	  as	  usual”	  instance	  
(1)	  by	  2017	  (months	  157-­‐168)	  and	  the	  ADESM	  in	  this	  run	  then	  also	  collapses	  to	  zero;	  due	  
to	   the	  higher	   consumption	  earlier	   in	   the	  year,	   the	   “no	  demand	  adjustment”	   version’s	   (2)	  
ADESM	  collapses	  earlier	  in	  the	  year	  as	  supplies	  are	  depleted	  faster.	  This	  keeps	  happening	  
every	  year	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  simulation.	  
Comparing	   the	  ADESM	  graphs	   for	   the	   “no	   spill	   over”	   version	  of	   scenario	  16	   (3)	  with	   the	  
base	  scenario	  (1)	  in	  figure	  38,	  we	  see	  that	  graph	  3	  goes	  down	  to	  a	  value	  around	  0,35	  soon	  
after	  each	  year’s	  harvest.	  This	  indicates	  the	  state	  where	  informal	  consumers	  have	  nothing	  
more	  to	  eat	  and	  simply	  starve	  or	  consume	  other	  crops,	  while	  consumers	  in	  the	  formal	  value	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chain	  have	  sufficient	  supply	  (which	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  remaining	  0,35),	  as	  they	  do	  not	  
have	   to	   share	   their	   supplies	   with	   informal	   consumers	   later	   in	   the	   marketing	   year.	   The	  
combined	  version	  featuring	  neither	  of	  the	  two	  feedback	  loos	  (4)	  then	  simply	  combines	  the	  
initial	   higher	   consumption	   after	   the	   harvest	   and	   the	   ensuing	   earlier	   breakdown	   for	  
informal	  consumer	  with	  the	  steady	  floor	  value	  of	  0,35	  –	  leading	  to	  an	  even	  higher	  integral.	  
However,	   besides	   the	   consumption	   adjustment	   loops,	   there	   are	   three	   switch	   feedback	  
structures	  whose	   influence	   on	   the	   resilience	   properties	   I	  want	   to	   examine	   next.	   Again,	   I	  
simulated	  four	  different	  structural	  instances	  for	  scenario	  16:	  
1) Structure	  as	  usual	  
2) Commercial	  farmers	  export	  switch	  turned	  off	  (cf.	  section	  4.6.4)	  
3) FRA	  reserves	  switch	  turned	  off	  (cf.	  section	  4.6.2)	  
4) Smallholder	  non-­‐FRA	  purchases	  switch	  turned	  off	  (cf.	  section	  4.6.3)	  
Turning	   these	   switches	   off	   in	   turn	   revealed	   the	   following	   impact	   on	   the	  ADESM	   integral	  
between	  the	  base	  run	  and	  the	  different	  versions	  of	  scenario	  16,	  visible	  in	  figure	  39:	  
	  
Figure	  39:	  Comparison	  ADESM	  Integral	  under	  different	  switch	  structures	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In	   figure	   39,	   we	   see	   that	   turning	   the	   commercial	   farmer	   export	   switch	   off	   (2)	   has	   the	  
greatest	   impact	  on	   the	   integral,	  as	   it	   rises	  nearly	  by	  70%	  compared	   to	   the	  base	  scenario.	  
Normally,	  the	  switch	  represents	  the	  export	  bans	  that	  the	  government	  introduces	  in	  years	  of	  
structural	  maize	  deficits.	  With	  this	  switch	  turned	  off,	  commercial	  farmers	  prefer	  to	  export	  
their	  maize	  and	  the	  domestic	  market	  loses	  even	  more	  supply,	  driving	  down	  the	  ADESM.	  
Turning	  the	  FRA	  reserves	  switch	  off	  (3)	  unfolds	  only	  a	  small	  adverse	  impact,	  as	  seen	  by	  the	  
small	  rise	  in	  the	  ADESM	  integral	  in	  figure	  39.	  Turning	  this	  switch	  off	  leads	  to	  FRA	  keeping	  
strategic	  maize	  reserves	  even	  in	  years	  with	  structural	  deficits.	  This	  takes	  maize	  out	  of	  the	  
market,	  worsening	  the	  supply	  situation.	  However,	  as	  FRA’s	  storages	  are	  relatively	  small	  in	  
scenario	   16,	   the	   effect	   is	   not	   that	   pronounced	   –	   it	   would	   be	   stronger	   with	   greater	   FRA	  
reserves.	  
Instance	  (4)	  encompassed	  turning	  off	  the	  non-­‐FRA	  smallholder	  sales	  switch,	  meaning	  that	  
smallholders	  now	  sell	  according	  to	  “first	  come,	   first	  serve”	  and	  do	  not	  show	  the	  strategic	  
behaviour	   of	   reserving	  maize	   for	   selling	   it	   to	   FRA	   later	   in	   the	  marketing	   year.	   Although	  
FRA’s	  policies	  are	  often	  ineffective,	  especially	  in	  surplus	  years	  (cf.	  section	  5.2.2),	  in	  scenario	  
16	   they	   have	   a	   favourably	   effect	   on	   the	   ADESM	   (cf.	   figure	   39):	   FRA’s	   purchases	   lock	   up	  
maize	  in	  the	  formal	  value	  chain	  and	  thus	  deplete	  the	  supply	  of	  grain	  for	  the	  informal	  value	  
chain.	  Consumers	  in	  the	  informal	  value	  chain	  therefore	  reduce	  their	  demand	  earlier	  on	  and	  
switch	  to	  other	  crops	  sooner,	  so	  that	  the	  overall	  demand	  goes	  down	  –	  which	  has	  a	  positive	  
effect	  on	  the	  ADESM.	  Therefore,	  the	  integral	  rises	  when	  this	  switch	  is	  turned	  off.	  
Apart	  from	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  feedback	  structures	  on	  the	  resilience	  properties	  discussed	  so	  
far,	  also	  the	  supply	  chain	  structure	  with	  its	  information	  feedback	  has	  an	  important	  effect	  on	  
the	   ADESM.	   As	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   5.2.2,	   these	   structures	   determine	   how	  much	   of	   the	  
smallholder	  maize	  available	  for	  private	  purchase	  is	  distributed	  into	  the	  informal	  vs.	  formal	  
value	  chain.	  As	  just	  explained	  in	  the	  last	  paragraph,	  this	  distribution	  affects	  the	  ADESM	  and	  
therefore	  the	  resilience	  properties.	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Another	  feature	  of	  the	  structure	  that	  has	  effects	  on	  the	  ADESM	  are	  the	  losses:	  the	  duration	  
of	   storage	   and	   the	   distribution	   between	   the	   different	   actors	   (esp.	   FRA)	   determines	   the	  
amount	  of	  losses	  throughout	  the	  value	  chain	  –	  thereby	  affecting	  supply	  and	  ultimately	  the	  
ADESM.	  And	  of	  course,	  in	  times	  of	  FRA	  surplus	  purchases,	  FRA’s	  decision	  on	  how	  much	  to	  
export	   has	   a	   large	   impact	   on	   the	   creation	   of	   buffer	   stocks	   and	   thus	   the	   resilience	   of	   the	  
value	  chain.	  I	  will	  come	  back	  to	  this	  in	  chapter	  9.	  
Summing	  up,	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  even	  though	  the	  resilience	  properties	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  
are	  determined	  to	  a	  great	  degree	  by	  exogenous	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  changes	  in	  production,	  
the	  feedback	  structure	  of	  the	  model	  significantly	  affects	  how	  resilient	  the	  value	  chain	  is	  to	  a	  
given	  shock.	  We	  saw	  that	  the	  two	  consumption	  adjustment	  loops	  had	  the	  strongest	  impact	  
due	   to	   their	   direct	   influence	   on	   the	   ADESM.	   Moreover,	   the	   non-­‐FRA	   smallholder	   sales	  
switch	  and	  the	  information	  feedback	  structure	  of	  the	  informal	  and	  formal	  value	  chain	  (cf.	  
section	  5.2.2)	  were	  shown	  to	  affect	  the	  distribution	  of	  maize	  between	  the	  two	  value	  chains.	  
And	  since	  consumers	  respond	  differently	  in	  each	  value	  chain	  due	  to	  the	  two	  consumption	  
adjustment	   loops,	   this	   distribution	   in	   turn	   affects	   the	   ADESM	   and	   thus	   the	   resilience	  
properties.	   Since	  also	   the	  other	   features	  of	   the	  model	   structure,	   such	  as	  export	  decisions	  
and	  the	  FRA	  reserves	  switch,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  loss	  outflows	  have	  an,	  albeit	  smaller,	  impact	  on	  
the	  resilience	  metrics;	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  the	  fine-­‐grained	  modelling	  of	  the	  value	  chain’s	  
(feedback)	  structure	  was	  crucial	   in	  determining	  the	  resilience	  of	   the	  value	  chain	   towards	  
the	  different	  production	  shocks.	  
	  
9.	  Policy	  Analysis	  
After	   having	   evaluated	   the	   resilience	   properties	   of	   the	   value	   chain	   in	   chapter	   8,	   in	   the	  
following	   section,	   I	   want	   to	   find	   answers	   to	   the	   question	   how	   they	   can	   be	   improved.	  
Building	  on	  the	  results	  from	  chapter	  8	  showing	  that	  buffer	  maize	  stocks	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	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in	   determining	   the	   resilience	   of	   the	   value	   chain	   towards	   production	   shocks,	   I	   designed	  
policy	   interventions	   that	   aim	   to	   promote	   the	   creation	   of	   those	   stocks.	   I	   will	   discuss	   the	  
policies	  and	  how	  they	  change	  the	  simulation	  results	  under	  different	  scenarios	   in	  the	  next	  
two	   sections,	   closing	   the	   chapter	   with	   an	   evaluation	   of	   the	   policies’	   feasibility	   for	  
implementation.	  
9.1	  Policies	  Under	  Base	  Run	  Assumptions	  
The	  policy	  I	  want	  to	  test	  is	  rather	  straightforward	  and	  relies	  on	  existing	  structures	  that	  are	  
already	  well	  established.	  Namely,	  I	  want	  to	  see	  what	  happened	  if	  FRA	  would	  try	  to	  fulfil	  its	  
original	  mandate:	   increasing	   food	   security	   for	  Zambians	  by	  buying	  and	  keeping	   strategic	  
maize	  reserves	  as	  buffer	  stocks.	  To	  test	  the	  effect	  of	  such	  storage	  policies	  under	  different	  
circumstances,	   I	  will	   simulate	   them	   in	   a	   low-­‐impact	   scenario	  with	   permanent	   change,	   as	  
well	  as	  a	  high-­‐impact	  scenario	  featuring	  a	  shock	  of	  limited	  duration.	  
First,	  I	  will	  look	  at	  scenario	  8,	  which	  encompasses	  an	  extreme	  drought	  in	  two	  consecutive	  
years	  that	  leads	  to	  a	  final	  ADESM	  integral	  value	  of	  12,44	  in	  the	  original	  scenario	  run.	  Since	  
the	   base	   run	   encompasses	   a	   structural	   maize	   deficit	   for	   the	   next	   years,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	  
accumulate	  carryover	  stocks	  without	  hurting	  the	  supply	  for	  the	  current	  year	  too	  much.	  As	  a	  
compromise,	   I	   set	   the	  policy	  so	   that	  FRA	  would	  accumulate	  stocks	  only	   the	   in	   first	  shock	  
year	  of	  2015,	  where	  the	  structural	  deficit	  is	  still	  smaller	  than	  in	  2016.	  By	  choosing	  a	  value	  
for	  the	  desired	  reserves	  that	  is	  just	  high	  enough	  so	  that	  the	  compensation	  mechanisms	  on	  
the	  consumption	  side	  prevent	  the	  ADESM	  from	  going	  to	  zero	  in	  2015	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  lower	  
supply,	  and	  then	  releasing	  this	  maize	  in	  2016	  –	  a	  year	  with	  an	  exacerbated	  structural	  maize	  
deficit	  –	  the	  overall	  performance	  of	  the	  ADESM	  could	  be	  enhanced.	  The	  final	  integral	  in	  that	  
case	  would	  only	  be	  11,3.	  	  
The	   logic	  behind	  the	  relative	  success	  of	  this	  policy	   is	  that	  the	  marginal	  positive	   impact	  of	  
extra	  maize	   supply	   in	   2016	   is	   higher	   than	   in	   2015:	   extra	  maize	   that	   would	   “only”	   have	  
helped	   to	   keep	   the	   ADESM	   at	   a	   value	   of	   1	   instead	   of	   0,84	   for	   longer	   in	   2015,	   helps	   to	  
stabilize	  it	  at	  0,84	  instead	  of	  going	  to	  zero	  in	  2016.	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However,	  the	  success	  of	  this	  policy	  depends	  on	  very	  fine-­‐tuned	  management	  of	  the	  maize	  
stocks	  by	  FRA	  and	   it	   is	  questionable	   if	   they	  would	  be	  able	   to	  determine	  which	   is	   just	   the	  
right	  amount	  of	  maize	  to	  store	  and	  release.	  Moreover,	  it	  would	  probably	  take	  some	  kind	  of	  
anticipation	  that	  another	  shock	  is	  to	  follow	  in	  the	  next	  year	  to	  execute	  the	  policy	  in	  the	  way	  
described.	   Finally,	   I	   deem	   the	   political	   feasibility	   of	   this	   policy	   to	   be	   quite	   low,	   as	  
withholding	  maize	  in	  times	  of	  supply	  shortage	  seems	  like	  a	  policy	  that	  would	  quickly	  falter	  
to	  domestic	  political	  pressure	  to	  release	  the	  maize	  right	  now.	  
Next,	   I	  want	   to	   test	   if	   similar	  results	  are	  obtained	   in	  a	  different	  scenario	  setting.	  Hence,	   I	  
will	  look	  at	  scenario	  16,	  which	  features	  the	  permanent	  reduction	  of	  fertilizer	  subsidies	  per	  
capita	  by	  50%,	  leading	  to	  a	  final	  integral	  value	  of	  4,64	  in	  the	  original	  scenario	  run.	  Different	  
to	  our	  findings	  for	  scenario	  8,	  the	  policy	  of	  storing	  maize	  in	  2015	  and	  then	  releasing	  it	  later	  
on	  does	  not	  have	  any	  significant	  positive	  effect	  on	  the	  overall	  development	  of	  the	  ADESM	  in	  
scenario	  16.	  This	  is	  because	  due	  to	  the	  permanence	  of	  the	  change,	  there	  is	  no	  central	  crisis	  
year	  (like	  2016	  in	  the	  case	  of	  scenario	  8),	  and	  the	  marginal	  impact	  of	  maize	  on	  the	  ADESM	  
is	  more	  or	  less	  the	  same	  throughout	  all	  years.	  Therefore,	  transferring	  maize	  from	  one	  year	  
to	  another	  does	  not	  significantly	  raise	  the	  ADESM.	  
The	  simulation	  results	  confirm	  that	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  implement	  a	  storage	  policy	  with	  significant	  
positive	   effects	   on	  maize	   supply	   in	   an	   environment	   of	   constant	   structural	  maize	   deficits.	  
The	  best	  effect	  one	  can	  hope	  to	  achieve	  with	  such	  a	  policy	  is	  to	  transfer	  maize	  from	  a	  bad	  
year	  to	  an	  even	  worse	  year,	  where	  its	  marginal	  positive	  impact	  on	  supply	  security	  would	  be	  
slightly	  higher.	  However,	   this	  policy	  would	   require	  very	   fine-­‐grained	  management	  and	   is	  
likely	   to	   falter	   to	   political	   pressures.	   In	   any	   case,	   it	   does	   not	   significantly	   enhance	   the	  
resilience	   properties,	   as	   the	   underlying	   problem	   of	   a	   structural	   maize	   deficit	   cannot	   be	  
redeemed.	  
9.2	  Policies	  Under	  Changed	  Scenario	  Assumptions	  
Having	   thus	  established	   that	  policies	   relying	  on	  storing	  domestically	  produced	  maize	  are	  
not	  promising	  in	  an	  environment	  of	  constant	  structural	  maize	  deficits,	  I	  want	  to	  explore	  the	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effects	  of	  storage	  policies	  in	  an	  environment	  with	  occasional	  bumper	  harvests	  –	  which,	  as	  
we	  know	  from	  historical	  data,	  do	  regularly	  occur	  in	  Zambia	  (cf.	  appendix	  C.1).	  
The	  scenario	  I	  will	  use	  to	  investigate	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  policy	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  base	  
run,	   a	  high	  production	   scenario	  and	   scenario	  8.	  The	  distribution	  of	  maize	  production	   for	  
the	  scenario	  (in	  metric	  tons)	  over	  the	  years	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  table	  6:	  








2015 761513,4 66218,6 993758,0 Base Run 
2016 761513,4 66218,6 993758,0 Base Run 
2017 1370691,08 248154,7 1291558,5 High Production 
2018 395346,1 34377,9 704086,0 Shock (SC8) 
2019 363404,6 31600,4 691625,0 Shock (SC 8) 
2020 754799,3 65634,7 1111506,0 Base Run 
Table	  6:	  Production	  timeline	  for	  the	  mixed	  bumper	  harvest	  and	  shock	  scenario	  23	  
After	  two	  years	  of	  base	  run	  production,	  Zambia	  experiences	  another	  bumper	  harvest,	  with	  
production	   computed	   as	   the	   average	   of	   the	   last	   five	   good	   harvest	   in	   2010-­‐2014.	   Then,	  
Zambia	   is	   hit	   by	   an	   extreme	   drought	   lasting	   two	   years,	   before	   returning	   to	   a	   year	   with	  
normal	  base	  run	  production.	  For	  simplicity,	  I	  will	  call	  this	  scenario	  23.	  
The	   policy	   that	   I	  want	   to	   test	   is	   for	   FRA	   to	   accumulate	   large	   buffer	   stocks	   in	   years	  with	  
bumper	  harvests	  and	  lock	  up	  the	  excess	  production	  (the	  amount	  of	  yearly	  production	  that	  
exceeds	  yearly	  demand)	  in	  their	  storages	  with	  the	  intention	  to	  keep	  these	  stocks	  constant	  
at	  that	  level,	  unless	  they	  need	  to	  release	  it	  in	  case	  of	  emergency.	  An	  emergency	  is	  defined	  as	  
a	  time	  when	  the	  ADESM	  would	  fall	  below	  a	  value	  of	  0,8	  without	  policy	  intervention.	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In	   the	   case	   of	   scenario	   23,	   this	   policy	   will	   cause	   FRA	   to	   keep	   515.000	   tons	   of	   their	  
purchases	   in	   the	   bumper	   harvest	   year	   of	   2017	   as	   a	   strategic	   reserve,	   and	   then	   release	  
390.000	  tons	  in	  the	  first	  shock	  year	  of	  2018	  to	  keep	  the	  ADESM	  over	  0,8.	  This	  leaves	  them	  
with	   125.000	   tons	   to	   spend	   in	   the	   second	   year.	   The	   uneven	   distribution	   over	   the	   two	  
drought	  years	  is	  due	  to	  the	  assumption	  that	  they	  cannot	  foresee	  the	  second	  drought	  coming	  
and	   need	   to	   keep	   the	   ADESM	   from	   collapsing	   to	   less	   than	   0,8	   in	   the	   first	   year.	   This	  
assumption	  seems	  credible,	   as	   it	  would	  hardly	  be	   justifiable	   for	  FRA	   to	  not	   release	   these	  
emergency	  relief	  stocks	  in	  the	  first	  drought	  year,	  just	  by	  pointing	  at	  the	  vague	  possibility	  of	  
second	  shock	  coming	  up	  next	  year.	  
Running	   the	   simulation	   with	   and	   without	   the	   policy	   intervention,	   we	   get	   the	   following	  
results	  for	  our	  resilience	  indicator:	  
	  
Figure	  40:	  Comparison	  of	  ADESM	  integral	  between	  base	  and	  scenario	  23	  run	  for	  a	  “no	  policy”	  and	  a	  “policy	  run”	  
Looking	   at	   figure	  40,	  we	   can	   see	   that	   the	  ADESM	  performs	   significantly	   better	  when	   the	  
policy	  is	  in	  place.	  The	  “no	  policy”	  run	  of	  the	  scenario	  featured	  a	  final	  integral	  between	  the	  
scenario	  ADESM	  and	  the	  base	  run	  ADESM	  of	  8,39	  –	  while	  the	  integral	  in	  the	  “with	  policy”	  
run	   only	   amounted	  5,56.	   This	   is	   a	   reduction	   by	  more	   than	   one	   third.	  Note	   that	   the	   total	  
Integral between ADESM for base and scenario run
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production	  over	  the	  years	  is	  exactly	  the	  same	  in	  both	  runs;	  the	  only	  change	  is	  the	  policy	  of	  
FRA	  to	  store	  bigger	  amounts	  of	  maize	  in	  surplus	  years	  and	  not	  export	  the	  excess	  maize	  at	  
the	   end	   of	   the	   respective	   surplus	   year.	  We	   can	   thus	   conclude	   that	   an	   intelligent	   storage	  
policy	   by	   FRA	   that	   exploits	   the	   frequent	   occurrence	   of	   surplus	   harvest	   years	   can	  
significantly	  enhance	  the	  resilience	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  to	  production	  shocks	  –	  without	  any	  
exogenous	  help	  or	  inputs	  from	  outside	  Zambia.	  
9.3	  Feasibility	  of	  the	  Proposed	  Policy	  
To	   conclude	   the	   policy	   analysis	   part,	   I	   want	   to	   address	   the	   feasibility	   of	   the	   proposed	  
policy.	  While	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  neither	  desirable	  nor	  politically	  feasible	  to	  accumulate	  
maize	  buffer	  stocks	   in	  years	  of	  structural	  maize	  deficit,	   the	  policy	  proposed	  and	  tested	  in	  
section	  9.2	  appears	  to	  be	  useful	  and	  feasible,	  as	  I	  will	  show	  in	  this	  section.	  Possible	  frictions	  
that	   might	   hinder	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   proposed	   policy	   can	   arise	   from	   political	  
opposition,	   storage	   capacity	   problems	   leading	   to	   high	   losses,	   and	   funding	   shortfalls	   for	  
FRA.	  I	  will	  discuss	  these	  problems	  in	  turn	  below.	  
Looking	  at	  political	  pressures	   that	  always	  have	  a	  big	  influence	  on	  the	  decisions	  taken	  in	  
politically	  controlled	  organizations	   like	  FRA,	   I	   can	  see	  no	  reason	  why	  an	  accumulation	  of	  
excess	  maize	  in	  surplus	  years	  should	  trigger	  political	  resistance	  or	  public	  outrage.	  
Loss	  of	  maize	  in	  FRA	  storages	  is	  actually	  a	  very	  valid	  concern	  when	  trying	  to	  implement	  a	  
policy	  that	  requires	  storing	  large	  amounts	  of	  maize	  for	   long	  times,	  potentially	  over	  years.	  
While	  FRA	  does	  possess	  large	  shed	  capacities,	  maize	  stored	  in	  sheds	  is	  subject	  to	  excessive	  
losses	  after	  just	  a	  few	  months	  of	  residence	  time:	  after	  one	  year,	  we	  can	  expect	  a	  loss	  ratio	  of	  
more	  than	  50%	  and	  after	  1,5	  years	  even	  more	  than	  80%	  (cf.	  appendix	  C.3).	  However,	  Bou	  
Schreiber	  (2015)	  expects	  FRA	  to	  keep	  on	  increasing	  their	  silo	  construction	  so	  that	  by	  the	  
end	  of	  2019,	  they	  will	  have	  silo	  capacities	  of	  nearly	  250.000	  tons.	  This	  means	  that	  a	  great	  
portion	  of	  the	  maize	  can	  be	  stored	  in	  a	  way	  that	  produces	  almost	  no	  significant	  losses	  (less	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than	  3%	  even	  after	  1,5	  years	  of	  storage	  time).10	  Furthermore,	  if	  FRA	  keeps	  up	  a	  steady	  flow	  
of	  maize	  through	  their	  storage	  by	  mixing	  and	  selling	  maize	  from	  last	  year	  while	  stocking	  up	  
fresh	   maize,	   they	   can	   limit	   the	   residence	   time	   and	   thus	   the	   loss	   ratio	   to	   reasonable	  
amounts,	   even	   in	   the	   sheds.	   I	   therefore	   believe	   that	   the	   storage	   loss	   problem	   can	   be	  
adequately	  addressed	  and	  will	  ultimately	  not	  hinder	   the	   implementation	  of	   the	  proposed	  
policy.	  
The	  biggest	  threat	  for	  implementation	  is	  in	  my	  opinion	  the	  fact	  that	  FRA	  would	  need	  steady	  
and	   significant	   funding	   over	   a	   long	   time	   in	   order	   to	   properly	   execute	   the	   storage	   policy	  
proposed.	   Funding	   for	   FRA	   has	   been	   fluctuating	   quite	   a	   lot	   over	   the	   decades	   and	   was	  
always	   subject	   to	   often-­‐arbitrary	   discretionary	   political	   decisions	   (N.	   Mason,	   2011).	  
Furthermore,	  funding	  a	  storage	  programme	  will	  not	  immediately	  bring	  benefits	  that	  can	  be	  
presented	   to	   the	   electorate	   and	   there	   are	   opportunity	   costs	   of	   allocating	   funds	   to	   the	  
proposed	   policy,	   since	   that	   money	   then	   cannot	   be	   used	   for	   other,	   maybe	  more	   popular	  
programmes	   like	   consumer	   price	   subsidies	   or	   other	   poverty	   reduction	   measures.	   I	  
therefore	  see	  a	  real	  danger	  that	  policymakers	  might,	  especially	  in	  pre-­‐election	  periods,	  re-­‐
allocate	  the	  funds	  from	  FRA’s	  buffer	  stock	  programme	  to	  other	  measures	  that	  reap	  instant	  
benefits	   for	   the	   population.	   However,	   in	   the	   end	   the	   funding	   decisions	   depend	   on	   the	  
government’s	   will	   to	   follow	   through	   with	   a	   policy	   and	   it	   therefore	   can	   work	   if	   there	   is	  
sufficient	  political	  will	  to	  do	  it.	  
9.4	  Change	  in	  FRA’s	  Sales	  Policy	  
Another	  change	  in	  policy	  I	  strongly	  want	  to	  suggest	  is	  that	  FRA	  should	  start	  selling	  maize	  to	  
grain	  retailers	  supplying	  the	  informal	  value	  chain.	  The	  current	  policy	  of	   just	  selling	  to	  big	  
commercial	  millers	  actually	  “locks	  up”	  maize	  in	  the	  formal	  value	  chain,	  which	  is	  eventually	  
often	   either	   exported	   under	   unfavourable	   terms	   or	   lost	   in	   inappropriate	   FRA	   storages,	  
while	  customers	  in	  the	  informal	  value	  chain	  at	  the	  same	  time	  cannot	  satisfy	  their	  demand	  
for	  cheap	  grain	  and	  have	  to	  reduce	  consumption.	  This	  obviously	  inefficient	  policy	  leads	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  For	  details	  on	  the	  storage	  loss	  ratios,	  see	  appendix	  C.3	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the	  ADESM	  taking	  on	  a	  value	  of	  around	  0,84	  instead	  of	  1	  even	  in	  surplus	  years,	  as	  can	  be	  
seen	  for	  the	  years	  2010-­‐12	  (months	  73	  –	  96)	  in	  figure	  41.	  
This	  problem	  can	  easily	  be	  avoided	  by	  a	  simple	  policy	  change	  requiring	  FRA	  to	  open	  their	  
sales	   to	   grain	   retailers	   as	  well.	   This	   policy	  would	   actually	   help	   them	   fulfil	   their	   original	  
mandate	  –	   increasing	  food	  security	   for	  the	  Zambian	  population	  as	  a	  whole	  –	  much	  better	  
and	  more	   efficient.	   To	   illustrate	   the	   effects	   of	   this	   policy,	   I	   simulated	   the	  ADESM	   for	   the	  
months	   73-­‐96	  with	   and	  without	   the	   proposed	   FRA	   sales	   policy.	   The	   results	   in	   figure	   41	  
show	  that	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  ADESM	  would	  have	  been	  enhanced	  significantly.	  
	  
Figure	  41:	  ADESM	  with	  and	  without	  proposed	  new	  FRA	  sales	  policy	  
Concerning	   feasibility	   of	   this	   policy	   change,	   I	   do	   not	   see	   any	   big	   obstacles	   to	  
implementation.	  Since	  FRA	  has	  maize	  storages	  all	  over	  the	  country,	  FRA	  officials	  could	  just	  
go	  there	  during	  a	  number	  of	  fixed	  sales	  days	  and	  administer	  the	  exchange	  of	  maize	  against	  
money	  –	  much	   like	   they	  do	  when	   they	  buy	  maize	  grain	   from	  smallholders,	   just	   the	  other	  
way	   around.	   Moreover,	   such	   a	   policy	   change	   can	   be	   expected	   to	   be	   popular	   in	   the	  
electorate,	  as	  helps	  the	  majority	  of	  consumers	  to	  gain	  better	  access	  to	  their	  preferred	  form	  
of	  maize.	  
Comparison ADESM scenario run to base run
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In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  shortly	  revisit	  the	  work	  done	  in	  the	  thesis	  and	  relate	  it	  
back	   to	   the	   research	  questions	   and	  objectives,	   as	  well	   as	   answering	   the	   central	   research	  
question	   and	   summarize	   the	   insights	   gained.	   In	   the	   second	   part,	   I	   will	   deliberate	   the	  
usefulness	  of	  the	  resilience	  framework	  used;	  and	  in	  the	  final	  part	  discuss	  the	  limitations	  of	  
my	  work	  and	  give	  clues	  to	  where	  further	  work	  might	  be	  necessary	  and	  desirable.	  
10.1	  Overview	  of	  Results	  
Chapter	  1	   introduced	   the	  problem	  and	   the	  guiding	   research	  questions	  and	  objectives	   for	  
this	   study,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   research	   design	   used.	   Chapter	   2	   further	   elaborated	   on	   the	  
background	   of	   the	   problem	   by	   explaining	   the	   concept	   of	   food	   security	   and	   how	   it	   is	  
connected	   to	   the	  situation	  of	   the	  maize	  sector	   in	  Zambia,	   thereby	  placing	  my	  research	   in	  
the	   context	   of	   already	   existing	   literature	   on	   the	   topic.	   Chapter	   3	   then	   established	   the	  
methodological	   framework	   by	   operationalizing	   the	   concept	   of	   resilience	   for	   quantitative	  
measurement	   in	   SD	  models	   and	   establishing	   the	   central	   resilience	   indicator,	   the	  ADESM.	  
This	  part	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  being	  able	  to	  answer	  the	  research	  questions	  and	  accomplished	  
research	  objectives	  1	  and	  2.	  
Chapter	   4	   then	   introduced	   the	   simulation	   model,	   discussed	   how	   it	   was	   grounded	   in	  
different	  sources	  and	  connected	  it	  to	  the	  literature,	  thereby	  answering	  research	  questions	  
1	  and	  2.	  We	  learned	  that	  the	  maize	  value	  chain	  in	  Zambia	  is	  not	  structured	  like	  a	  classical	  
value	   chain	   in	   an	   industrial	   country,	   but	   has	   many	   peculiarities	   –	   including	   the	   strong	  
influence	   of	   FRA,	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   developed	   wholesale	   sector	   and	   the	   execution	   of	   milling	  
processes	   by	   the	   consumers	   themselves.	   It	   further	   became	   clear	   that	   the	   value	   chain	   is	  
effectively	   divided	   in	   an	   informal	   value	   chain	   mainly	   operated	   by	   small-­‐scale	   informal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
	  
109
actors,	   where	   customers	   buy	   grain	   and	   produce	   the	   cheaper	   self-­‐hammer-­‐milled	   whole	  
grain	  meal	   themselves;	  and	  a	   formal	  value	  chain	   involving	   larger	  economic	  agents	  with	  a	  
more	   formalized	   structure	   that	   sell	   readymade	   and	   more	   expensive	   roller	   meal	   to	  
customers.	  
Chapter	  5	  discussed	   the	  base	   run	  by	  explicating	   the	   rationale	  behind	   the	  external	   inputs	  
and	   explaining	   the	   model’s	   behaviour.	   It	   became	   clear	   that	   the	   model’s	   key	   parameters	  
exhibited	  strong	  seasonal	  fluctuations	  and	  that	  informal	  customers	  respond	  to	  changes	  in	  
the	  availability	  of	  grain	  by	  reducing	  and	  substituting	  maize	  consumption.	  Furthermore,	  we	  
learned	   that	  FRA’s	  policies	  and	  differences	   in	   the	  availability	  of	  maize	   in	   the	   informal	  vs.	  
formal	  value	  chain	  in	  the	  previous	  marketing	  season	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  
distribution	   and	   availability	   of	   maize	   between	   the	   two	   value	   chains	   in	   the	   current	  
marketing	  year.	  Chapter	  6	  generated	  confidence	  in	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  model	  by	  employing	  a	  
series	  of	  validation	  tests,	  thereby	  together	  with	  chapter	  4	  ensuring	  that	  research	  objective	  
3	  was	  met.	  
In	   chapter	   7,	   I	   then	   discussed	   and	   justified	   the	   choice	   and	   operationalization	   of	   the	  
different	  production	  shock	  scenarios	  as	  a	  necessary	  prerequisite	  for	  the	  resilience	  analysis,	  
thus	   answering	   research	   question	   3	   and	   accomplishing	   research	   objective	   4.	   The	  
conclusion	   was	   that	   production	   is	   most	   affected	   through	   changes	   in	   the	   parameters	  
fertilizer	   input,	   exposure	   to	   water	   and	   cultivated	   land.	   The	  most	   plausible	   and	   relevant	  
scenarios	   for	   changes	   in	   those	  parameters	  were	   shown	   to	  be	  droughts,	   fertilizer	   subsidy	  
cuts,	   exchange	   rate	   shocks	  and	   floods.	  These	  scenarios	  were	   then	  simulated	   in	   chapter	  8	  
and	   the	   responses	   analysed	   in	   terms	   of	   my	   resilience	   framework,	   thereby	   answering	  
research	   question	   4	   and	   accomplishing	   research	   objective	   5.	   Furthermore,	   I	   investigated	  
how	  the	  structural	  properties	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  affected	  its	  resilience	  towards	  production	  
shocks.	  Finally,	  chapter	  9	  encompassed	  the	  simulation	  and	  discussion	  of	  policies	  that	  could	  
improve	   the	   resilience	   properties,	   thus	   fulfilling	   research	   objective	   6	   and	   answering	  
research	  question	  5.	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It	  should	  be	  clear	  from	  this	  overview	  how	  the	  results	  of	  every	  chapter	  built	  on	  each	  other	  to	  
finally	   enable	  me,	   using	   the	   results	   of	   chapters	   8	   and	   9,	   to	   answer	   the	   central	   research	  
question:	   What	   are	   the	   resilience	   properties	   of	   the	   maize	   value	   chain	   in	   Zambia	  	  
towards	   production	   shocks	   in	   terms	   of	   ensuring	   sufficient	   maize	   supply,	  
and	  how	  can	  the	  resilience	  be	  improved	  endogenously?	  
The	   general	   result	  was	   that	   the	   resilience	   of	   the	   value	   chain	   towards	   one-­‐year	   shocks	   is	  
quite	  good,	  as	  the	  ADESM	  exhibits	  a	  low	  initial	  vulnerability	  due	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  buffer	  
stocks	   in	   the	   chain	   that	   can	   be	   consumed	   as	   a	   substitute	   for	   lacking	   fresh	   production.	  
However,	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  value	  chain	  is	  faced	  with	  several	  consecutive	  shocks,	  resilience	  is	  
low:	   the	   adaptive	   capacity	  quickly	  wears	  off	   as	  buffer	   stocks	   are	   soon	  depleted	  after	   1-­‐2	  
years,	   and	   the	   food	   supply	  breaks	  down.	  We	   furthermore	   found	   that	   there	  are	   two	  main	  
determinants	  for	  the	  effect	  that	  a	  shock	  has	  on	  the	  ADESM	  in	  the	  value	  chain:	  the	  change	  in	  
the	   current	   year’s	   production,	   and	   the	   availability	   of	   carryover	   stocks	   that	   can	   act	   as	   a	  
buffer.	  
Yet,	  as	  discussed	  in	  section	  3.2,	  resilience	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  as	  resilience	  towards	  a	  
specific	  shock,	  and	  we	  therefore	  needed	  to	  disaggregate	  the	  results	  into	  the	  different	  types	  
of	  shocks.	  In	  doing	  so,	  we	  learned	  that	  the	  value	  chain	  is	  quite	  resilient	  towards	  exchange	  
rate	   shocks	   due	   to	   the	   dynamic	   response	   of	   the	   production	   system	   assumed,	   as	  well	   as	  
towards	   flood	  events	  causing	  a	   loss	  of	   cultivated	  area.	   In	   the	  case	  of	   shocks	  affecting	   the	  
fertilizer	   subsidies,	   the	   value	   chain	   is	   rather	   vulnerable	   when	   these	   changes	   become	  
permanent,	  but	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  show	  a	  relatively	  small	  vulnerability	  if	  the	  changes	  only	  
last	  1-­‐2	  years.	  
However,	   the	   value	   chain	   is	   very	   vulnerable	   towards	   a	   prolonged	   drought.	  While	   a	   one-­‐
year	   drought	   still	   has	   only	   limited	   impact	   and	   its	   effects	   on	   the	   ADESM	   and	   can	   be	  
mitigated	   through	   the	   consumption	   of	   carryover	   stocks;	   already	   a	   second	   consecutive	  
medium	   to	   extreme	   drought	   year	   depletes	   the	   buffer	   stocks	   and	   leads	   to	   increasingly	  
strong	   impacts	   on	   the	  maize	   supply.	   Finally,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   two	  different	   types	   of	   shocks	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hitting	   the	   value	   chain	   simultaneously	   or	   consecutively,	   resilience	   has	   proven	   to	   be	   low.	  
The	  adaptive	  capacities	  in	  the	  form	  of	  buffer	  stocks	  are	  insufficient	  to	  alleviate	  the	  effects	  
on	  the	  ADESM	  and	  the	  food	  supply	  quickly	  falls	  to	  threateningly	  low	  levels	  –	  even	  though	  
the	   marginal	   impact	   of	   a	   given	   shock	   on	   the	   maize	   production	   decreases	   as	   shocks	  
accumulate	  in	  a	  combined	  scenario.	  
Concerning	   the	   relation	   between	   the	   model’s	   structure	   and	   the	   resilience	   exhibited	  
towards	   production	   shocks	   by	   the	   value	   chain,	   we	   found	   out	   that	   the	   two	   consumption	  
adjustment	  loops	  have	  an	  especially	  strong	  impact	  on	  the	  resilience	  properties	  due	  to	  their	  
direct	  influence	  on	  the	  computation	  of	  the	  ADESM.	  The	  reduction	  of	  demand	  in	  response	  to	  
the	  changing	  availability	  of	  grain	   in	   the	   informal	  value	  chain,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  behaviour	  of	  
informal	  consumers	  to	  change	  to	  other	  crops	  and	  roller	  meal	  when	  supply	  in	  the	  informal	  
value	  chain	  dries	  up,	  both	  significantly	  improve	  the	  resilience	  in	  response	  to	  a	  given	  shock.	  
These	   coping	  mechanisms	   reduce	   demand	   for	   a	   given	   supply	   and	   therefore	   improve	   the	  
ratio	  that	  determines	  the	  ADESM.	  
Moreover,	  the	  non-­‐FRA	  smallholder	  sales	  switch	  and	  the	  information	  feedback	  structure	  of	  
the	  informal	  and	  formal	  value	  chain	  were	  shown	  to	  affect	  the	  distribution	  of	  maize	  between	  
the	   two	   value	   chains.	   And	   since	   consumers	   respond	  differently	   to	   supply	   changes	   in	   the	  
informal	   value	   chain	   due	   to	   the	   two	   consumption	   adjustment	   loops,	   this	   distribution	   in	  
turn	  affects	  the	  ADESM.	  Furthermore,	  the	  FRA	  reserves	  switch	  structure	  and	  the	  feedback	  
structure	   of	   the	   value	   chain	   determine	   which	   actors	   build	   up	   how	  much	   storage	   stocks	  
throughout	  the	  value	  chain	  –	  which	  in	  turn	  influences	  the	  extent	  of	  buffer	  stocks	  available	  
to	  mitigate	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  given	  shock	  on	  the	  ADESM.	  
Analysing	  policies	   that	   can	   improve	   the	   resilience	  properties,	  we	   learned	   that	   the	  key	   to	  
endogenously	   improve	   performance	  was	   the	   creation	   and	  maintenance	   of	   buffer	   stocks.	  
However,	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   building	   up	   carryover	   stocks	   in	   an	   environment	   of	  
permanent	   structural	   maize	   deficits	   was	   neither	   desirable	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   effect	   on	   the	  
resilience	  metrics,	  nor	  politically	  feasible.	  Yet,	  I	  showed	  that	  a	  smart	  storage	  policy,	  using	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FRA’s	   infrastructure	   and	   exploiting	   the	   frequent	   occurrence	   of	   surplus	  production	   years,	  
could	   significantly	   improve	   the	   resilience	   towards	   production	   shocks.	   Furthermore,	   the	  
feasibility	  of	  such	  a	  policy	  seemed	  promising	  under	  a	  few	  conditions,	  which	  were	  that	  FRA	  
keeps	  expanding	  its	  silo	  capacity	  as	  predicted	  by	  Bou	  Schreiber	  (2015),	  keeps	  a	  steady	  flow	  
of	  maize	   through	   its	   storages	  and	   that	   the	   storage	  programme	   is	  backed	  up	  by	   sufficient	  
political	  will.	  Lastly,	  I	  showed	  that	  the	  often	  inefficient	  distribution	  of	  maize	  in	  between	  the	  
formal	   and	   informal	   value	   chain,	   which	   can	   lead	   to	   supply	   shortages	   even	   in	   bumper	  
harvest	  years,	  could	  easily	  be	  remedied	   if	  FRA	  changed	   its	  sales	  policy	   in	  a	  way	  that	  also	  
allowed	  sales	  of	  maize	  into	  the	  informal	  value	  chain.	  
10.2	  Discussion	  of	  Methodological	  Framework	  
Apart	  from	  the	  main	  goal	  of	  yielding	  insights	  about	  the	  structure,	  dynamics	  and	  resilience	  
properties	   of	   the	   maize	   value	   chain	   in	   Zambia,	   my	   thesis	   also	   served	   as	   a	   test	   for	   the	  
usefulness	  of	  the	  framework	  for	  quantified	  measurement	  of	  resilience	  in	  an	  SD	  simulation	  
model.	  I	  therefore	  shortly	  want	  to	  evaluate	  how	  the	  framework	  has	  performed.	  
Comparing	  this	  framework	  to	  the	  “usual	  ways”	  of	  analysing	  the	  behaviour	  of	  SD	  models	  by	  
graphically	  comparing	  the	  development	  of	  a	  host	  of	  variables,	  I	  feel	  that	  the	  firm	  focus	  on	  
one	  metric	  helped	  to	  get	  a	  much	  clearer	  picture	  of	  the	  value	  chain’s	  capacity	  to	  maintain	  a	  
sufficient	   food	   supply	   in	   response	   to	   the	   different	   production	   shocks.	   Using	   the	   ADESM	  
integral	  as	  a	  metric,	  we	  received	  a	  fine	  relative	  scale	  that	  allowed	  comparing	  the	  strengths	  
of	   the	   impact	   between	   the	   different	   scenarios	  more	   precisely.	   Moreover,	   the	   distinction	  
between	   initial	   vulnerability	   and	   adaptive	   capacity	   helped	   to	   add	   further	   clarity	   to	   the	  
discussion	  of	  the	  shock	  responses.	  	  
The	  major	  drawback	  of	  using	   this	  method	   is	  probably	   the	   lack	  of	  an	  absolute	   scale	  –	   the	  
values	  of	  the	  integral	  only	  make	  sense	  in	  relation	  to	  each	  other	  and	  cannot	  be	  compared	  to	  
some	  form	  of	  general	  metric.	  However,	  despite	  this	  limitation	  I	  conclude	  that	  working	  with	  
a	  clear	  framework	  has	  added	  focus	  and	  clarity	  to	  my	  analysis.	  I	  understand	  that	  the	  method	  
is	   not	   perfect	   yet,	   but	   am	   confident	   that	   it	   is	   an	   interesting	   reference	   point	   for	   other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
	  
113
scholars	   who	   want	   to	   study	   resilience	   in	   more	   depth	   using	   System	   Dynamics;	   and	   that	  
inspiration	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  evidence	  of	  this	  application	  to	  further	  refine	  the	  method.	  
10.3	  Limitations	  and	  Areas	  for	  Further	  Work	  
Just	  as	  probably	  the	  majority	  of	  my	  fellow	  thesis	  writers	  feel,	  I	  would	  have	  liked	  to	  expand	  
my	  research	  much	  more	  and	  cover	  the	  topic	  in	  greater	  extent	  and	  detail,	  but	  had	  to	  focus	  
on	   certain	   aspects	   in	   order	   to	   give	   the	   subject	   a	  manageable	   scope.	  This	   in	   turn	   led	   to	   a	  
number	   of	   limitations	   for	   my	   work	   that	   I	   will	   discuss	   below.	   Since	   a	   number	   of	   minor	  
limitations	  have	   already	  been	  discussed	   throughout	   the	   text,	   such	   as	   the	   assumptions	  or	  
simplifications	  made	  in	  the	  modelling	  process	  in	  chapter	  4,	  I	  will	  not	  re-­‐iterate	  those	  again	  
here	  but	  focus	  on	  the	  bigger	  picture.	  
The	  major	  limitation	  of	  my	  work	  is	  probably	  the	  rather	  strong	  reliance	  on	  external	  inputs	  
when	   it	   comes	   to	   determining	   the	   resilience	   properties	   of	   the	   value	   chain	   towards	  
production	   shocks.	   However,	   I	   feel	   that	   this	   reflects	   the	   nature	   of	   research	   processes,	  
where	   one	   starts	   out	   with	   an	   initial	   hypothesis	   (in	   my	   case	   that	   more	   of	   the	   resilience	  
properties	   were	   determined	   endogenously),	   and	   finds	   evidence	   that	   points	   in	   another	  
direction.	   Nonetheless,	   even	   though	   external	   inputs	   play	   a	   big	   role	   in	   explaining	   the	  
different	  resilience	  properties	  shown	  towards	  the	  various	  scenarios,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  it	  
was	  still	  worthwhile	  to	  use	  an	  SD	  approach	  to	  this	  problem	  due	  to	  the	  strong	  influence	  that	  
the	   feedback	   structure	   had	   on	   the	   value	   chain’s	   resilience	   towards	   a	   given	   production	  
shock	   (cf.	   chapter	  8.5	  and	  10.1).	  Moreover,	   the	   fine-­‐grained	  modelling	  of	   the	  value	   chain	  
also	  helped	  to	  grasp	  the	  strong	  seasonality	  of	  behaviour,	  which	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  
when	  designing	  appropriate	  and	  effective	  policy	  responses.	  Finally,	   the	  creation	  of	  maize	  
stocks	   throughout	   the	   value	   chain	   is	   to	   a	   good	   degree	   governed	   by	   the	   endogenous	  
information	  feedback	  structure	  of	  the	  value	  chain.	  	  
One	   limitation	   concerning	   the	   resilience	   measurement	   framework	   was	   that,	   due	   to	   the	  
strong	  seasonality	  in	  my	  key	  indicators,	  the	  idea	  of	  splitting	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  resilience	  
metrics	   in	   “initial	   vulnerability”	   vs.	   “adaptive	   capacity”	   did	   not	   work	   exactly	   as	   planned	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because	   there	  was	  no	   steady	   original	   trajectory	   that	   the	  ADESM	   could	   be	   compared	   and	  
return	  to.	  However,	  I	  tried	  to	  incorporate	  the	  idea	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  by	  looking	  at	  how	  
strongly	  the	  integral	  rises	  at	  which	  points	  in	  time,	  defining	  the	  initial	  rise	  in	  the	  first	  year	  of	  
a	   shock	   as	   the	   initial	   vulnerability	   and	   the	   slope	   of	   the	   integral	   rise	   in	   later	   years	   as	   an	  
expression	   of	   the	   adaptive	   capacity.	   As	   such,	   the	   idea	   did	   help	   to	   structure	   the	   analysis.	  
Furthermore,	   the	  resilience	   framework	  could	  not	  account	   for	  compensatory	  responses	   in	  
the	   production	   sector,	   which	   lead	   to	   increases	   in	   production	   compared	   to	   the	   base	   run	  
following	  a	  shock	  event,	  as	  for	  example	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  flood	  loss	  scenarios	  (cf.	  figure	  29).	  
However,	  the	  better	  performance	  in	  a	  “business	  as	  usual”	  environment	  following	  a	  shock	  is	  
not	  really	  a	  concern	  of	  resilience	  analysis,	  and	  I	  therefore	  feel	  that	  this	  was	  not	  a	  problem	  
in	  terms	  of	  my	  analysis.	  
Another	  limitation	  is	  obviously	  that	  maize	  alone,	  as	  overwhelmingly	  important	  as	  it	   is	  for	  
the	  food	  supply	  in	  Zambia,	  does	  not	  determine	  the	  food	  security	  situation	  on	  its	  own.	  Even	  
though	   agricultural	   productivity	   is	   probably	   correlated	   between	   different	   crops,	   as	   their	  
yields	   are	   determined	   by	   similar	   parameters,	   one	   can	   imagine	   a	   year	   with	   a	   bad	  maize	  
harvest	  and	  a	  good	  harvest	  for	  other	  crops	  that	  may	  act	  as	  a	  substitute.	  In	  that	  case,	  a	  low	  
ADESM	  for	  maize	  might	  not	  be	  so	  much	  of	  a	  problem,	  as	  consumers	  could	  relatively	  easy	  
change	  to	  other	  food	  sources.	  To	  reflect	  the	  situation	  in	  Zambia	  more	  holistically,	  it	  would	  
therefore	   be	   necessary	   to	  model	   the	   value	   chains	   for	   other	   crops	   as	  well	   –	   something	   I	  
unfortunately	   did	   not	   have	   the	   time	   and	   resources	   to	   do.	   However,	   the	   literature	   I	  
consulted	  suggested	  that	  the	  distribution	  channels	  for	  other	  important	  crops	  in	  Zambia	  are	  
structured	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  to	  the	  maize	  value	  chain,	  so	  that	  future	  research	  could	  build	  on	  
the	  basic	  model	  structure	  that	   I	  carved	  out	   for	  maize,	  and	  adapt	   it	   to	  represent	  the	  value	  
chains	  for	  other	  crops.	  
A	   further	   limitation	   is	   that	   my	   work	   had	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   availability	   dimension	   of	   food	  
security	   due	   to	   time	   limitations,	   and	   therefore	   only	   incorporates	   parts	   of	   the	   access	  
dimension.	  This	  limited	  representation	  of	  the	  access	  dimension	  through	  just	  two	  feedback	  
loops	  also	  leads	  to	  the	  “threshold	  behaviour”	  of	  the	  ADESM	  that	  I	  discussed	  in	  section	  8.3.4,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
	  
115
meaning	   that	   the	   ADESM	   usually	   either	   stays	   at	   0,84	   or	   quickly	   collapses	   to	   zero,	   not	  
representing	  the	  intermediate	  stages	   in	  detail.	  However,	   this	  representation	  might	  not	  be	  
too	  far	  from	  reality	  after	  all,	  since	  maize	  is	  such	  a	  central	  staple	  food	  that	  demand	  can	  be	  
expected	  to	  be	  rather	  inelastic	  –	  which	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  I	  chose	  to	  only	  incorporate	  those	  
two	  availability-­‐to-­‐demand	  feedback	  loops	  that	  were	  well	  grounded	  in	  the	  data	  available	  to	  
me	  and	  assumed	  inelasticity	  otherwise.	  To	  investigate	  the	  access	  dimension	  in	  the	  model	  in	  
greater	   detail,	   it	   would	   be	   necessary	   to	   explicitly	   model	   prices	   and	   therefore	   gather	  
detailed	  information	  about	  them.	  Since	  there	  is	  hardly	  enough	  comprehensive	  information	  
about	  prices	  at	  the	  different	  stages	  of	  the	  value	  chain,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  seasonal	  fluctuations	  
that	   drive	   the	   demand	   dynamics,	   further	   work	   in	   that	   direction	   would	   require	   field	  
research	  in	  Zambia.	  
Furthermore,	  I	  had	  to	  limit	  my	  resilience	  analysis	  to	  production	  shocks.	  Inter	  alia,	  this	  was	  
due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   building	   the	   model	   of	   the	   maize	   value	   chain	   took	   longer	   than	  
anticipated	  because	  it	  was	  quite	  difficult	  to	  get	  the	  appropriate	  data	  from	  Zambia.	  On	  the	  
one	  hand,	  this	  means	  that	  future	  research	  in	  this	  area	  can	  benefit	  quite	  a	  lot	  by	  building	  on	  
the	   insights	   I	   already	   laid	   down	   in	   this	   thesis.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   this	  means	   that	   some	  
aspects	   of	   resilience	   could	   not	   be	   included	   in	   my	   work.	   Following	   what	   I	   discussed	   in	  
chapter	   3.3,	   it	   would	   have	   also	   been	   interesting	   to	   look	   at	   transportation	   and	   energy	  
shocks.	  	  
To	   incorporate	   transportation	   shocks,	   however,	   one	   would	   need	   to	   include	   spatial	  
dimensions	  into	  the	  model,	  as	  the	  impact	  of	  shocks	  affecting	  the	  transportation	  capacity	  of	  
a	  given	  physical	   flow	  in	  the	  model	  would	  depend	  on	  the	  distances	  covered	   in	  that	   link.	  A	  
way	  to	  go	  about	  this	  could	  be	  to	  compute	  averages	  for	  the	  distances	  maize	  typically	  travels	  
from	  stage	  A	  to	  stage	  B	   in	   the	  value	  chain.	  This	  average	  could	   then	  be	  used	  to	  model	   the	  
degree	  of	  impact	  that	  the	  shocks	  disturbing	  the	  transportation	  capacity	  of	  the	  flow	  would	  
unfold.	   The	  means	   of	   transportation	   that	   are	   typically	   used	   in	   that	   flow	  would	   probably	  
also	  have	  to	  be	  accounted	  for	  in	  such	  an	  effect	  variable.	  However,	  I	  did	  not	  find	  appropriate	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information	  about	   this	   in	   the	   secondary	  data	  or	   literature,	   so	   that	   researchers	   looking	  at	  
this	  phenomenon	  would	  probably	  need	  to	  go	  to	  Zambia	  for	  first-­‐hand	  data	  collection.	  
Summing	  up,	  I	  can	  conclude	  that	  even	  though	  I	  gained	  many	  interesting	  new	  insights	  over	  
the	  course	  of	  my	  research,	  there	  is	  still	  plenty	  of	  exciting	  work	  to	  be	  done	  to	  create	  a	  more	  
thorough	  picture	  of	  the	  food	  security	  situation	  in	  Zambia,	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  maize	  value	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Scenario	  7:	  Extreme	  3-­‐year	  Drought	  (2015-­‐17)	  
	  
	   	  
Comparison ADESM scenario run to base run
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Scenario	  8:	  Extreme	  2-­‐year	  Drought	  (2015-­‐16)	  
	  
	  
Comparison ADESM scenario run to base run
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Scenario	  9:	  Extreme	  1-­‐year	  Drought	  (2015)	  
	  
	  
Comparison ADESM scenario run to base run
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Scenario	  10:	  Severe	  2-­‐year	  Drought	  (2015-­‐16)	  
	  
	   	  
Comparison ADESM scenario run to base run
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Scenario	  11:	  Severe	  1-­‐year	  Drought	  (2015)	  
	  
	   	  
Comparison ADESM scenario run to base run
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Scenario	  12:	  Moderate	  2-­‐year	  Drought	  (2015-­‐16)	  
	  
	   	  
Comparison ADESM scenario run to base run
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Scenario	  13:	  Moderate	  1-­‐year	  Drought	  (2015)	  
	  
	  
Comparison ADESM scenario run to base run
Page 1



















Integral between ADESM for base and scenario run
Page 1














	  	  	  	  	  	   33	  
	  
Scenario	  14:	  Extreme	  followed	  by	  Severe	  Drought	  (2015-­‐16)	  
	  
	   	  
Comparison ADESM scenario run to base run
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Scenario	  15:	  Steady	  Fertilizer	  Subsidies	  of	  1500	  Kwacha/Person/Year	  
	  
	  
This	   is	   not	   a	   shock	   scenario:	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   production	   sector,	   and	   thus	   the	  
trajectory	   of	   the	   ADESM,	   become	   even	   better	   in	   comparison	   to	   the	   base	   run	   where	  
subsidies	  are	  assumed	  to	  not	  increase	  with	  the	  population,	  but	  stay	  on	  a	  steady	  total	  level.	  
Comparison ADESM scenario run to base run
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Scenario	  17:	  Fertilizer	  Subsidies	  Permanently	  Abandoned	  
	  
	   	  	  
Comparison ADESM scenario run to base run
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Scenario	   18:	   Flood	   Loss	   of	   Cultivated	   Area	   by	   20%	   and	   Zero	   Subsidies	   in	   2015,	  
followed	  by	  Subsidies	  Cut-­‐in-­‐Half	  to	  750	  Kwacha/Person/Year	  in	  2016	  
	  
	  
Comparison ADESM scenario run to base run
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Scenario	   19:	   Flood	   Loss	   of	   Cultivated	   Area	   by	   20%	   in	   2015	   and	   2017,	   as	   well	   as	  
Permanently	  Abandoned	  Fertilizer	  Subsidies	  
	  	  
	  
Comparison ADESM scenario run to base run
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Scenario	   20:	   Severe	  Droughts	   in	   2015	   and	   2017	   and	   Extreme	  Drought	   in	   2016,	   as	  
well	  as	  Reduced	  Fertilizer	  Subsidies	   in	  2015	  and	  2018	  (750	  Kwacha/Person/Year)	  
and	  No	  Fertilizer	  Subsidies	  in	  2016-­‐17	  
	  
	   	  
Comparison ADESM scenario run to base run
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Scenario	   21:	   Severe	  Droughts	   in	   2015	   and	   2017	   and	   Extreme	  Drought	   in	   2016,	   as	  
well	  as	  Permanently	  Abandoned	  Fertilizer	  Subsidies	  
	  
	  
Comparison ADESM scenario run to base run
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Scenario	   22:	   Extreme	   Droughts	   in	   3	   consecutive	   years	   (2015-­‐17),	   as	   well	   as	  
Permanently	  Abandoned	  Fertilizer	  Subsidies	  
	  
	  
Comparison ADESM scenario run to base run
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Appendix	  C:	  Data	  
C.1	  Maize	  Production	  Data	  
	   Maize	  production	  in	  metric	  tons	  










2004	   1213599	   48579	   1165021	   343878	   821143	  
2005	   866187	   65613	   800574	   178803	   621771	  
2006	   1424439	   84960	   1339479	   564348	   775131	  
2007	   1366158	   97099	   1269059	   647863	   621196	  
2008	   1211566	   85578	   1125988	   522033	   603955	  
2009	   1887010	   229893	   1657117	   613356	   1043761	  
2010	   2795483	   331960	   2463523	   1062010	   1401513	  
2011	   3020380	   233484	   2786896	   1663043	   1123853	  
2012	   2852687	   220521	   2632166	   1362812	   1269354	  
2013	   2532800	   195793	   2337008	   1215244	   1121764	  
2014	   3350671	   259016	   3091655	   1550346	   1541309	  
2015	   1821490	   66219	   1755271	   761513	   993758	  
2016	   1823090	   64551	   1758539	   742338	   1016201	  
2017	   1843830	   64258	   1779572	   738971	   1040601	  
2018	   1877020	   64792	   1812228	   745113	   1067115	  
2019	   1917240	   65768	   1851472	   756334	   1095138	  
2020	   1961300	   66966	   1894334	   770112	   1124222	  
	  
Sources	  for	  maize	  production	  data:	  
• All	  data	  projections	  from	  2015-­‐2020	  are	  based	  on	  simulations	  from	  Gerber	  (2015)	  
• Total	  maize	  production:	  
o 2004	  –	  2013:	  CSO	  Zambia	  (2015:	  data	  sheet	  "maize	  production	  timeline")	  
o 2014:	  Chapoto	  et	  al.	  (2015)	  
• Total	  smallholder	  production:	  
o 2004	  –	  2011:	  N.	  M.	  Mason	  &	  Myers	  (2011)	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o 2012	   –	   2014:	   Triangulated	   from	   total	  maize	   production	   assuming	   a	   steady	  
relation	  between	  commercial	  and	  smallholder	  production	  
• Smallholder	  surplus:	  
o 2004	  –	  2011:	  N.	  M.	  Mason	  &	  Myers	  (2011)	  
o 2012	  –	  2014:	  Triangulated	  from	  other	  sources	  as:	  Smallholder	  surplus	  
=	  total	  maize	  traded	  (Kuteya	  et	  al.,	  2014)	  –	  commercial	  production	  
• Commercial	  farmers:	  
o 2004	  	  -­‐	  2011:	  Triangulated	  from	  other	  sources	  as:	  
Commercial	  production	  =	  total	  production	  –	  total	  smallholder	  production	  
o 2012	  –	  2014:	  
Triangulated	   from	   total	   maize	   production	   assuming	   a	   steady	   relation	  
between	  commercial	  and	  smallholder	  production	  
• Smallholder	  subsistence:	  
o 2004	  –	  2012:	  Triangulated	  from	  other	  sources	  as:	  
SH	  subsistence	  =	  total	  smallholder	  production	  –	  smallholder	  surplus	  
o 2013:	   Triangulated	   from	   smallholder	   production	   assuming	   ratio	   of	  
subsistence	  consumption	  staying	  steady	  for	  two	  years.	  
o 2014:	   Triangulated	   from	   smallholder	   production	   with	   information	   about	  
subsistence	  ratio	  from	  (Chapoto,	  Chisanga,	  Kuteya,	  &	  Kabwe,	  2015)	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C.2	  FRA	  Data	  
	   F.R.A.	  Parameter	  in	  metric	  tons	  
	   Yearly	  purchase	   Desired	  reserves	   Shed	  capacity	   Silo	  capacity	   Imports	  
2004	   105279	   0	   539200	   55720	   9400	  
2005	   78667	   0	   567020	   55720	   38950	  
2006	   389510	   0	   566430	   55270	   119700	  
2007	   396450	   0	   566410	   55060	   1458	  
2008	   73876	   0	   566460	   54960	   1015	  
2009	   198630	   0	   566480	   54930	   42027	  
2010	   878570	   131786	   566480	   54930	   5704	  
2011	   1579891	   236984	   590950	   57370	   2911	  
2012	   1044998	   156750	   652990	   63540	   0	  
2013	   422391	   63359	   737320	   71920	   0	  
2014	   1031303	   154695	   833910	   82460	   0	  
2015	   380757	   76151	   932780	   99130	   0	  
2016	   371169	   74234	   1026640	   125610	   0	  
2017	   369485	   73897	   1111110	   164140	   0	  
2018	   372556	   74511	   1179570	   212660	   0	  
2019	   378167	   75633	   1204760	   244410	   0	  
2020	   385056	   77011	   1211838	   248011	   0	  
	  
Sources	  for	  FRA	  Data:	  
• Yearly	  purchase:	  
o 2004	  –	  2010:	  N.	  M.	  Mason	  &	  Myers	  (2011)	  
o 2011	  –	  2013:	  Kuteya	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  
o 2014:	  Chapoto	  et	  al.	  (2015)	  	  
o 2015	  –	  2020:	  Assuming	  FRA	  wants	  to	  purchase	  50%	  of	  smallholder	  surplus	  
production	  
• Desired	  reserves:	  
Derived	  from	  the	  yearly	  purchase	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  FRA	  wants	  to	  keep	  
20%	  of	  their	  yearly	  purchase	  as	  reserves.	  
• Silo	  capacity:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	   45	  
	  
Bou	  Schreiber	  (2015)	  
• Shed	  capacity:	  
Bou	  Schreiber	  (2015)	  
• Imports:	  
o 2004	  –	  2014:	  FAO	  (2015a:	  Timeline	  under	  "Trade	  -­‐>	  Crops	  &	  livestock	  -­‐>	  
Zambia")	  
o 2015	  –	  2020:	  Assuming	  no	  imports	  take	  place	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C.3	  Storage	  Loss	  Data	  
	   Accumulated	  storage	  Loss	  in	  per	  cent	  
Residence	  
time	  (months)	  
Silo	  Loss	   Shed	  Loss	   Slab	  Loss	  
1	   0,00%	   0,72%	   5,72%	  
2	   0,28%	   1,61%	   6,61%	  
3	   0,81%	   1,83%	   6,83%	  
4	   0,82%	   4,47%	   9,47%	  
5	   0,83%	   6,50%	   11,50%	  
6	   1,36%	   10,12%	   15,12%	  
7	   1,66%	   14,97%	   19,97%	  
8	   1,86%	   20,61%	   25,61%	  
9	   2,04%	   26,86%	   31,86%	  
10	   2,20%	   34,09%	   39,09%	  
11	   2,34%	   42,22%	   47,22%	  
12	   2,46%	   51,23%	   56,23%	  
13	   2,56%	   61,14%	   66,14%	  
14	   2,64%	   71,93%	   76,93%	  
15	   2,70%	   83,62%	   88,62%	  
16	   2,74%	   83,62%	   88,62%	  
17	   2,76%	   83,62%	   88,62%	  
18	   2,76%	   83,62%	   88,62%	  
	  
Sources	  for	  storage	  loss	  data:	  
• All	  data	  from	  Bou	  Schreiber	  (2015)	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	   47	  
	  
C.4	  Roller	  Meal	  to	  Consumer	  Made	  Hammer	  Meal	  Price	  Relation	  Data	  
	   Price	  August	  (ZMK/kg)	  
	  	   Lusaka	   Kitwe	   Mansa	   Kasama	   Mean	  
Breakfast	  meal	  (25	  kg	  bag)	   1391,0	   1421,0	   1505,0	   1373,0	   1422,50	  
Roller	  meal	  (25	  kg	  bag)	   915,0	   975,0	   1093,0	   1000,0	   995,75	  
Ratio	  breakfast	  of	  commercial	  meal	   0,90	   0,87	   0,66	   0,93	   0,84	  
Composite	  commercial	  meal	   1342,0	   1362,2	   1363,8	   1348,4	   1354,09	  
Consumer	  made	  meal	  (hammer	  
mill)	  
1063	   912	   910	   941,00	   956,50	  
Relation	  roller	  meal	  to	  grain	  price	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   1,42	  
	  
	   Price	  February	  (ZMK/kg)	  
	   Lusaka	   Kitwe	   Mansa	   Kasama	   Mean	  
Breakfast	  meal	  (25	  kg	  bag)	   1536,0	   1562,0	   1750,0	   1706,0	   1638,50	  
Roller	  meal	  (25	  kg	  bag)	   1188,0	   1261,0	   1408,0	   1408,0	   1316,25	  
Ratio	  breakfast	  of	  commercial	  meal	   0,92	   0,88	   0,62	   0,96	   0,84	  
Composite	  commercial	  meal	   1506,9	   1525,1	   1620,1	   1694,3	   1586,62	  
Consumer	  made	  meal	  (hammer	  
mill)	  
1185	   1138	   1336	   1455	   1278,50	  
Relation	  roller	  meal	  to	  grain	  price	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   1,24	  
	  
Source:	  Nicole	  Mason	  &	  Jayne	  (2009:	  tables	  10	  &	  11)	  
Price	   relation	   values	   plotted	   over	   the	   year	   assuming	   steady	   change	   from	   lean	   to	   plenty	  
season	  yields	  this	  final	  relation:	  
Yearly	  Counter	   Price	  relation	  
1	   1,27	  
2	   1,24	  
8	   1,42	  
12	   1,30	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C.5	  Urban	  Consumption	  of	  Meal	  Types	  Data	  
	  	   Commercial	  meal	   Hammer	  mill	  meal	  
Lusaka	   0,899	   0,101	  
Kitwe	   0,855	   0,145	  
Mansa	   0,606	   0,394	  
Kasama	   0,317	   0,683	  
Average	   0,669	   0,331	  
	  
Source:	  Nicole	  Mason	  &	  Jayne	  (2009:	  tables	  10-­‐11)	  
Categories	  “consumer	  made	  maize	  meal	  via	  taking	  grain	  to	  grinding	  mill”	  and	  “maize	  meal	  
made	   at	   grinding	  mill	   and	   sold	   by	   a	   vendor/retailer”	   were	   aggregated	   to	   “hammer	  mill	  
meal”	  and	  the	  categories	  “samp”	  and	  “green	  maize”	  were	  excluded	  from	  the	  calculation	  to	  
obtain	  the	  final	  ratio	  visible	  in	  the	  table	  above.	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Appendix	  D:	  Interviews	  
In	   the	   following	   appendix,	   you	   will	   find	   the	   transcript	   of	   the	   two	   personal	   interviews	   I	  
conducted	   with	   Dr	   Progress	   Nyanga	   from	   the	   University	   of	   Zambia.	   The	   interview	   is	  
reported	   so	   that	   the	   core	   statements	   that	   he	   provided	   as	   answers	   to	   my	   questions	   are	  
summarized	  in	  bullet	  points	  below	  the	  corresponding	  question.	  Information	  that	  I	  shared	  
as	   a	  background	   for	   the	  questions	  and	   the	  questions	   that	   I	   asked	  are	   in	   italics,	  while	  his	  
answers	  are	  in	  normal	  font.	  
D.1	  Transcript	  of	  Personal	  Interview	  with	  Progress	  Nyanga	  on	  27.04.2015	  
Q1:	  Would	  you	  agree	  that	  consumers	  roughly	  demand	  the	  same	  daily	  quantity	  of	  maize	  
throughout	  the	  year,	  or	  are	  there	  cycles	  in	  private	  demand?	  
• The	  quantities	   consumed	  vary	   according	   to	   availability.	   In	   the	   lean	   season,	  where	  
maize	  is	  scarce,	  consumers	  normally	  consume	  less	  maize	  per	  day.	  
• People	  would	   like	   to	   consume	   the	   same	  amount	   throughout	   the	  year,	   but	   they	  do	  
not	  have	  sufficient	  access	  to	  maize	  in	  the	  lean	  season	  (roughly	  corresponding	  to	  late	  
fall	   to	   early	   spring	   in	   Europe)	   due	   to	   shortage	   in	   availability	   that	   also	   lead	   to	  
increasing	  prices,	  especially	  for	  maize	  grain.	  
• Grain	   starts	   to	   become	   scarce	   from	   September	   to	   December,	   reaching	   bottom	   at	  
January/February.	  
• From	  March	  on,	  the	  green	  harvest	  starts	  becoming	  available	  so	  that	  the	  lean	  season	  
gradually	  ends.	  
	  
Q2:	  In	  which	  quantities	  (intended	  to	  cover	  how	  much	  time)	  do	  customers	  on	  average	  buy	  their	  
maize	  meal?	  Every	  day,	  week,	  or	  month?	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• Consumers	  wish	  to	  have	  a	  meal	  storage	  covering	  up	  to	  a	  maximum	  of	   four	  weeks’	  
consumption.	  However,	  the	  actual	  coverage	  they	  have	  fluctuates	  with	  the	  changes	  in	  
maize	  availability	  and	  prices	  over	  the	  seasons.	  
• Without	   chemical	   treatment,	   you	   can	   only	   store	  maize	  meal	   2-­‐3	  months	   before	   it	  
goes	  bad.	  
	  
Q3:	  Do	  rural	  customers	  also	  have	  access	  to	  maize	  meal,	  or	  only	  to	  grain?	  
• As	  a	  general	  rule,	   rural	  customers	  have	  better	  access	   to	  grain,	  while	  roller	  meal	   is	  
often	  not	  distributed	  in	  the	  villages.	  
• The	   distribution	   of	   maize	   grain	   to	   consumers	   often	   works	   in	   the	   following	   way:	  
someone	  (most	  often	  a	  farmer	  with	  a	  maize	  production	  surplus)	  stores	  maize	  grain	  
in	   a	   rural	   community	   and	   pays	   people	   in	   the	   hungry	   season	   in	   grain	   for	   their	  
services	  or	  labour,	  or	  sells	  it	  to	  the	  community.	  
• In	  a	  normal	  year,	  rural	  communities	  still	  eat	  grain	  in	  the	  hungry	  period,	  while	  in	  the	  
urban	  areas,	  it	  might	  run	  out	  completely.	  However,	  grain	  is	  even	  in	  times	  of	  shortage	  
normally	  still	  cheaper	  than	  roller	  maize	  meal.	  
• Roller	  meal	   is	  usually	  not	  sold	   in	  the	  villages,	   these	  rural	  consumers	  often	  have	  to	  
travel	   to	   more	   urbanized	   regions	   to	   purchase	   it.	   These	   travel	   costs	   makes	   roller	  
meal	  very	  expensive	   for	  rural	  consumers,	   so	   that	   it	   is	   really	   just	  a	  measure	  of	   last	  
resort	  to	  buy	  it.	  
• Smallholder	  farmers	  often	  find	  themselves	  in	  a	  bad	  situation	  in	  the	  lean	  season,	  as	  
they	  need	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  next	  harvest,	  while	  having	  to	  pay	  more	  for	  grain.	  
	  
Q4:	  In	  which	  intervals	  do	  grain-­‐buying	  customers	  purchase	  maize	  grain?	  E.g.	  how	  much	  time	  
do	  they	  want	  to	  cover	  with	  a	  ratio	  on	  average	  when	  buying	  maize?	  A	  week,	  month,	  or	  more?	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• In	  the	  plenty	  season,	  when	  maize	  is	  well	  available,	  consumers	  wish	  to	  store	  grain	  for	  
up	  to	  2-­‐3	  months’	  consumption.	  
• The	  storage,	  however,	  changes	  according	  to	  availability	  and	  usually	  is	  smaller	  in	  the	  
lean	  season.	  
• The	   size	   of	   the	   storage	   for	   an	   individual	   customer	   also	   depends	   on	   her	   overall	  
purchasing	  power.	  
	  
Q5:	  I	  assume	  that	  farmers	  buying	  grain	  to	  top	  up	  their	  insufficient	  subsistence	  consumption	  
basically	  exhibit	  the	  same	  purchasing	  behaviour	  as	  other	  (rural)	  customers	  that	  buy	  grain	  
and	  bring	  it	  to	  hammer	  mills	  themselves.	  Is	  that	  a	  suitable	  assumption?	  
• Yes,	   as	   farmers	   exhibit	   the	   same	   behaviour	   as	   the	   other	   rural	   poor	   in	   terms	   of	  
purchasing	  maize.	  	  
• Many	  smallholder	  farmers	  do	  not	  produce	  sufficient	  maize	  to	  even	  cover	  their	  own	  
subsistence	  consumption,	  so	  they	  often	  use	  up	  their	  own	  maize	  in	  the	  months	  after	  
the	  harvest	  and	  then	  have	  to	  resort	  to	  buying	  grain	  in	  the	  lean	  period,	  just	  as	  other	  
non-­‐farmers	  in	  the	  rural	  areas	  do.	  
• Smallholder	   farmers	   usually	   do	   not	   plan	   ahead	   strategically	   with	   their	   buying	  
behaviour,	   because	   they	   need	   to	   live	   off	   their	   grain	   in	   the	   plenty	   period	   as	   they	  
generally	  do	  not	  have	  any	  other	  means	  to	  make	  cash	  in	  the	  plenty	  season.	  This	  is	  so	  
because	  the	  peak	  demand	  for	  labour	  in	  the	  rural	  areas	  is	  in	  the	  lean	  season	  –	  which	  
happens	  to	  be	  the	  period	  where	  most	  farming	  work	  takes	  place.	  
	  
Q6:	  Apparently,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  maize	  (grain/meal)	  sales	  are	  made	  through	  traditional	  
retail	  channels	  (large	  markets,	  street	  vendors),	  especially	  in	  rural	  areas.	  I	  further	  assume	  that	  
these	  small	  retailers	  do	  not	  stock	  significant	  amounts	  of	  grain/meal	  themselves,	  but	  purchase	  
it	  on	  a	  daily	  basis	  from	  their	  source.	  Is	  this	  a	  sound	  assumption?	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	   52	  
	  
• Concerning	  urban	  retailers:	  They	  usually	  store	  maize	  intended	  to	  cover	  1-­‐2	  weeks	  of	  
sales,	   and	   thus	  go	   to	  buy	   from	   their	   sources	   every	  1-­‐2	  weeks.	  The	   then	   store	   this	  
maize	   in	  a	   facility	   close	   to	   the	  market,	   so	   that	   they	  can	  bring	  a	  daily	   ration	   to	   the	  
market	  every	  day,	  and	  quickly	  re-­‐stock	  in	  case	  of	  higher-­‐than-­‐usual	  demand.	  
• Concerning	  rural	  retailers:	  There	  is	  normally	  no	  professional	  maize	  retailing	  in	  rural	  
areas.	   Instead,	   consumers	   buy	   from	   other	   people	   (farmers)	   in	   the	   area	   that	   have	  
larger	  surpluses.	  Rural	  consumers	  usually	  just	  find	  out	  whoever	  has	  maize	  in	  their	  
area	  and	  go	  there	  to	  negotiate	  purchases.	  
	  
Q7	  –	  Q9:	  Wholesale	  sector	  
Right	  now,	  I	  am	  (based	  on	  an	  article	  about	  onion	  &	  fruit	  marketing)	  assuming	  that	  there	  is	  no	  
significant	   wholesale	   market	   developed	   for	   maize	   in	   Zambia.	   	   This	   implies	   that	   retailers	  
purchase	  their	  stocks	  right	  away	  from	  millers,	  farmers,	  and/or	  traders	  that	  just	  bring	  it	  from	  
farm	   A	   to	   retailer	   B	   as	   soon	   as	   they	   purchased	   it.	   This	   would	   mean	   that	   between	   the	  
miller/farmer	   and	   the	   retailer,	   there	   is	   no	   actor	   that	   stocks	   the	   maize	   and/or	   markets	   it	  
intentionally	  over	  time,	  e.g.	  getting	  better	  prices	   from	  retailers	   later	   in	  the	  year	  by	  stocking	  
grain	  he	  bought	  in	  June	  until	  December.	  
Q7:	  Is	  that	  a	  sound	  assumption?	  
Q8:	   Is	   there	   a	   significant	   amount	   of	   wholesalers	   involved	   in	   either	   the	   formal	   or	   informal	  
maize	  marketing	  that	  stock	  maize	  and	  sell	  it	  over	  time?	  
Q9:	  If	  yes,	  would	  you	  say	  that	  the	  commercial	  assemblers	  and	  wholesalers	  could	  conceptually	  
be	  understood	  as	  the	  same	  class	  of	  actors?	  	  
	  
• Yes,	  it	  is	  true	  that	  broadly	  speaking,	  you	  can	  say	  that	  there	  is	  no	  developed	  
wholesale	  market	  for	  maize	  in	  Zambia.	  
• There	  are	  middlemen/assemblers	  in	  between	  retailers	  and	  farmers,	  but	  they	  just	  
buy	  from	  farmers	  and	  quickly	  sell	  nearly	  at	  purchase	  price	  to	  retailers.	  They	  thus	  do	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not	  exhibit	  strategic	  behaviour	  or	  built	  up	  any	  meaningful	  reserves	  (stocks),	  but	  
rather	  at	  as	  mere	  agents	  of	  the	  retailer	  merely	  fulfilling	  a	  transport	  service.	  
• One	  can	  therefore	  conceptually	  subsume	  retailers	  going	  to	  buy	  themselves	  (or	  
farmers	  going	  to	  sell	  in	  bulk	  to	  the	  retailers)	  into	  the	  same	  class	  of	  activity	  as	  when	  
maize	  is	  delivered	  by	  these	  middlemen/assemblers.	  
	  
Q10-­‐Q11:	  Smallholder	  maize	  sales	  
Q10:	  When	  and	  how	  much	  grain	  do	  private	  traders	  buy	  from	  smallholder	  farmers	  throughout	  
the	  year;	  and	  why	  is	  the	  demand	  from	  these	  traders	  usually	  not	  covered	  by	  grain	  sales?	  
Q11:	  What	  are	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  distribution	  of	  purchases?	  
• Farmers	   sell	   70-­‐80%	   of	   their	   surplus	   harvest	   in	   the	   first	   few	   months	   of	   the	  
purchasing	   season,	   and	   then	   they	   become	   reluctant	   to	   sell	   more	   maize	   to	  
retailers/assemblers	  as	  their	  stocks	  become	  scarce.	  
• As	   their	   stocks	   of	   maize	   become	   lower,	   smallholders	   want	   to	   keep	   their	   few	  
remaining	  maize	  as	  a	  risk	  buffer	  and	  want	  to	  pay	  with	  maize	  in	  exchange	  for	  labour	  
or	   inputs,	   as	   it	   is	   cheaper	   to	  buy	   labour	  with	  maize	   rather	   than	  cash,	  or	  exchange	  
maize	  for	  cash	  later	  and	  buy	  agricultural	  inputs.	  
	  
Q12-­‐13:	  FRA’s	  sales	  decisions	  
Q12:	  Is	  there	  a	  market	  feedback	  insofar	  that	  FRA	  reacts	  with	  their	  sales	  to	  information	  from	  
other	  actors	  downstream	  in	  the	  value	  chain	  (e.g.	  millers,	  wholesalers);	  or	  are	  sales	  decisions	  
solely	  governed	  by	  discretionary	  decisions	  from	  FRA/government	  officials	  largely	  
disconnected	  from	  market	  feedback?	  	  
Q13:	  How	  does	  FRA	  determine	  which	  quantities	  to	  sell?	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• The	  de	  facto	  main	  goal	  of	  FRA	  is	  to	  control	  and	  stabilize	  the	  roller	  meal	  price	  
• In	   general,	   maize	   is	   sold	   to	   big	   commercial	   millers	   according	   to	   these	   millers’	  
demand.	  
• Apart	   from	   that,	   FRA	   also	   responds	   politically	   to	   price	   changes	   for	   maize	   meal,	  
trying	  to	  stabilize	  prices	  in	  case	  of	  strong	  fluctuations.	  
	  
Q14:	  In	  particular,	  I	  want	  to	  know:	  how	  does	  FRA	  determine	  to	  whom	  to	  sell?	  
• FRA	   does	   not	   sell	   to	   the	   informal	   grain	   retailers;	   they	   only	   sell	   to	   commercial	  
millers.	  
• Furthermore,	  the	  government	  tries	  to	  help	  small-­‐scale	  farmers	  by	  buying	  for	  above-­‐
market	  prices	  from	  smallholders	  through	  FRA	  
	  
Q15:	  Does	  FRA	  always	  sell	  everything	  they	  have	  in	  stock	  or	  do	  they	  often/sometimes	  carry	  
over	  old	  stocks	  from	  one	  (marketing)	  year	  into	  another?	  
• Sometimes,	  they	  export	  to	  not	  let	  their	  stocks	  rot	  away	  in	  the	  storages,	  even	  if	  they	  
sell	  at	  a	  loss.	  
• Sometimes,	  they	  do	  carry	  over	  maize	  stocks	  from	  one	  year	  to	  the	  next	  
	  
Q16:	  Assuming	  that	  FRA	  does	  not	  sell	  everything	  that	  is	  demanded	  (like	  in	  2012/13,	  where	  
maize	  meal	  prices	  spiked),	  what	  is	  the	  limiting	  factor	  for	  sales?	  Has	  it	  occurred	  that	  there	  are	  
bottlenecks	  that	  stop	  them	  from	  selling	  as	  much	  as	  they	  want	  to?	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• FRA	   collects	  maize	   in	   satellite	   storages	   (mostly	   slabs)	   around	   the	   country.	   This	   is	  
where	   farmers	   bring	   their	   grain.	   The	   purchased	   maize	   is	   then	   moved	   to	   bigger	  
storage	  facilities	  that	  are	  located	  in	  regional	  centres	  around	  the	  country.	  
o Normally,	   they	   keep	   the	   maize	   in	   these	   regional	   storages	   unless	   there	   is	  
stronger	   than	   expected	   demand	   from	   a	   particular	   region.	   Maize	   is	   then	  
moved	   to	   that	   region,	   which	   can	   involve	   a	   lot	   of	   delays.	   The	   most	   likely	  
scenario	   for	   this	   is	   that	   millers,	   who	   are	   quite	   concentrated	   in	   Lusaka,	  
demand	  more	  maize	  than	  usual.	  
• In	  case	  of	  a	  maize	  shortage	  in	  a	  certain	  region,	  where	  the	  regional	  storage	  amount	  is	  
insufficient,	   the	   maize	   has	   to	   be	   transported	   to	   the	   millers	   first	   (most	   often	   in	  
Lusaka),	  then	  milled	  there	  and	  transported	  from	  there	  again	  until	  it	  reaches	  the	  final	  
destination.	  
• It	   seems	   to	   mostly	   be	   a	   logistical	   problem:	   bad	   logistical	   planning	   lead	   to	   huge	  
delays.	   The	   process	   of	   getting	   maize	   from	   a	   surplus	   region	   to	   the	   deficit	   region	  
might	  take	  more	  than	  2	  months	  in	  total,	  involving	  the	  following	  steps:	  
o Getting	  grain	  from	  satellite	  to	  central	  regional	  depots	  (1	  month)	  
o Doing	  the	  necessary	  bureaucratic	  paperwork	  (2	  weeks)	  
o The	  transport	  itself	  (1-­‐2	  days	  in	  region,	  1	  week	  outside)	  
o Milling	  and	  then	  getting	  the	  meal	  from	  the	  miller	  to	  the	  region	  of	  (1	  week)	  
	  
Q17:	  When	  does	  FRA	  sell	  how	  much?	  (I	  read	  that	  they	  “mainly	  sell	  during	  the	  ‘hungry	  season’”	  
from	  December	  through	  March)	  
• Zambia’s	   government	   needs	   money	   in	   the	   hungry	   season	   to	   finance	   agricultural	  
activities	  (e.g.	  fertilizer	  subsidies)	  and	  they	  hope	  to	  get	  some	  FRA	  revenues	  in	  that	  
time.	  
• This	  behaviour	  is	  also	  connected	  to	  the	  goal	  of	  stabilizing	  maize	  prices:	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o During	   the	   plenty	   period,	   the	   millers	   can	   buy	   from	   farmers	   directly	   (who	  
usually	  sell	  at	  a	  cheaper	  price	  than	  FRA	  and	  are	  thus	  preferred	  sources),	  but	  
in	  the	  hungry	  period,	  they	  need	  to	  resort	  to	  FRA.	  
o During	   the	  hungry	  period,	   the	  millers	   have	  more	  demand	   from	   the	  market	  
due	  to	  	  grain	  shortages	  in	  the	  informal	  value	  chain.	  
	  
Q18:	  Is	  it	  safe	  to	  assume	  that	  purchase	  quantities	  are	  decided	  upon	  without	  responding	  to	  
other	  actors	  in	  the	  market	  and	  purely	  at	  the	  discretion	  of	  government/FRA	  officials?	  
• Yes,	  that	  is	  a	  sound	  assumption.	  
	  
Q19:	  Does	  FRA	  only	  buy	  in	  the	  purchasing	  season?	  
• The	  marketing	  season	  runs	  usually	   from	  June	  or	   July	   to	  beginning	  of	  October.	  The	  
government	  announces	  the	  beginning	  and	  end	  of	  marketing	  season,	  FRA	  purchases	  
outside	  of	  this	  season	  are	  not	  allowed.	  
• The	  purchases	  follow	  largely	  a	  bell-­‐shaped	  distribution,	  with	  purchases	  reaching	  the	  
highest	  volume	  around	  July/August.	  
• Another	  reason	  for	  the	  delay	  between	  the	  harvesting	  and	  FRA	  purchasing	  season	  is	  
that	  it	  takes	  some	  time	  for	  farmers	  to	  process	  the	  harvest.	  
	  
Q20:	  Is	  FRA’s	  price	  always	  pan-­‐seasonal?	  
• Yes,	  FRA	  has	  a	  pan-­‐seasonal	  price.	  
	  
Q21:	  I	  assume	  that	  all	  the	  maize	  is	  harvested	  in	  May,	  is	  that	  a	  suitable	  approximation?	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• No,	  since	  there	  is	  a	  green	  harvest	  coming	  in	  from	  March	  on.	  
• Furthermore,	   the	   main	   maize	   harvest	   takes	   place	   in	   May	   and	   June,	   where	   both	  
months	  see	  a	  similar	  amount	  of	  harvest.	  Together,	  the	  main	  harvest	  in	  May	  and	  June	  
accounts	  for	  90-­‐95%	  of	  the	  total	  harvest.	  
	  
Q22:	  I	  assume	  that	  farmers	  sell	  preferably	  to	  FRA	  since	  FRA	  typically	  offers	  prices	  above	  
market	  level.	  Is	  that	  assumption	  suitable?	  
• That	  assumption	  is	  true.	  
• Farmers	  are	  even	  willing	  to	  wait	  for	  later	  payment	  by	  FRA	  because	  of	  the	  good	  pries	  
they	  can	  get.	  
	  
Q23:	  Is	  it	  a	  suitable	  approximation	  to	  assume	  that	  big	  commercial	  farmers	  store	  their	  grain	  
for	  6	  months?	  
• In	  general,	  you	  can	  say	  that	  they	  wait	  a	  little	  bit	  longer	  to	  sell,	  as	  prices	  are	  higher	  
later	  in	  the	  year	  during	  the	  lean	  season.	  
• Normally,	  exports	  are	  restricted	  by	  the	  government.	  
• However,	   if	   possible	   they	  prefer	   to	   export	   –	   if	   they	   can	  get	   the	  government	   to	   lift	  
export	  bans	  and	  obtain	  the	  necessary	  export	   license.	  That	  is	  because	  they	  produce	  
under	  quite	   competitive	   conditions	  due	   to	  economies	  of	   scale	  and	  can	  make	  quite	  
good	  money	  when	   exporting,	   especially	   to	   DR	   Congo	   or	   Zimbabwe.	   Furthermore,	  
they	  fear	  competition	  by	  the	  often-­‐unpredictable	  FRA	  in	  the	  domestic	  market.	  
• However,	   the	   commercial	   miller’s	   role	   in	   the	   domestic	   maize	   supply	   is	   not	   that	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Q24:	  Is	  it	  a	  suitable	  approximation	  to	  assume	  that	  big	  commercial	  farmers	  sell	  only	  to	  large	  
commercial	  millers?	  
• Yes,	  that	  is	  true.	  
	  
Q25:	  I	  assume	  that	  brewers	  buy	  maize	  evenly	  distributed	  throughout	  the	  year	  and	  directly	  
from	  millers.	  Are	  these	  two	  sound	  assumptions?	  
• Yes,	   they	  buy	  more	  or	   less	   the	  same	  amount	  all	  year	  round.	   I	  would	  estimate	   that	  
they	  account	  for	  5-­‐10%	  of	  domestic	  demand	  for	  maize.	  
• However,	   they	   buy	   grain	   from	   farmers	   to	   mill	   themselves,	   as	   well	   as	   meal	   from	  
millers.	  
	  
Q26:	  I	  assume	  that	  livestock	  companies	  either	  produce	  their	  own	  maize	  for	  livestock	  feed	  or	  
buy	  the	  milling	  by-­‐products	  (such	  as	  bran	  or	  germ),	  so	  that	  their	  demand	  does	  not	  drain	  from	  
the	  maize	  intended	  for	  sale	  for	  human	  consumption.	  Is	  that	  a	  suitable	  approximation?	  
• Yes,	  most	  of	  the	  big	  livestock	  companies	  grow	  their	  own	  livestock	  feed	  
• Furthermore,	  livestock	  is	  often	  feeding	  other	  crops	  and	  many	  just	  roam	  free	  and	  eat	  
grass	  
• The	  impact	  of	  between	  livestock	  consumption	  on	  the	  maize	  market	  is	  therefore	  very	  
weak,	  negligible.	  
	  
Q27:	  What	  do	  you	  think	  are	  the	  reasons	  that	  the	  informal	  channel	  does	  not	  purchase	  
sufficient	  quantities	  of	  maize	  grain	  to	  satisfy	  its	  customers	  throughout	  the	  year?	  
• A	  problem	   is	   often	   that	   FRA	   buys	   large	   amounts	   of	  maize	   and	   only	   sells	   it	   to	   the	  
formal	  value	  chain,	  so	  that	  not	  enough	  is	  left	  to	  buy	  for	  informal	  traders	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• Another	  possibility	   is	   that	   the	  surplus	  harvest	   is	   just	   too	  small,	  either	  because	   the	  
overall	   harvest	   was	   small	   or	   because	   the	   farmers	   keep	   large	   amounts	   for	  
subsistence	  consumption	  and	  other	  purposes	   (paying	   in	  maize,	   security	  stocks)	   to	  
themselves.	  	  
	  
Q28-­‐29:	  DMMU	  (Disaster	  Mitigation	  and	  Management	  Unit)	  
Q28:	  What	  is	  the	  DMMU	  (Disaster	  Mitigation	  and	  Management	  Unit)?	  
Q29:	  Why	  does	  DMMU	  purchase	  large	  quantities	  of	  maize	  from	  FRA	  and	  what	  does	  it	  do	  with	  
it?	  
• DMMU	  is	  a	  government	  agency	  destined	  to	  provide	  support	  to	  affected	  populations	  
in	  cases	  of	  disaster	  or	  hunger.	  This	  includes	  the	  distribution	  of	  emergency	  food	  aid	  
in	  maize.	  
• They	  do	  not	  stock	  maize	  themselves,	  but	  in	  case	  of	  an	  emergency	  they	  request	  maize	  
from	   FRA	   and	   distribute	   it	   directly	   to	   consumers.	   It	   therefore	   does	   not	   enter	   the	  
value	  chain	  in	  that	  case.	  
	  
	  	  
Q30:	  Why	  do	  farmers	  sell	  most	  of	  their	  maize	  in	  just	  a	  few	  months	  after	  the	  harvest?	  
There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  reasons,	  including:	  
• Storage	  problems:	   farmers	  often	  prefer	   to	  sell	   the	  grain	  sooner	   than	   later	  because	  
storing	   grain	   at	   home	   involves	   a	   higher	   risk	   of	   losing	  maize	   through	   pests,	   fungi,	  
thieves,	   fires	   etc.	  Note	   that	   smallholder	   farm	   storage	   is	  mostly	   not	   very	   advanced	  
and	  prone	  to	  high	  losses.	  
• Prices	  for	  agricultural	  inputs	  like	  fertilizer	  or	  seeds	  are	  lower	  in	  the	  plenty	  season,	  
so	  that	  they	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  sell	  a	  lot	  of	  surplus	  maize	  early	  on	  so	  that	  they	  can	  
buy	  all	  the	  inputs	  they	  need	  while	  prices	  are	  still	  low.	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• Livelihood	  demands:	  
o Many	   payments	   are	   timed	   after	   the	   typical	   income	   distribution	   for	  
smallholders	  so	  that	  a	  lot	  of	  payments	  are	  due	  quickly	  after	  the	  harvest	  and	  
they	  need	  cash	  right	  away.	  For	  example,	  school	  fees	  are	  due	  in	  August.	  
o A	  queue	  of	  demands	  has	  accumulated	  over	  the	   lean	  season	  that	  now	  finally	  
can	  and	  need	  to	  be	  satisfied	  as	  cash	  becomes	  available.	  
• Strategic	  purchasing	  behaviour:	  	  
o Farmers	   anchor	   on	   the	   old	   FRA	   price,	   so	   it	   is	   risky	   for	   private	   traders	   /	  
millers	  to	  start	  buying	  too	  early:	  if	  FRA	  has	  a	  lower	  price	  this	  year,	  they	  might	  
end	  up	  having	  paid	  too	  much.	  They	  therefore	  wait	  until	  the	  government	  has	  
announced	  FRA’s	  new	  purchasing	  price,	  so	  that	  they	  have	  a	  reference	  point.	  
o Finally,	   FRA	   and	   private	   traders	   the	   often	   end	   up	   making	   most	   of	   their	  
purchases	   in	   the	   weeks	   following	   the	   announcement	   of	   the	   start	   of	   the	  
marketing	  season.	  
	  
Q31:	  Who	  are	  the	  private	  buyers	  of	  maize	  from	  farmers?	  
• Oftentimes,	   they	  are	   small-­‐scale	   independent	  maize	   assemblers	  who	  act	   as	   agents	  
for	  millers	  or	  grain	  retailers.	  
• However,	   it	   is	   also	   common	   that	   retailers	   just	   go	   buying	   their	   grain	  directly	   from	  
farmers;	  or	  especially	  in	  rural	  areas,	  that	  consumers	  go	  and	  buy	  their	  grain	  directly	  
from	  smallholders	  with	  surplus	  maize	  harvests.	  
• Another	  possibility	   is	   that	   local	   farmers	  get	  together	  and	  make	  a	  bulk	  shipment	  of	  
maize	  that	  they	  bring	  to	  the	  millers	  or	  FRA	  themselves.	  
o Information	   is	  quickly	  distributed	  by	   the	  Zambian	  National	  Farmer’s	  Union	  
app	  on	  mobile	  phones.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	   61	  
	  
o Farmers	  can	  safely	  can	  assume	  that	  the	  millers,	  competing	  with	  FRA,	  always	  
want	   to	   buy	   maize	   from	   them	   because	   millers	   normally	   have	   to	   pay	   less	  
when	  buying	  from	  farmers	  directly	  than	  when	  buying	  from	  FRA.	  
	  
Q32:	  Where	  are	  the	  millers	  located?	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Adjustment	  Times	  
Q1:	  AT	  Hammer	  milling:	  	  How	  long	  does	  it	  take	  from	  a	  grain-­‐owning	  customer’s	  decision	  to	  
get	  his	  grain	  milled	  until	  he	  finally	  has	  it	  back	  home?	  
• It	  only	  takes	  a	  day.	  Normally,	  you	  just	  go	  there,	  give	  them	  the	  grain	  and	  you	  can	  take	  
it	  back	  2-­‐3	  hours	  later	  if	  there	  are	  no	  queues.	  	  
Q2:	  AT	  Commercial	  Exports:	  Is	  1	  month	  a	  suitable	  approximation	  for	  their	  export	  sales	  time	  
(more	  technical,	  they	  might	  already	  have	  decided	  and	  planned	  what	  to	  do	  in	  case	  the	  lobbying	  
for	  exports	  ban	  lifts	  works	  out)	  
• I	  would	  estimate	  that	  the	  paperwork	  takes	  2	  weeks	  and	  the	  actual	  logistical	  process	  
of	   shipping	   and	   selling	   the	   maize	   another	   2	   week.	   So,	   in	   case	   that	   the	   permit	   is	  
already	   there,	   one	   can	   assume	   that	   it	   takes	   the	   commercial	   farmers	   2	   weeks	   to	  
export.	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Q3:	  AT	  FRA	  exports:	  How	  long	  does	  it	  take	  FRA	  to	  export?	  Currently	  I	  am	  assuming	  1	  month	  
(again,	   this	   concerns	  more	   the	   technical	   side,	   assuming	   that	   high	   production	  was	   foreseen	  
and	  exports	  therefore	  planned	  for)	  
• 1	  month	   seems	   like	   a	   reasonable	   assumption,	   as	   FRA	   always	   takes	  more	   time	   for	  
their	  processes	  than	  private	  actors	  due	  to	  bureaucracy.	  
	  
Q4:	   AT	  miller	   purchases:	  How	   long	   does	   it	   take	   a	  miller	   from	   the	   purchase	   decision	   to	   the	  
actual	   receipt	   of	   the	  maize	   he	   needs?	   Furthermore,	   considering	   that	   they	   can	   source	   from	  
three	   sources	   (smallholders,	   commercial	   farmers,	   FRA),	   is	   it	   okay	   to	   assume	   one	   unified	  
adjustment	  time	  for	  the	  millers’	  purchases,	  or	  are	  the	  differences	  too	  great?	  
• For	  commercial	  and	  smallholder	  farmers,	  it	  should	  only	  take	  around	  1	  week,	  while	  
for	  FRA	  it	  should	  take	  longer	  due	  to	  bureaucratic	  process,	  around	  2	  weeks.	  
	  
Coverage	  Times	  
Q5:	   CT	   miller	   grain	   storage:	   For	   how	   long	   do	   millers	   wish	   to	   cover	   their	   production	   with	  
stored	  grain?	  
• One	  month	  seems	   like	  an	  appropriate	  assumption,	  as	   it	   strikes	  a	  balance	  between	  
the	  need	  to	  have	  a	  certain	  storage	  that	  can	  guard	  against	  demand	  fluctuations,	  but	  
also	  considers	  the	  costs	  of	  storage.	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Q6:	  CT	  customer	  meal	  storage	  informal:	  How	  long	  do	  customers	  want	  to	  store	  their	  self-­‐milled	  
meal?	  Can	  I	  assume	  the	  same	  time	  for	  self-­‐milled	  and	  ready-­‐made	  bought	  meal?	  
• For	   customers	   in	   the	   formal,	   as	  well	   as	   informal	   value	   chain	   you	   can	   assume	  one	  




Q7:	   Grain	   vs.	   readymade	  meal	   demand:	   right	   now,	   I	   am	   assuming	   all	   the	   rural	   population	  
prefers	   (or	   only	   has	   access	   to)	   grain	   instead	   of	   readymade	   meal,	   and	   60%	   of	   the	   rural	  
population.	  Is	  this	  plausible?	  
• The	   vast	   majority	   of	   urban	   consumers	   prefer	   the	   commercial	   meal.	   There	   is	   a	  
general	  shift	   towards	  processed	  food.	   I	  would	  estimate	  that	  only	  15-­‐30%	  of	  urban	  
population	  prefers	  to	  buy	  grain	  instead	  of	  roller	  meal.	  Furthermore,	  there	  is	  simply	  
often	  no	  supply	  with	  roller	  meal	  in	  rural	  areas.	  
• In	   rural	   areas,	   more	   or	   less	   everyone	   prefers	   to	   buy	   grain	   and	   bring	   it	   to	   the	  
hammer	  mill	  herself.	  Only	  a	  small	  class	  of	  wealthy	  people,	  mostly	  civil	  servants	  that	  
often	  journey	  to	  the	  city	  prefer	  and	  have	  access	  to	  roller	  meal,	  I	  would	  estimate	  that	  
they	  only	  account	  for	  5%	  of	  the	  rural	  population.	  	  
	  
Q8:	  Price	  grain-­‐to-­‐meal	  relation	  feedback:	  I	  assume	  that	  people	  who	  purchase	  grain	  have	  very	  
limited	   budgets,	   so	   that	   they	   cannot	   spend	  more	   on	   meal,	   thus	   their	   effective	   purchase	   of	  
maize	  falls	  by	  the	  ratio	  that	  meal	  is	  more	  expensive	  than	  grain.	  What	  do	  you	  think	  about	  this	  
assumption?	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• I	   think	   there	   are	   two	   trends:	   people	   try	   to	   reduce	   their	   per	   capita	   consumption	  
when	  they	  switch	  to	  the	  more	  expensive	  commercial	  roller	  meal,	  but	  they	  also	  try	  to	  
allocate	  more	  money	  to	  their	  maize	  budget	  to	  make	  up	  for	  the	  higher	  price.	  
• Furthermore,	  maize	   is	   a	   priority	   in	   their	   spending,	   so	   that	   they	  would	   rather	   cut	  
other	   expenses	   or	   sell	   assets	   rather	   than	   reducing	   their	   consumption	   below	   a	  
certain	  level	  where	  they	  would	  start	  being	  hungry.	  
• I	   would	   estimate	   that	   those	   consumers	   who	   have	   to	   change	   from	   grain	   to	  
commercially	  made	  meal	  stretch	  the	  amount	  of	  maize	  they	  would	  normally	  consume	  
in	  4	  weeks	  to	  5	  weeks’	  consumption.	  	  
Q9:	  Feedback	  from	  grain	  availability	  to	  grain	  demand:	  do	  you	  agree	  that	  people	  progressively	  
lower	  their	  demand	  towards	  the	  minimum,	  as	  grain	  gets	  scarcer?	  
• Yes,	  I	  agree	  with	  that	  idea.	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  certain	  minimum	  daily	  consumption	  
that	  people	  would	  do	  almost	  anything	  to	  not	  fall	  below.	  	  
	  
FRA	  structure	  
Q10:	  Is	  the	  assumption	  about	  the	  cascade	  of	  maize	  storage	  suitable?	  (I.e.	  that	  FRA	  first	  buys	  
maize	  in	  the	  slabs,	  then	  transports	  it	  to	  silos,	  fills	  these	  up	  until	  they	  are	  full	  and	  then	  fills	  up	  
the	  sheds.	  Only	  when	  these	  are	  also	  full,	  they	  leave	  maize	  in	  the	  slabs)	  
• Yes,	  this	  assumption	  is	  plausible.	  
	  
Q11:	  AT	  moving	  FRA	  maize	  to	  built	   facilities:	  how	  long	  does	  it	  take	  to	  move	  maize	  from	  the	  
collection	  points	  (very	  basic	  open	  sheds	  or	  just	  slabs,	  I	  assume)	  to	  the	  silos	  or	  more	  elaborate	  
sheds?	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• Moving	  maize	  from	  the	  slabs	  to	  the	  permanent	  storage	  (sheds	  or	  silos)	  should	  not	  
take	   more	   than	   3	   days,	   as	   FRA	   has	   contractors	   doing	   that	   for	   them	   so	   that	   we	  
assume	  the	  following	  distribution:	  1	  day	  for	  getting	  the	  maize	  from	  the	  slab,	  1	  days	  
for	  transporting	  it	  and	  1	  day	  for	  offloading	  it	  to	  the	  permanent	  depot. 
	  
Q12:	  FRA	  Selling	  season:	  Does	  FRA	  only	  sell	  in	  a	  certain	  season,	  or	  can	  millers	  buy	  from	  them	  
throughout	  the	  year?	  
• Sales	  can	  happen	  any	  time	  throughout	  the	  year.	  
• When	   FRA	   gets	   indications	   from	   the	   CFS	   that	   the	   next	   harvest	  will	   be	   good,	   they	  




Q13:	   Commercial	   farmers	   export	   switch:	   does	   the	   logic	   behind	   switch	   the	   structure	   make	  
sense?	  
• It	  seems	  plausible.	  After	  the	  main	  harvest	  comes	  in,	  the	  government	  becomes	  willing	  
to	   lift	   the	   export	   ban	   when	   they	   see	   that	   enough	   smallholder	   harvest	   was	   good	  
enough	  to	  sustain	  domestic	  demand.	  
	  
Q14:	  Non-­‐FRA	  smallholder	  sales	  switch:	  does	  the	  logic	  behind	  this	  structure	  largely	  conform	  
to	  reality?	  
• Non-­‐FRA	  smallholder	  sales	  channels	  are	  in	  principal	  open	  all	  the	  time,	  but	  farmers	  
are	  strategic	  and	  reserve	   their	  stocks	  so	   that	   they	  can	  sell	   to	  FRA	   later,	   since	   they	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want	   to	   profit	   from	   their	   higher	   prices.	   The	   structure	   thus	   seems	   plausible	   as	   it	  
represents	  the	  smallholder	  farmers’	  strategic	  sales	  behaviour.	  
	  
Other	  Concerns	  
Q15:	   I	  am	  assuming	   that	  millers	  prefer	   to	  buy	   from	  commercial	   farmers,	   then	   smallholders	  
(although	  this	  never	  really	  conflicts	  due	  to	  seasonality),	  and	  as	  a	  last	  resort	  from	  FRA.	  Is	  this	  
plausible?	  
• This	  seems	  reasonable,	  as	  it	  reflects	  that	  millers	  usually	  prefer	  to	  buy	  from	  farmers	  
because	  they	  sell	  faster	  and	  often	  at	  lower	  prices.	  
	  
Q16:	   I	   am	   assuming	   that	   commercial	   farmers	   do	   not	   engage	   in	   any	   meaningful	   “green	  
harvest”,	  is	  that	  plausible?	  
• This	  assumption	  seems	  plausible.	  
	  
Q17:	  Is	  milling	  capacity	  ever	  a	  problem	  for	  commercial	  millers?	  I.e.	  has	  it	  ever	  occurred	  that	  
they	   cannot	   satisfy	   the	   demand	   of	   their	   customers?	   Currently,	   demand	   goes	   as	   high	   as	   ca.	  
100.000	  mt/month	  in	  milling,	  and	  I	  assume	  they	  can	  always	  satisfy	  it.	  Is	  that	  plausible?	  
• Commercial	  millers	  have	  never	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  bottleneck	  in	  the	  production	  system.	  
100.000	  MT	   per	   month	   seems	   to	   be	   well	   possible.	   The	   assumption	   thus	   appears	  
reasonable.	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Q18:	   Have	   any	   other	   bottlenecks	   in	   the	   maize	   distribution	   system	   been	   observed	   (e.g.	   in	  
retailing,	  hammer	  milling,	  storage	  of	  any	  actor)?	  If	  yes,	  what	  is	  their	  nature?	  
• I	  have	  not	  observed	  any	  bottleneck	  in	  the	  maize	  marketing	  system	  that	  has	  not	  yet	  
been	  represented	  in	  the	  model	  so	  far.	  
